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(VOL 11) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  
Request for Discovery Disclosure; Alibi Demand (June 11. 2007) . . (VOL I) . 
Request for Jury Instructions (November 15.2007) . . .  (VOL 11) . . . . . . . . . . . . .  
Response to Request for Discovery (April 17.2007) . . .  (VOL I) . . . . . . . . . . .  
Response to State's Request for Discovery and Alibi Disclosure 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  (March 28.2008) . . .  (VOL 11) 
. . . . . . . . . . . .  Return of Warrant of Arrest (April 2.2007) . . .  (VOL I) 
Scheduling Order (June 15.2007) . . .  (VOL I) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  
Scheduling Order Regarding Sentencing (June 12.2008) . . .  (VOL 11) . . . . . . .  
Second Scheduling Order (October 15.2007) . . .  (VOL I) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  
Second Supplemental Response to Request for Discovery (March 28. 2008) 
(VOL 11) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  
Sentencing Enhancement (April 9.2008) . . .  (VOL 11) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  
Stipulation to Continue (April 12.2007) . . .  (VOL I) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  
Stipulation to Continue (October 26.2007) . . .  (VOL I). 
Supplement to Brief in Support of Motion to Suppress (August 3. 2007) 
(VOL I) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  
Supplemental Response to Request for Discovery (February 12. 2008) 
(VOL 11) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  
Third Scheduling Order (February 27.2008) . . .  (VOL 11) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  
Verdict (April 9.2008) . . .  (VOL 11) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  
. . . . . . . . . . .  . . .  Verdict for Sentencing Enhancement (April 9. 2008) (VOL 11) 
Date: 8/21/2008 Seco. Judicial District Court - Latah County 
Time: l2:33 PM ROA Report 
Page 1 of 8 Case: CR-2007-0001292 Current Judge: John R. Stegner 
Defendant: Mantz, Tim Carl 
State of Idaho vs T I ~  Carl Mantz 
Date Code User 






























411 312007 NCOC ELLEN 
ELLEN 
411 712007 VlCT ELLEN 
RESP ELLEN 
4/20/2007 NCOS ELLEN 
4/25/2007 SUER ELLEN 
5/23/2007 SUBR ELLEN 




New Case Filed William C. Hamlett 
Prosecutor assigned William W. Thompson Jr. William C. Hamlett 
INITIAL DETERMINATION OF PROBABLE William C. Hamlett 
CAUSE 
Criminal Complaint William C. Hamlett 
Warrant Issued -Arrest Bond amount: 15000.00 William C. Hamlett 
Defendant: Mantz, Tim Carl 
Warrant Returned Defendant: Mantz, Tim Carl William C. Hamlett 
NO CONTACT ORDER - EXPIRES 4/13/07 William C. Hamlett 
Hearing Scheduled (Preliminary 04/13/2007 William C. Hamlett 
09:30 AM) 
Notice Of Hearing William C. Hamlett 
Defendant: Mantz, Tim Carl Appearance John C. William C. Hamlett 
Judge 
Court Minutes William C. Hamlett 
Interim Hearing Held 
Initial Appearance 
William C. Hamlett 
William C. Hamlett 
Commitment - Held To Answer William C. Hamlett 
Bond Posted - Surety (Amount 3000.00 ) William C. Hamlett 
Notice Of Appearance William C. Hamlett 
Request For Discovery William C. Hamlett 
Stipulation to Continue William C. Hamlett. 
Order Vacating and Continuing Preliminary William C. Hamlett 
Hearing 
Hearing result for Preliminary held on 04/13/2007 .William C. Hamlett 
09:30 AM: Hearing Vacated 
Hearing Scheduled (Preliminary 06/07/2007 William C. Hamlett 
10:OO AM) 
No Contact Order - Expires 6/7/2007 William C. Hamlett 
Miscellaneous Payment: Personal Copy Fee Paid William C. Hamlett 
by: x- for three CDS Receipt number: 0145176 
Dated: 411 312007 Amount: $15.00 (Cash) 
Victims Rights William C. Hamlett 
Response To Request For Discoverylplaintiff William C. Hamlett 
No Contact Order Returned After Service William C. Hamlett 
Subpoena Returned - Lisher, Tamye William C. Hamlett 
Subpoena Returned - McGreal, Dana William C. Hamlett 
Hearing result for Preliminary held on 06/07/2007 Randall W. Robinson .. 
10:OO AM: Bound Over (after Prelim) :. 
Hearing Scheduled (Arraignment 06/11/2007 John R. Stegner 
01:30 PM) 
RANAE Notice Of Hearing John R. Stegner 000 6 
User: RANAE Date: 8/21/2008 Seco, .Judicial District Court - Latah County 
Time: 12:33 PM ROA Report 
Page 2 of 8 Case: CR-2007-0001292 Current Judge: John R. Stegner 
Defendant: Mantz, Tim Carl 
s. Tim Carl Mantz 
Judge 
6/7/2007 NCTO MAGGIE NO CONTACT ORDER - EXPIRES 6-1 1-07 John R. Stegner 
NOAJ 
OBOV 
























7/30/2007 MOTN SUE 
BREF SUE 
8/3/2007 BREF ELLEN 
MOTN ELLEN 
8/7/2007 MOTN ELLEN 
811 312007 MOTN 









911 112007 ORDR 















Notice Of Assignment Of Judge John R. Stegner 
Order Binding Over Defendant JohnR. Stegner 
Criminal Information John R. Stegner 
Request For Discovery Disclosure; Alibi Demand John R. Stegner 
Hearing result for Arraignment held on John R. Stegner 
0611 112007 01:30 PM: Arraignment I First 
Appearance 
Appear & Plead Not Guilty John R. Stegner 
Court Minutes John R. Stegner 
Hearing Scheduled (Jury Trial 10/29/2007 09:OO John R. Stegner 
AM) Estimated 4 days on a 9-4 schedule 
Hearing Scheduled (Pretrial Conference John R. Stegner 
09/21/2007 04:OO AM) 
No Contact Order Returned After Service John R. Stegner 
Jury Trial Scheduled John R. Stegner 
Scheduling Order John R. Stegner 
Preliminary Hearing Transcript John R. Stegner 
Motions to Suppress, to Exclude Evidence and t6 John R. Stegner 
Dismiss 
Brief in Support of Motion to Suppress John R. Stegner 
SUPPLEMENT to Brief in Support of Motion to John R. Stegner 
Suppress 
Motion to Supplement Pretrial Motions John R. Stegner 
Motion to Correct Clerical Errors in Pretrial John R. Stegner 
Motions, Briefs, and Subsequent Supplements 
Motion for Extension of Time John R. Stegner 
Order for Extention of Time John R. Stegner 
Motion for Extension of Time John R. Stegner 
Order for Extension of Time 
Motion for Extension of Time 
Order for Extension of Time 
John R. Stegner 
John R. Stegner 
John R. Stegner 
Brief in Opposition to Defendant's Motions to John R. Stegner 
SUppress, Exclude Evidence, and Dismiss 
Motion for Extension of Time John R. Stegner 
Order for Extension of Time - Sept 11, 5pm John R. Stegner 
Motion for Extension of Time 
Order for Extension of Time 
John R Stegner 
John R Stegner 
Subpoena Returned - Katus, Jarod John R ~tegner' 
.., ~ 
Subpoena Returned - McGreal, Patrick John R. Stegner 
0007 
Date: 8/21/2008 S e c ~  J Judicial District Court - Latah County User: RANAE 
Time: ?2:33 PM ROA Report 
ase. CR-2007-0001292 Current Judge John R Stegner 
Defendant Mantz, Tim Carl 
s Tim Carl Man 
Date Code User Judge 
9/14/2007 SUBR ELLEN Subpoena Returned - Vietmeier, Ron John R. Stegner 
BREF ELLEN Defendant's Reply Brief in Support of Motion to John R. Stegner 
Supress 
911 8/2007 SUBR ELLEN Subpoena Returned - Lisher, Tamye John R. Stegner 
911 9/2007 SUBR ELLEN Subpoena Returned -Carpenter, Damon John R. Stegner 
9/21/2007 SUBR ELLEN Subpoena Returned -Smith, Carl John R. Stegner 
HRHD TERRY Hearing result for Pretrial Conference held on John R. Stegner 
09/21/2007 04:OO PM: Hearing Held 
HRSC TERRY Hearing Scheduled (Pretrial Motion Hearing John R. Stegner 
1011 012007 09:30 AM) 
9/25/2007 SUBR ELLEN Subpoena Returned - Hoidal, Brian John R. Stegner 
SUBR ELLEN Subpoena Returned - McGreal, Dana Sue John R. Stegner 
SUBR ELLEN Subpoena Returned - Merrell, Cody John R. Stegner 
9/26/2007 SUBR ELLEN Subpoena Returned -Hoicial, Karl John R. Stegner 
SUBR ELLEN Subpoena Returned - Pollock, Brennen John R. Stegner 
10/9/2007 MOTN ELLEN Motions in Limine John R. Stegner 
MEMO ELLEN Memoran'dum in Support of Motion in Limine Re: John R. Stegner 
Admisssion of Preliminary Hearing Testimony of 
Victim. 
1011 012007 INHD TERRY Interim Hearing Held John R. Stegner 
CTMN TERRY Court Minutes John R. Stegner 
CONT TERRY Continued (Pretrial Motion Hearing 10/17/2007 John R. Stegner 
01:OO PM) 
CONT TERRY Continued (Jury Trial 11/26/2007 09:OO AM) John R. Stegner 
Estimated 4 days on a 9-4 schedule 
HRSC TERRY Hearing Scheduled (Motion in Limine John R. Stegner 
10/29/2007 04:30 PM) to be followed by a pretrial 
conference at which the defendant is to be in 
attendance 
SECOND Scheduling Order John R. Stegner 
Hearing result for Pretrial Motion Hearing.held on John R. Stegner 
10/17/2007 01:00 PM: Interim Hearing Held 
Motion to Suppress 
ELLEN 
TERRY 














Hearing result for Pretrial Motion Hearing held on John R. Stegner 
10/17/2007 01:OO PM: Court Minutes Motion to 
Suppress (,' .*. 
Order Denying Defendant's Motions to Supress ' ~ o h d R .  Stegner 
and Exclude Evidence 
Notice Of Hearing John R. Stegner 
DEFENDANT'S Motions in Limine John R. Stegner 
Brief in Opposition to State's Motions in Limine John R. Stegner 
Motion in Limine and Notice of I.R.E. 404(b) John R. Stegner 
Evidence 
Date: 8/21/2008 Seco Judicial District Court - Latah County User: RANAE 
ROA Report 
Case: CR-2007-0001292 Current Judge: John R. Stegner 
Defendant: Mantz, Tim Carl 
State of Idaho vs. Tim Cari Mantz 
Date Code User 





















1 1/6/2007 SUBR ELLEN 
1 1 /8/2007 SUBR ELLEN 
SUBR ELLEN 
SUBR ELLEN 




Continued (Motion in Limine 11/01/2007 02:OO John R. Stegner 
PM) to be followed by a pretrial conference at 
which the defendant is to be in attendance 
Subpoena Returned - Hoidal, Juli John R. Stegner 
Subpoena Returned - Hoidal, Brian John R. Stegner 
Stipulation to Continue John R. Stegner 
Subpoena Returned - Pollock, Brennan John R. Stegner 
Subpoena Returned - Carpenter, Damon John R. Stegner 
Subpoena Returned - Vietmeier, Ron John R. Stegner 
Order Continuing John R. Stegner 
Brief in Opposition to State's Motion in Limine John R. Stegner 
And Notice of I.R.E. 404(b) Evidence 
Subpoena Returned - Katus, Jarod John R. Stegner 
Hearing result for Motion in Limine held on John R. Stegner 
11/01/2007 02:OO PM: Interim Hearing Held to 
be followed by a pretrial conference at which the 
defendant is to be in attendance 
Hearing result for Motion in Limine held on John R. Stegner 
11/01/2007 02:OO PM: Court Minutes to be 
followed by a pretrial conference at which the 
defendant is to be in attendance 
No Contact Order filed on return John R. Stegner 
Subpoena Returned - Larson, Kayla John R. Stegner 
Subpoena Returned - McGreal, Dana John R. ~tegner  
Subpoena Returned- Smith- Taylor John R. Stegner 
Subpoena Returned - McGreal, Kent John R. Stegner 
Notice of Substitution of Counsel John R. Stegner 
Motion to Vacate & Reset Trial John R. Stegner 
Defendant: Mantz, Tim Carl Appearance Thomas John R. Stegner 
W. Whitney 
11/13/2007 HRSC TERRY Hearing Scheduled (Mot~on to Contlnue John R Stegner 
11/15/2007 02 30 PM) 
11/14/2007 NTHR ELLEN Notice Of Hearing John R Stegner 
11/1 512007 MlSC ELLEN Request for Jury Instructions John R. Stegner 
INHD TERRY Hearing result for Motion to Continue held on John R. Stegner 
11/15/2007 02:30 PM: Interim Hearing Held 
CTMN TERRY Hearing result for Motion to Continue held on John R. Stegner 
1111 512007 0230 PM: Court Minutes 
CONT TERRY Continued (Jury Trial 03/31/2008 09:OO AM) John R. Stegner 
Estimated 4 days on a 9-4 schedule 
11/16/2007 SUBR ELLEN Subpoena Returned - Lisher, Tamye John R. Stegner 
ORDR JAN no contact order: Order EXPIRES 4/4/2008 John R, Stegner 
ORDR TERRY No Contact Order on Return John R. Stegner 0.0 0 CJ
Date 8/21/2008 Seco, Judicial District Court - Latah County .User: RANAE 
Time 12 33 PM ROA Report 
Page 5 of 8 Case CR-2007-0001292 Current Judge John R Stegner 
Defendant Mantz, Tim Carl 
State of Idaho vs. Tim Carl Mantz 
Date Code User Judge 
11/19/2007 SUBR ELLEN RECALLED Subpoena Returned - Merrell, Cody John R. Stegner 
11/21/2007 ORDR ELLEN Order Vacat~ng and Resetting Jury Trial John R Stegner 
11/3012007 ORDR ELLEN Order John R Stegner 
2/6/2008 REQU SUE Request for Discovery Disclosure, Alibi Demand John R. Stegner 
211 2/2008 RESP ELLEN Supplemental Response to Request for Discovery John R. Stegner 
211 912008 SUBR ELLEN Subpoena Returned - Hoidal, Brian John R. Stegner 
2/21/2008 SUBR ELLEN Subpoena Returned - Vietmeier, Ron John R. Stegner 
2/22/2008 SUBR ELLEN Subpoena Returned - Carpenter, Damon John R. Stegner 
SUBR ELLEN Subpoena Returned - McGreal, Kent John R. Stegner 
2/26/2008 SUBR ELLEN Subpoena Returned -Lisher, Tamye John R. Stegner 
SUBR ELLEN Subpoena Returned - McGreal, Dana John R. Stegner 
2/27/2008 CONT TERRY Continued (Jury Trial 04/01/2008 09 00 AM) John R. Stegner 
Estimated 4 days on a 9-4 schedule 
ORDR TERRY Third Scheduling Order John R. Stegner 
2/29/2008 SUBR MAGGIE Subpoena Returned John R Stegner 
311 212008 SUER MAGGIE Subpoena Returned John R Stegner 
312012008 SUBR ELLEN Subpoena Returned - Jacobson, Stuart John R Stegner 
3/24/2008 SUBR ELLEN Subpoena Returned - Katus, Jarod John R. Stegner 
SUBR ELLEN Subpoena Returned - SMith, Taylor John R. Stegner 
3/25/2008 SUBR ELLEN Subpoena Returned -Fork, Carl John R. Stegner 
3/28/2008 RESD ELLEN Response to State's Request for Discovery and John R. Stegner 
Alibi Disclosure 
SUBR ELLEN Subpoena Returned - Larson, Kayla John R. Stegner 
SUBR ELLEN Subpoena Returned- Hash, Dallas John R. Stegner 
RESP ELLEN Second Supplemental Response To Request For John R. Stegner 
Discovery 
4/1/2008 SUBR ELLEN Subpoena Returned -Workman, Zachary John R. Stegner 
JTST TERRY Hearing result for Jury Trial held on 04/01/2008 John R. Stegner 
09:OO AM: Jury Trial Started Estimated 4 days 
on a 9-4 schedule 
CTMN TERRY Hearing result for Jury Trial held on 04/01/2008 John R. SYegner 
09:OO AM: Court Minutes Estimated 4 days on a 
9-4 schedule 
4/2/2008 INHD TERRY Second day of Jury Trial John R. Stegner 
CTMN TERRY Court Minutes John R. Stegner 
4/3/2008 ORDR JAN no contact order: Order EXPIRES 411 1/08 John R. Stegner 
SUBR ELLEN Subpoena Returned - Vietmeier, Ron John R. Stegner 
CTMN TERRY Court Minutes John R. Stegner , . . 
INHD TERRY Third day of trial John R. Stegner 
4/4/2008 SUBR ELLEN Subpoena Returned - Neelon, Mike John R. Stegner 00 10 
Date: 8/21/2008 Seco .  Judicial District Court - Latah County 
Time: 12:33 PM ROA Report 
Page 6 of 8 Case: CR-2007-0001292 Current Judge: John R. Stegner 
Defendant: Mantz, Tim Carl 




































































Subpoena Returned -Waters, Jay John R. Stegner 
Subpoena Returned -NOT FOUND - Johnson, John R. Stegner 
Darren 
Fourth day of trail John R. Stegner 
Court Minutes John R. Stegner 
D-Requested J u j  lnstructions 
Day five of jury trial 
Court Minutes 
John R. Stegner 
John R. Stegner 
John R. Stegner 
Jury Instructions Given at Trial John R. Stegner 
No Contact Order Returned ARer Service John R. Stegner 
Verdict John R. Stegner 
Bond Posted - Surety (Amount 47000.00 ) John R. Stegner 
Found Guilty After Trial John R. Stegner 
Court Minutes 
Verdict 
John R. Stegner 
John R. Stegner 
Jury Instructions John R. Stegner 
Verdict For Sentencing Enhancement John R. Stegner 
Hearing Scheduled (Sentencing 06/10/2008 Jehn R. Stegner 
04:OO PM) 
No Contact Order filed on Return -expiration date John R. Stegner 
June 10,2008 
Subpoena Returned - Davis, William (faxed John R. Stegner 
4/8/2008) 
Miscellaneous Payment: CD Copy Fee Paid by: John R. Stegner 
Lee Carrick Receipt number: 0155069 Dated: 
4/15/2008 Amount: $5.00 (Cash) 
Pre-sentence Report John R. Stegner 
Motion to rebut PSR: Mtn to reset sent John R. Stegner 
additions to PSI John R. Stegner 
additions to psi 
Interim Hearing Held 
John R. Stegner 
John R. Stegner 
Court Minutes John R. Stegner 
No Contact Order Issued John R. Stegner 
Hearing Scheduled (Motion 06/17/2008 04:OO John R. Stegner 
PM) any and all motions to strike 
Continued (Sentencing 06/19/2008 02:OO PM) John R. Stegner 
No Contact Order Returned After Service John R. Stegner . . 
Motion to Strike Portions of the Presentence John R. Stegner 
Report; Rebuttal to Presentence Report 
Scheduling Order John R. Stegner 
0064. 
Date: 812112008 Seco,. Judicial District Court - Latah County 
Time: 12:33 PM ROAReport 
Page 7 of 8 Case: CR-2007-0001292 Current Judge: John R. Stegner 
Defendant: Mantz, Tim car1 
State of Idaho vs. Tim Carl Mantz 
Date Code User 
611 312008 MlSC MAGGIE 
611 612008 MlSC JAN 




611 812008 MlSC MAGGIE 







6/20/2008 FJDE MAUREEN 
6/23/2008 MlSC MAGGIE 
7/1/2008 JDCN MAGGIE 
7/3/2008 MlSC MAGGIE 
711 612008 MAUREEN 
7/21/2008 NCTO JEANETTE 








John R. Stegner additional letters to PSI 
ADDITIONAL LETTER TO PSI John R. Stegner 
Hearing result for Motion held on 06/17/2008 John R. Stegner 
04:00 PM: Interim Hearing Held any and all 
motions to strike 
Hearing result for Motion held on 06/17/2008 John R. Stegner 
04:OO PM: Court Minutes any and all motions to 
strike 
Subpoena Returned John R. Stegner 
Subpoena Returned John R. Stegner 
additional letter to PSI John R. Stegner 
Hearing result for Sentencing held on 06/19/2008 John R. Stegner 
02:OO PM: Hearing Held 
Court Minutes John R. Stegner 
Sentenced To Fine And Incarceration John R. Stegner 
Order for DNA Sample and Thumbprint John R. Stegner 
Impression 
Sentenced To Incarceration (118-905 John R. Stegner 
Assault-aggravated) Confinement terms: Jail: 5 
years. Penitentiary determinate: 2 years. 
Penitentiary indeteiminate: 3 years. 
Sentenced To Incarceration (119-2520 John R. Stegner 
Enhancement-use Of Deadly Weapon Comm Of 
Felony) Confinement terms: Jail: 5 years. 
Penitentiary indeterminate: 5 years. 
Subpoena ~eturned -Mays John R. Stegner 
Final Judgement, Order Or Decree Entered John R. Stegner 
letters to be attached to psi John R. Stegner 
Judgment Of Conviction John R. Stegner 
objectin to portion of defendant' rebuttal to psi John R. Stegner 
being included in psi 
Miscellaneous Payment: CD Copy Fee Paid by: John R. Stegner 
Mantz, Tim Carl Receipt number: 0157656 
Dated: 711 612008 Amount: $1 O.OO(Cash) 
NO CONTACT ORDER - EXPIRES 6-19-2018 John R. Stegner 
Notice Of Appeal John R. Stegner 
Appealed To The Supreme Court John R. Stegner 
Surety Bond Exonerated (Amount 3,000.00) John R. Stegner 
Surety Bond Exonerated (Amount 47,000.00) John R. Stegner 
, . 
Bond Posted - Cash (Receipt 157819 Dated John R. Stegner 
7/25/2008 for 100.00) estimated clerk's record 
Bond Posted - Cash (Receipt 157820 Dated John R. Stegner 
7/25/2008 for 200.00) estimated transcript fee 
Date: 812112008 Seco,. .. Judicial District Court - Latah County 
Time: 12:33 PM ROA Report 
Page 8 of 8 Case: CR-2007-0001292 Current Judge: John R. Stegner 
Deferidant: Mantz. Tim Carl 
User: RANAE 
State of Idaho vs. Tim Carl Mantz 
Date Code User Judge 
712512008 MlSC RANAE FAXED NOTICE OF APPEAL TO CLERK OF John R. Stegner 
THE SUPREME COURT 
81412008 MlSC RANAE S.C. - Clerk's Record1Reporter3s Trans. 
Suspended 
John R. Stegner 
81612008 MlSC RANAE S.C. - Order Conditionally Dismiss Appeal John R. Stegner 
811 212008 BNDC RANAE Bond Posted -Cash (Receipt 158389 Dated John R. Stegner 
8/12/2008 for 4643.00) 
P' 
IN DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL D I S T ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ T H E - - . - . - . - - .  
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF 
i.8 HAR 29 9: ob 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, 1 CASE NO. -&&d2r I. .\-.; , ,,, . . o?&:.;; 0; i;ic.m;rT Cyrzf 
1 i 1-1 LI.>I!E!~Y 
Plaintiff, 1 - ,- W O R M  CITATION BifQ .--., -. , . IJ:P(;T/ 
INITIAL. DETERMINATION OF 
PROBABLE CAUSE 
1 
Tim Carl Mantz 1 
DO 1 
Defendant 
E-Iaving exanuned the Affidavit submitted by Peace Officer R.J.Vietmeier 
along with the attached documents and Complaint against the above name defendant for the 
crime of: A ~ q a v a t e d  Assault 
IDAHO CODE (18-905) 
~t 1s bereby found that there 1s probable cause to believe the above offense bas been committed, 
and the defendant has comm~tted it. 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF LATAH 
THE STATE OF IDAI-IO, 1 CASE NO. 
1' 
Plaintiff, 1 UNJFORM CITATION NO. - 
v. 
. ~ 1 > AFFIDAVIT OF R.J.Vi6hneief 
1 SUPPORTING M T m  DETERMINATION 
1 OF PROBABLE CAUSE PURSUANT TO 
1 
/ 




Your AFFIANT, being first sworn, deposes and says: 
1. Your Affiant is a duly qualified peace officer serving the Latah County Sheriff 
2. Tile above defendant has been investigated for the crime of: 
A~gravated Assault 
IDAI-IO CODE (u-905) 
. . 
on w, 2007. Your Affiant requests that a Judge detennrne whether there is probable cause 
lo belleve the offense has been coinmltted and that the defendant bas comn~lted it. 
The facts upon wh~ch the Affiant rel~ed m bellevrng there is probable cause are: 
On 02/16/07, around 2015 brs, Karl Hoidal (age 18) and a group fiiends went riding on 
their ATV's along aroad most comnonly Icnown as "Flat Creek Road" near the 
intersection of Hwy 6 and 1% 9, near Harvard, Latall County, Idaho. "Flat Creelc Road" 
is an ulideveloped road that parallels Hwy 9 from about rnile post 13 to near mile post 8. 
It accesses Potlatch land and traverses through some private land. 
There are no h ~ o m  gates along the main road and it has tradionally been open to public 
access by Potlatch Corp.. The goup of friends, after entering the road from Hwy 9, near 
MP13, stopped to regroup about one lnile in. Several people, of the nearly 30 people on 
the ride, heard what sounded like two to three gun shots coming from across the Palouse 
River, near Harvard, ~daho, about one quzrter mile north of their location. The gun shots 
did not appear or sound to be directly at them. Several of the riders believed the gun shots 
may have been fired by Tim Mantz as he has been m e r e d  to have done this before. 
Some of these people felt the shots did come from the direction of Mmtz's horne. It is 
lcoown to the residents in this area that Mantz can, and has, become confrontational about 
vehicles driving along tllis road through his property. There was now concenl that it may 
be Mantz shooting tliese shots as a warning to the group. The group decided to leave the 
point they were on (visible from Harvard) and continue on in to the Harvard well pump (a 
lulown location with a structure and exterior lighting, it is about one mile further up this 
road). 
As they drove into this area, the ATV riden by ICarl Hoidal collided with another ATV 
causing his rear axle support piece to break. Hoidal decided not to continue the ride from 
.the Harvard well pump and turned around with the intention of retunling to a kiend, 
Cody Merrell's, house. He made this journey by himself, retu~ning the same way he had 
-entered, "Flat CreekRoad" is the main road into and out of this area. As he wasexiting 
the area, and was just a couple hundred yards from the highway, he encountered a vehicle 
coming into the area. 
Hoidal told me the other vehicle and his ATV scraped each other as they tried to pass on 
the ice covered road. Hoidal said there was very little damage, if any, done to the other 
vehicle or his ATV. Hoidal recogizized the vehicle as "Tim Mantz's older red hruck," and 
the ,&iver as Tim Mantz. Both drivers stopped in the roadway. Iloidal said it was dark 
along the road yet there was enough ambient light in the area to see. Hoidal said he was 
yelled at to "freeze" followed by demands of "what's your name." Hoidal told Mantz who 
he was. Hoidal. was ordered to the front of Mantz's pickup where the headlights shown. 
As Hoidal walked towards Mantz he could see what he thought was a firearm iri Mantz's 
hand which was down to his side. Hoidal looked away for a moment (to see where he was 
walling) and when he looked back up he saw Mantz standing about five feet away 
inting a handgun with his right hand, aiming directly at Eoidal's head. 
idal told me Mantz demanded to know the other ATV rider's names. I-loidal said 
.z was very angry and yelling. Hoidal told me Mantz aimed the barrel of the gun, 
h he believes was a revolver, about three feet to the right side of Iloidal's head and 
fired one shot. Hoidal believes the distance from the barrel end to his head was less than 
three feet. Boidal had looked away and did not see the muzzle flash but did feel the 
concussion of the fired round and his ears began to ring. Hoidal told me the very next 
thing Mantz said was "the next ones 'in you." Hoidal said there was no warning or threat 
made to him prior to the shot being fired, Hoidal said he was doing what he bas told to 
do which was give his name and walk to the front of the piclmp 
Hoidal said Maiztz continued demanding lo know who the other riders were. Hoidal told 
me he just started making up names and this seemed to calm Manlz down somewhat. 
Mantz became agitated again and told Hoidal, is., that he could "shoot you and put you 
in the river and nobody would lolow." Hoidal said he kept apologizing for whatever 
Mantz perceived to have been wronged for and Hoidal said to him, "please don't shoot 
me" as he was atkaid. 
E-Ioidal said Mantz seemed to calm again and then went on to lei1 him he o~tly wanted 
everyone to stop and get written pemission from him before entering his land. ARer this, 
the DNO seperated and went different directions. Hoidal tried to call the others on his cell 
phone but he was unable to get through to them due lo the limited cell coverage. He left a 
message on Cody Merrell's voice mail warning them Mantz might be still looking for 
them. (During an interview with Merrell, I was allowed access into his voice mail system 
and I made a copy of the call froin I-loidal to Merrell that was made that night. Merrell 
saved the call in case law e~lforcement had a need for it.) 
Hoidal returned to his Merrell's house on Bear Creelc Road (about seven miles by county 
road) where he called his father to come and get him. The first message was received 
Menell at midnight when they reached the end of the ride baclc at the highway near mile 
- p o s t  8. 
The family made a formal police report on 02-19-07. Hoidal was reluctant to make any 
complaints because Mantz has the local reputation for retaliation'and intimidation. 
011 02-16-07, at 2028 hrs, Tamye Lisher, who lives in the house on Hwy 9 at the entrance 
to "Flat Creelc Road," called the Sheriff's Office to report hearing a gun shot and then 
going outside where she heard angry yelling fcom just behind her home. Lisher reported 
she had just seen Tim Mantz drive up the road. "like a wild man" and then come back out 
a few minutes later and return to the Mantz Ranch outbuildings located just north of her 
home. A single ATV and rider had ridden out in front of Mantz and tuned the opposite 
way on the highway. The deputies who responded could not locate anyone in the area at 
the time. I spoke with Lisher on 02-20-07 at her home and she told me she lcnows Tim 
antz by sight and knows what vehicles he normally drives around in the area. 
n 02-22-07,I investigated the area where Hoidal said this incident occmed. Due to the 
eather and time elapsed, I did not Emd traclcs or other m d s  to pillpoiilt the exact 
location. Hoidal told me there was an old skid road that went up the side of the bank just 
from the highway. He could see this road in the headlights at the time of the incident 
at ni.ght. Ilocated this road which is about 150 yards east of the highway. It would be 
about 225 yards from Lisherls house and well within her hearing range. 
Hoidal told me he did not remember seeing any signs posted saying "No Trespassing" as 
they drove in. Menell told me he was the lead driver that night and he only saw some 
yellow signs he thought were about tree cutting boundaries or the like. I photographed 
four yellow signs which were posted on both sides of the road about 100 yards in from 
the highway. They said, "POSTED PRIVATE PROPERTY, Hunting, Fishing, Trapping, 
or Trespassing for ant purpose is strictly forbidden. Violators will be prosecuted." There 
was also a name and address bloclc which was not filled out on the first three signs. The 
last one had a legible name saying "Mantz Ranch" and phone number. The largest letters 
on the signs were 3 3/4 inclles tall. All others were 314 inch tall. Members of the group 
interviewed said no one rode off the road until they reached the railroad tracks, which is 
past any of the Mantz property. 
I am requesting a warrant rather than a sunmons for Tim Mantz's arrest based on 
previous law enforcement reports of threats, harassments, intimidations, and numerous 
reports of confrolltations dealing with this road. The Latah County Sheriffs Office has on 
file about ten reports in the last two years from citizens reporting Manlz is the suspect in 
having threatened them ibr being on 'the road, of blocking people in on the road, and of 
phone harrassment regarding illcidents on the road. Mantz has also made trespass 
complaints ofpeople generally being on 'this road. Mantz does have a previous history of 
assault and battery colnplaints starting in the 1980's to current. 
,I ~~4yy Residing in c\ / J  
My commission expires -4(?r"/ 
TERM00 Message Received From DMV 
MAY BE THE SAME AS: PAGE 01 FOR OFFICIAL INVESTIGATION PURPOSES ONLY 
OLN/JA3GO894C. PRIVACY FLAG. 
NAM/MANTZ, TIM CARL. * *  OPR STATUS/VALID. 
RES/ * *  CDL STATUS/NOT LICENSED. 
1011 VALE RD CLASS/D. **  EXP/02-17-2009. 
HARVARD ID 83834. OLT/DRIVER LICENSE. 
SEX/M. HAI/BRO. EYE/BLu. DOB . SOC/  ORGAN DONOR 
HGT/602. WGT/225. ISS . REC/290051580052. CNTY/LATA. 
AKA OLN/940110376 AKA OLS/ID 
 ID. 
CITN/OG-23-2OOOC. 06-03-200OA.BASIC RULE. SIIR . LATAH . 
ORD DEGREE/INFR. 
END OF RECORD 
END OF MESSAGE . . .  
MRI 3444381 IN: DMVIOl 4308 AT 09:36 20FEB07 
OUT: SLT2 35 AT 09:36 20FEB07 
TXT: PUR/C .ATN/DET R VIETMEIER 200700706 
SID/IDOOO51505 
- IDAHO CRIMINAL HISTORY - 
THE SUBJECT OF THIS CRIMINAL RECORD INQUIRY HAS BEEN CONVICTED OF A 
FELONY CRIME AS DEFINED BY IDAHO CODE 18-111 AND 18-111A. 
INDIVIDUAL MAY BE PROHIBITED FROM POSSESSING OR AQUIRING FIREARM OR 
AMMUNITION PURSUANT TO FEDERAL GUN CONTROL ACT OF 1968 AND IDAHO CODE 18-310. 
NAME STATE ID FBI NO 
MANTZ,TIM CARL  00051505 905476N8 
RACE SEX HE I GHT WEIGHT EYES HAIR SKIN 
W M 601 180 BLU BRO MEC 
COB POB I11 MULTI -ST 
SPOKANE, WA N 
EXTENDED INFORMATION 
DOM 
RRESTS AND DISPOSITIONS 
ARREST DATE: 11-16-1987 ORI: ID0290000 AGENCY: LATAH COUNTY SO 
CASE : 17996 
CHARGE : (F) AGGRAVATED ASSAULT COUNTS: 1 
ARREST DATE: 10-17-1986 ORI: ID0290000 AGENCY: LATAH COUNTY SO 
CASE : 17172 
CHARGE : ( F) AGGRAVATED ASSAULT COUNTS: 1 
COURT : ID029015J CASE: C232 DATE: 11-07-1986 
CHARGE : (M) EXHIBITION OF DEADLY WEAPON COUNTS: 1 
DISP/SENT: JAIL-60 DAYS. JAIL SUSPENDED-54 DAYS. PROBATION-6 MONTHS. 
COSTS-$25. 
ARREST DATE: 07-06-1979 ORI: ID0290000 AGENCY: LATAH COUNTY SO 
CASE : 11670 
CHARGE : (MI POSS OF CONTR SUBST-MARIJUANA COUNTS: 1 
ARREST DATE: 06-25-1975 ORI: ID001015C AGENCY: STATE PENITENTIARY 
CASE : 14.614 
CHARGE : (F) 1ST DEG BURG (CLEARWATER CO. ) COUNTS: 1 
COURT : ID0290155 CASE: DATE : 
CHARGE : (F) IST DEG BURG (CLEARWATER CO. ) COUNTS : 1 
DISP/SENT: JAIL-NTE 5 YEARS. 
ARREST DATE: 03-17-1975 ORI: ID0180000 AGENCY: CLEARWATER CO SHERIFF 
CASE : 5383 
CHARGE : (F) 1ST DEGREE BURGLARY COUNTS: 1 
COURT : ID029015J CASE: DATE: 04-08-1975 
CHARGE : (F) 1ST DEGREE BURGLARY COUNTS: 1 
DISP/SENT: PROBATION-3 YEARS. 
THIS RECORD MAY BE USED ONLY FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE PURPOSES AS DEFINED BY THE 
ILETS BOARD AND NCIC ADVISORY POLICY BOARD. 
0020 
EOR - END OF IDAHO CRIMINAL HISTORY - END OF RECORD 
MRI 4063056 IN: CCH 616 AT 11:28 28FEB07 
OUT: SLT8 40 AT 11:28 28FEB07 
LATAH COUNTY PROSECUTOR'S OFFICE 
WILLIAM W. THOMPSON, JR. 
PROSECUTING ATTORNEY 
Latah County Courthouse 
P.O. Box 8068 
Moscow, Idaho 83843-0568 
(208) 882-8580 EXt. 3316 
ISB No. 2613 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF LATAH 
STATE OF IDAHO, ) 
Plaintiff, ) 
) Case No. CR-2007-000/= 
V. ) 
) CRIMINAL COMPLAINT 
TIM CARL MANTZ, ) 
Defendant. ) 
) 
R.J. Vietmeier personally appeared before me this 2% day of 
March, 2007, who being sworn, complains and says; that TIM CARL 
MANTZ, in Latah County, State of Idaho, on or about the 16th day 
of February, 2007, did then and there commit a crime against the 
People of the State of Idaho, to-wit: AGGRAVATED ASSAULT, Idaho 
Code 18-901, 905, 906, a Feiony, committed as follows: 
That the Defendant, TIM CARL MANTZ, on or about the 
16th day of February, 2007, in Latah County, State of 
Idaho, did intentionally, unlawfully, and with apparent 
ability, threaten by word or act to do violence to the 
person of Karl A. Hoidal with a deadly weapon or 
instrument, to-wit: by firing a handgun approxj.mately 
three (3) feet to the right of Karl A. Hoidal's head 
and then saying "the next one's in you", which created 
a well-founded fear in Karl A. Hoidal that such 
violence was imminent. 
CRIMINAL COMPLAINT: Page -1- 
A l l  of which i s  c o n t r a r y  t o  t h e  form, f o r c e  and e f f e c t  of 
t h e  s t a t u t e s  above c i t e d ,  and a g a i n s t  t h e  peace and d r g n i t y  of 
t h e  People of t h e  S t a t e  of  Idaho, WHEREFORE complainant  REQUESTS 
a Warrant of A r r e s t  be l s s u e d  f o r  t h e  person c f :  
T I M  CARL HANTZ 
DOB:
SSN:
And t h a t  t h e  Defendant may be d e a l t  wi th  accord 
- 
Subscr ibed and 
2007. 
sworn t o  be fo re  
CRIMINAL COMPLAINT: Page -2- 
u 
me t h i s  4 day of March, 
Randall W .  Robinson 
MAGISTRATE 
.( 
OFFICE OF ,THEBmW+.  
P.O. Box 8068, Moscow, ,28&a&?%452 t~ 8: Q5 
PHONE (208) 882-2216 FAX (208) 883-2281 
, -y., , , . . \. cLkc& ut B ~ ; $ ~ ~ I  xmr 
SHERIFF'S RETURN OF 
. . 
. . . .  
State of Idaho ' ) . 
County of Latah ) Case # -0 LL?< 
Plaintiff: State of Idaho 
vs . 
.A . . 
Defendent: 1 h? . .. 
, . 





------------ Detention Order 
7' 29 -a- on, d+- (date), and thatit was'served by the Sheriff's Deputy who has 
signed this service, within the county of Latah, State of idaho, by delivering to and leaving 
with: 
a m  o p e r s o n s e r v e :  C . M ,Q f i 4 ~  . , 
ma AL Personally at: . .. 
And that helshe is the iisted respondent of this service. 
/ 3397 At: hours oil (date) @ 05 /a ,k)? 
Initials 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF LATAH 





) Case No. CR-2007-000 @?A 
) 
) WARRANT OF ARREST 
) 
To any Sheriff, Constable, Marshal or Policeman of said 
State, or County of Latah, Greetings: 
A complaj.nt on oath being laid before me charging that the 
crime of AGGRAVATED ASSAULT, Idaho Code 18-901, 905, 906, a 
Felony, has been committed, and accusing TIM CARL MANTZ thereof, 
and a finding of probable cause having been made; 
YOU ARE THEREFORE COMMANDED forthwith to arrest the above 
named TIM CARL MANTZ day or night, and bring that person before 
me at the Latah County Courthouse at Moscow, in said Latah 
County, or in the case of my absence or inability to act, before 
the nearest and most accessible Maaistrate in this County. Bond 
is set in the amount of $/KQ@c;~ 
- 
ISSUED AT MOSCOW CITY, LATAH COUNTY, IDAHO, BY MY HAND THIS 
%?&DAY OF MARCH, 2007, AT ?;o 3. d @. M. 
gw.lt, w 
~Sndall W. Robinson 
Magistrate 
OFFICER'S =TURN 
STATE OF IDAHO ) 
) ss.  
County of ) 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that the within Warrant of Arrest came to hand on the 
- day of , and that I executed the same by arresting 




WARRANT OF ARREST 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF LATAH %\------------------------ ------------ ; ---  ...................... ..................................................... z&, % \=Js 
Title of Action '-- ..a r-s-+ Judge \,? - - C AS, cahV&o".;?. 
-.,. Type oiHearing ~ ~ ~ ~ L ~ ~ T  ----- +a_% h ,%_& \ C 
\ 
Attorney-for.. P ..Tape .No .7&/ .& OQ\- qa 
LLa-7- i%.Q,\ 
Case No. j$ Attorney for D CK.. a""'\- \L& 0 
Others Present Date %-L-~L 
Time cv,~--j 
BE IT KNOWN THAT THE FOLLOWING PROCEEDINGS WERE HAD, TO WIT: 
38 
I N  T E E  D I S T R I C T  COURT OF W E  SECOND 
L 
OF THE STATE O F  IDAT30, I N  AND FOR THE 
STATE OF 'IDAHO, ) 
vs . ) COMMITMENT 
THE STATE OF I D ~ O  TO THE SHERIFF OF THE COUNTY'OF 'UTAH: 
A n  order having been m a d e  b 
held t o  a n s w e r  upon a charge of 
c o m m i t t e d  on o r  about the  & 
the  County of L a t a h ,  . S t a t e  of Idaho: 
YO3 ARZ C V i v D E D  t o  receive h i m  into your custody and detain 
h i m  u n t i l  he is  legally discharged. 
~ a t e d '  t h i s  & ' A d a y  of' 
t 6 
L-R'h?.. ' -7 2 0 . 2 2 2 L -  
'1 
b u  
MAGISTRATE JUDGE 
*Q 
BOND * % c?%h 
A P P E W C E  DATE ~-Y%--OT 
TIME  SO ?%,k\ 
MAGISTRATE COURT TO SERVE DAYS J A I L  
D I S T R I C T  COURT CREDIT FOR DAYS SERVED 
PRE-TRIAL CONFERENCE :.iAY ZAEGU EAYS GOOD TI:-=i: 
CASE NO. 
IN THE DISTRIF,COUF$T OF TYE ECQND JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF I ~ H ~ I N  A ~ D  i=d&~t lcouNTY OF LATAH COUNTY 
STATE OF IDAHO, Plaintiff 
vs. TIM CARL MANTZ ORDER 
Defendant ~ f f .  07101104 
DOB SSN: V 
The Defendant has been characd with or convicted of violatinq ldaho Code Scction(s): 
: 78-95: Assa~ i .' '8-903 Ba!:aly KIU-905 Aggravated Assa~ I .' 18.997 Acgavated Eariey 
18-909 Assauit with Intent to Commlt Felony '0 18-911 Battery with Intent to Commit Felony 
u 18-913 Felonious Administering of Drug 0 18-915 Assauit or Battery upon Ceriain Personnel 
0 18-918 Domestic Assault or Battery o 18-919 Sexual Exploitation by Medical Provider 
18-6710 Use of Telephone - Lewd/Profane D 18-671 1 Use of Telephone - False Statements 
18-7905 Stalkina (1 st ") 0 18-7906 Staiking (2nd O )  39-6312 Violation of a Protection Order - .  
O Other: 
against the ALLEGED VICTIM, KARL A. HOIDAL, AND HIS PARENTS, JULl HOIDAL AND BRIAN 
HOIDAL. 
THE COURT, having jurisdiction, and having provided the Defendant with notice of his 
opportunity to be heard, either previously or herein, ORDERS THE DEFENDANT TO HAVE NO 
DIRECT OR INDIRECT CONTACT WITH THE ALLEGED VICTIM, unless through an a t t o r n e ~  You 
may not harass, follow, contact, attempt to  contact, communicate with (in any form or by any 
means including another person), or knowingly go or remain within # feet of  the alleged 
victim's person, property, residence, workplace or school. This order is  issued under ldaho Code 
18-920, ldaho Criminal Rule 46.2 and Administrative Order 2004 - 2. 
NOTICE OF RIGHT TO A HEARING: You have the right to a hearing before a Judge on the 
continuation of this Order within a reasonable time of its issuance. To request that hearing, and 
TO AVOID GIVING UP THlS RIGHT you must contact the Clerk of Court, Latah County Courthouse, 
522 S. Adams, Moscow ID 83843,208-883-2255. 
VIOLATION OF THlS ORDER IS A SEPARATE CRIME UNDER ldaho Code 18-920 for which bail will 
be set by a judge; it is subject to a penalty of  up to one year in jail and up to  a $1,000 fine. 
ORDER CAN ONLY BE MODIFIED BY A JUDGE AND WILL REMAIN IN EFFECT UNTIL 11:59 P.M. 
ON A-fi,, / JOQ7 ,OR UNTIL THlS CASE IS DISMISSED. 
The Clerk o f  the Court shaii give written notification to the records department o i  ihe sheriif's 
office in  the county of issuance IMMEDIATELY and this order shall be entered into the ldaho Law 
Enforcement Telecommunications System. 
2 dl2 .e/l 2807 
Dqte of Order 
y-2.-97 
Date of Service 
3- 1-07 
Date o f  Service OFFICERIAGENCY SERVING (include badge no.) 
cc: Arresting Agency, County Sher~ff, Victim, Prosecuting Attorney, DefendanffDefendant's Attorney 
0078 
STATE OF IDAHO, 
Plaintiff. 
VS. 





DL or SSN: 
d Judicial District Court, Stateof Id 5 
In and For the County of Latah ( 
522 S. Adams 
Moscow, Idaho 83843-0568 CASE NO. . , 
) 
) ( p, *?. 8",,a-,,-,v;v- 
) 
'iJ..:', . ,. . .,$,#,. ! I-?'" .-. ... ,,# w +  ...,. ",, "~t i r iT  
) 
@;>A;j ~ O l j & ~ < ~  
-.."uPUn' ) Case No: C 28W 8804292 
\ 
NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN that the above-entitled case is hereby set for: 
Preliminary Friday, April 13, 2007 09:30 AM 
Judge: William C. Hamlett 
Courtroom: Magistrate Courtroom #I 
I hereby certify that the foregoing is a true and correct copy of this Notice of Hearing entered by the Court and 
on file in this office. I further certify that copies of this Notice were sewed as follows on this date Monday, April 
Defendant: Tim Carl Mantz 
Mailed- Hand Delivered- /' 
Private Counsel: 
John C. Judge Mailed- Hand Delivered- 
Attorney At Law ' 
Po Box 9344 
Moscow ID 83843 
Prosecutor: William W. Thompson Jr. Latah County Prosecutor 
Mailed- f Hand Delivered- 
Officer: Ronald Vietmeier 
Mailed- / Hand Delivered- 
Dated: Mondav, April 02. 2007 
Susan R. Petersen 
Clerk Of The District Court 
By: i - Y - D  
De~utv  Clerk 
( :  (. , .: 
SASE NTj Cko?-~!% 
2001 WPE - 2  PM 4: 00 
JOHN C. JUDGE 
LANDECK, WESTBERG, JUDGE & G W ,  P.A. 
414 S. Jefferson 
................................. - . 
P.O. Box 9344 
Moscow, ID 83843 
(208) 883-1505 
FAX: (208) 883-4593 
Idaho State Bar Number 3288 
Attorneys for Defendant 
IN TWE DISTRICT COURT OF THE: SECOND JUDICW, DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF LATAH 
STATE OF IDAHO, 1 
) Case No. CR-2007-0001292 
Plaintiff, i 
) NOTICE OF APPEARANCE 
v. ) 
1 
TIM C. MANTZ, ) 
1 
Defendant. 1 
John C. Judge, of the f i  Landeck, Westberg, Judge & Graham, P.A., hereby enters this 
appearance in the above-entitled action on behalf of Defendant Tim C. Mantz. The Court and 
the State of Idaho are requested to direct all further pleadings and correspondence to John C. 
Judge at the above address. 
DATED this znd day of April, 2007. 
LANDECK, WESTBERG, JUDGE & G W ,  P.A. 
NOTICE OF APPEARANCE --1 
I hereby certify that on this 2"* day of April, 2007,I caused a true and correct copy ofthis 
document lo be served on the followillg in the manner indicated below: 
WILLIAM W. THOMPSON, JR. [ x ] U.S. Mail 
LATAH COUNTY P,ROSECUTTNC ATTORNEY . . . . . .  ~ . .  1. OvernightMail , . . .  . . 
L A T ~  COUNTY PROSECUTORS OFFICE [ IFAX 
LATAH COUNTY COURTHOUSE [ ] Iiand Delivery 
P.O. BOX 8068 
MOSCOW, ID 83843 
NOTICE OF APPEARANCE --2 
JOHN C. JUDGE 
LANDECK, WESTBERG, JUDGE & GRAHAM, P.A. 
414 S. Jefferson 
P.O. Box 9344 
Moscow, r[) 83 843 
(208) 883-1505 
FAX: (208) 883-4593 
Idaho State Bar Number 3288 
Attorneys for Defendant 
IN THE DISTRlCT COURT OF TH33 SECOND SUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF LATAFX 
STATE OF IDAFXO, 1 
) Case No. CR-2007-0001292 
Plaintiff, 




TO: WILLLAM W. THOMPSON, JR., LATAFX COUNTY PROSECUTING ATTORNEY. 
PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that the undersigned, pursuant to Rule 16 of the Idaho 
Criminal Rules, requests discovery and inspection of the following information, evidence and 
materials: 
1. Any Statements of Defendant: Any relevant written or recorded statements made by 
the Defendant, or copies thereof, within the possession, custody or control of the State, the 
existence of which is lcnown or is available to the Prosecuting Attorney by the exercise of due 
diligence; and also the substance of any relevant, oral statement made by the Defendant, whether 
before or after arrest, to a peace officer, Prosecuting Attorney or his agent. 
REQUEST FOR DISCOVERY -- I 0032 
2. Any Statements of a Co-Defendant: Any written or recorded statements of a 
co-defendant; and the substance of any relevant oral statement made by a co-defendant, whether 
before or after arrest, in response to interrogation by any person known by the co-defendant to be 
a peace officer or agent of the Prosecuting Attorney. 
3. Defendant's Prior Criminal Record: If any, as is or may become available to the 
Prosecuting Attorney. 
4. Any Docuunents and Tankble Obiects: Books, papers, documents, photographs, 
tangible objects, buildings, or places, or copies or portions thereof, which are in the possession, 
custody or control of the Prosecuting Attorney and which are material to the preparation of the 
defense, or intended ibr use by the Prosecutor as evidence at trial, or obtained from or belonging 
to the Defendant. 
5. Any Reports of Examinations and Tests: Results or reports of physical or mental 
exminations, and of scientific tests or experiments, made in connection with the particular case, 
or copies thereof, within the possession, custody or control of the Prosecuting Attorney, the 
existence of which is lcnown or is available to the Prosecuting Attorney by the exercise of due 
diligence. 
6. State Witnesses: Defendant herehirequests a written list of the names and addresses 
of all persons having knowledge of relevant facts who may be called by the State as witnesses at 
the trial, together with any record of prior felony convictions of any such person which is within 
the knowledge of the Prosecuting Attorney. Defendant furtller requests any statements made by 
prosecution witnesses or prospective prosecution witnesses to the Prosecuting Attorney or his 
agents or to any official involved in the investigatory process of this or any related case. 
REQUEST FOR DISCOVERY -- 2 
7. Police Reoorts: Defendant hereby requests that the Prosecuting Attorney fiunish to 
the Defendant reports and memoranda in his possession which were made by a police officer or 
investigator in connection with the investigation or prosecution of the case. 
8. Any other matters, evidence and material subject to automatic disclosure by the 
prosecution as prescribed under the Rule 16(a) of the Idaho Criminal Rules. 
TI33 UNDERSIGNED FURTHER REQUESTS permission to inspect and copy said 
infonnation, evidence and materials within fourteen (14) days of service of this Request, at a 
time as is reasonably practicable to the Prosecutor. 
Pussuant to Rule 16(i) of the Idaho Criminal Rules, if the Prosecutor discovers additional 
evidence or the evidence of an additional witness or witnesses, or decides to use additional 
evidence, witness or witnesses, such evidence shall be automatically subject to discovery and 
inspection pursuant to this request. The defense respectfully requests the prosecutiori's prompt 
notification in order to allow the defense the opporlru~ity to make an appropriate request for 
additional discovery or inspection. 
LANDECK, WESTBERG, JUDGE 
& GRAIIAM, P.A. 
REQUEST FOR DISCOVJ2RY -- 3 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on this 2nd day of April, 2007, I caused a true and correct copy of this 
document to be served on the following in the manner indicated below: 
WILLIAM W. THOMPSON, JR. [ x ] U.S. Mail 
LATAH COUNTY PROSECUTING A T T O m Y  [ ] Ovenlight Mail 
LATAH COUNTY PROSECUTOR'S OFFICE [ IFAX 
LATAH COUNTY COURTHOUSE [ ] Hand Delivery 
P.O. BOX 8068 
MOSCOW, ID 83843 
REQUEST FOR DISCOVERY -- 4 
LATAH COUNTY PROSECUTOR'S OFFICE 
MICHELLE M. EVANS 
DEPUTY PROSECUTING ATTORNEY 
Latah County Courthouse 
P.O. Box 8068 
Moscow, Idaho 83843-0568 
(208) 882-8580 Ext. 3316 
ISB NO. 4795 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY 0k LATAH 
STATE OF IDAHO, 1 
Plaintiff, ) 
) Case No. CR-2007-0001292 
COME NOW the State of Idaho and the above named defendant, by 
and through their respective attorneys of record, and hereby 
stipulate to the entry of an order herein vacating the preliminary 
hearing currently scheduled for April 13, 2007, and resetting the 
same, for June 7, 2007, at 10:OO a.m. In support of this 
stipulation, the undersigned respectfully represent to the court 
that Defense counsel will be filing a Defendant's Waiver of Right 
to Speedy Preliminary Hearing prior to April 13, 2007, with the 
STIPULATION TO CONTINUE: Page -1- 
NAL 0016 
Clerk of the Court. This continuance is also requested to allow 
for adequate preparation time once full discovery in both cases is 
completed. 
72%ay of p i ,  2007 DATED this -
Deputy Prosecuting Attorney 
STIPULATION TO CONTINUE: Page -2- 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF LATAH 
) 
Plaintiff, ) 
) Case No. CR-2007-00 
1 CR-2007-0001320 
1 
) ORDER VACATING AND CONTINUING 
) PRELIMINARY HEARING 
ef endant. ) 
) 
The above matter having come before the court upon 
stipulation of the parties and good cause appearing; 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the preliminary hearing currently 
scheduled for April 13, 2007, be and the same hereby vacated and 
rescheduled to June 7, 2007, at 10:OO a.m. 
1%. DATED this - day of April, 2007. 
ORDER VACATING AND CONTINUING 
PRELIMINARY HEARING: Page -1- 
,'- &-... v -.-...: . 
.J /' 
\II_ W.C. ~amlett 
Magistrate Judge 
CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY 
I hereby certify that true and correct copies of the ORDER 
VACATING AND CONTINUING PRELIMINARY HEARING were served on the 
following in the manner indicated below: 
John C. Judge U.S. Mail 
Attorney at Law [ ] Overnight Mall 
P.O. BOX 9344 i I Fax 
Moscow, ID 83843 [ ] Hand Delivery 




/a* day of April, 2007. 
ORDER VACATING AND CONTINUING 
PRELIMINARY HEARING: Page -2- 
LATAH COUNTY PROSECUTOR'S OFFICE 
MICHELLE M. EVANS . 
DEPUTY PROSECUTING ATTORNEY 
Latah County Courthouse 
P.O. Box 8068 
Moscow, Idaho 83843-0568 
Phone: (208) 883-2246 
ISB No. 4795 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
TIM CARL MANTZ, 
Defendant. 
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF LATAH 
) 
) 
) Case No. CR-2007-0001292 
i 
) RESPONSE TO REQUEST 
) FOR DISCOVERY 
) 
TO: THE DEFENDANT, TIM CARL MANTZ, 
and Counsel, John C. Judge; 
COMES NOW, the State in the above-entitled matter, and submits 
the following Response to Request for Discovery. 
The State has complied with such request by providing the 
following: 
1. Any relevant written or recorded statements made by the 
RESPONSE TO REQUEST 
FOR DISCOVERY: Page -1- 
defendant, or copies thereof, within the possession, custody or 
control of the state, the existence of which is known or is 
available to the prosecuting .attorhey b y  the exercise of due 
diligence; and also the substance of any relevant, oral statement 
made by the defendant whether before or after arrest to a peace 
g attorney, or the prosecuting attorney's agent 
sed; made available, or are attached hereto as set 
. . 
or recorded statements of a co-defendant; and 
the substance of any relevant oral statement made by a co-defendant 
whether before or after arrest in response to interrogation by any 
person known by the co-defendant to be a peace officer or agent of 
the prosecuting attorney, have been disclosed, made available, or 
are attached hereto as set forth in Exhibit "A." 
3. Defendant's prior criminal record, if any, has been 
disclosed, made available, or is attached hereto as set forth in 
Exhibit "A." 
4. Any books, papers, documents, photographs, tangible 
objects, buildings, or places, or copies or portions thereof, which 
are in the possession, custody, or control of the prosecuting 
RESPONSE TO REQUEST 
FOR DISCOVERY: Page -2- 
attorney and which are material to the preparation of the defense 
or intended for use by the prosecutor as evj-dence at trial or 
obtained from or belonging to the Defendant have been disclosed, 
made available, or are attached hereto as set forth in Exhibit "A." 
5. Any results or reports of physical or mental 
examinations, and of scientific tests or experiments, made in 
connection with the particular case, or copies thereof, within the 
possession, custody, or control of the prosecuting attorney, the 
existence of which is known or is availab1.e to the prosecuting 
attorney by the exercise of due diligence have been disclosed, made 
available, or are attached hereto as set forth in Exhibit "A." 
6. A written list of the names and addresses of all persons 
havlng knowledge of relevant facts who may be called by the state 
as witnesses at the trial. is set forth in Exhibit "B." Any record 
of prior felony convictions of any such persons which is within the 
knowledge of the prosecuting attorney and all statements made by 
the prosecution witnesses or prospective prosecution witnesses to 
the prosecuting attorney or the prosecuting attorney's agents or to 
any official involved in the investigatory process of the case have 
been disclosed, made available, or are attached hereto as set forth 
RESPONSE TO REQUEST 
FOR DISCOVERY: Page -3- 
in Exhibit "A." Additionally, the State may call as witnesses 
anyone otherwise identified or referred to in reports, statements, 
or other documents referred to in this response. 
7. Any reports and memoranda in possession of the 
prosecuting attorney which were made by any police officer or 
investigator in connection with this investigation or prosecution 
of this case have been disclosed, made available, or are attached 
hereto as set forth in Exhibit "A." 
8. All materj-a1 or information within .the prosecuting 
attorney's possession or control which tends to negate the guilt of 
the accused as to the offense charged or which would tend to reduce 
the punishment therefore have been disclosed, made available, or 
are attached hereto as set forth in Exhibit "A." In addltlon, with 
regard to material or information which may be exculpatory as used 
or interpreted, the State requests that the defendant inform the 
State, in writing, of the defense which will be asserted 1.n this 
case, so counsel for the State can determine if any additional 
material or information may be material to the defense, and thus 
fulfill its duty under I.C.R. 16(a) and Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 
83 (1963). 
RESPONSE TO REQUEST 
FOR DISCOVERY: Page -4- 
' 9. The State objects to requests by the Defendant for 
anything not addressed above on the grounds that such requests are 
outside the scope of I.C.R. 16. 
10. Wherever this Response indicates that certain evidence or 
materials have been disclosed, made available, or are attached 
hereto as set forth in Exhibit "A," such indication should not be 
construed as confirmation that such evidence or materials exist, 
but simply as an lndicatlon that if such evidence or materials 
exist, they have been disclosed or made available to the Defendant. 
Furthermore, any items which are listed in Exhibit "A" but are not 
specifically provided, or which are referred to in documents which 
are listed in Exhibit "A," are available for inspection upon 
appointment with the Prosecuting Attorney's Office. Additionally, 
all property forms, chain of custody documents, and similar items, 
are likewise available for inspection on appointment, and are 
hereby deemed to be part of "Exhibit A" for purposes of this 
response. 
DATED this day of April, 2007 
Deputy Prosecuting Attorney 
RESPONSE TO REQUEST 
FOR DISCOVERY: Page -5- 
CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing 
Response to Request for Discovery was 
mailed, Uni-ced States mail, postage prepaid 
,X hand delivered 
sent by facsimile, original by mail 
to the following: 
John C. Judge 
Attorney at Law 
P.O. Box 9344 
Moscow, ID 83843 
L2 
Dated this 17 day of April, 2007. 
RESPONSE TO REQUEST 
FOR DISCOVERY: Page -6- 
STATE V. TIM CARL MANTZ 
CR-2007-0001292 
EXHIBIT "A" 
Pollce reports and documents covered by ICR 16 which are in the 
possession of the State have been disclosed to counsel for the 
defendant as of April 17, 2007. These materials consist of 
approximately one hundred thirty-eight (138) pages. The State is 
also in receipt of four (4) CD's and upon receipt of blanks will 
copy and discover to defense counsel. 
EXHIBIT "A" 




Any person referred to or identified in any reports or other 
discovery provided in this case (set forth in Exhibit "AN) may be 
called by the State as a witness in this matter. 
EXHIBIT "B" 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF LATAH 
judge , 
Clerk 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  
Tape No. , %  / / . a d 7  
Case No. &~%%2/2?2+/32# 
Others Present Date 6. . . .  7-0 7 
Time. A?<u 4 
. . . . . .  . . . . . . . .  . . . . . .  . . .  .< 
BE IT KNOWN THAT THE FOLLOWING PROCEEDINGS WERE HAD, TO.WIT: . 




BE IT ICNOWN THAT THE FOLLOWING PROCEEDINGS WERE HAD, TO WIT: 
RECORD OF COURT PROCEEDINGS 
PAGE 3 
TAPE # 
BE IT KNOWN TI-IAT THE FOLLOWING PROCEEDINGS WERE IFAD, TO WIT: 
PAGE 9 
TAPE # 
BE IT KNOWN TRAT THE FOLLOWING PROCEEDINGS WERE HAD, TO WIT: 
RECORD OF COURT PROCEEDINGS, 
PAGE u 
TAPE # 
BE IT KNOWN T1IiA.T THE FOLLOWING PROCEEDINGS WERE HAD, TO WIT: 
PAGE # (' 
. .  TAPE# . . .  ' RECORD OF COURT PROCEEDINGS. 
. . ODOMETER READING '. . . . . cdo"-\aQ 
--cL&-4 w& ................................................... ................................................... cr= 
EXHIBITS 
WITNESSES 
PLAINTIFF - STATE DEFENDANT 
J.'//wo 7 
i PAGE A+ i ' .  : .TAPE# . RECORD OF COURT PROCEEDINGS 
ODOMETER REABXMG . . . . c ~ a 1 k  
T&- wCi2hq ................................................... ................................................... , - T  
~ x n x ~ x i s  
PLAINTIFF-STATE DEFENDANT 
STATE OF IDAHO, 
Plaintiff. 
vs. 
Tim Carl Mantz 
I01 1 Vale Road 
Harvard, ID 83834 
-1' 'pd JudiciaI District Court, State 
(... - . . '  In and For the County of Lata 
. . < ,  . 
522 S. Adams 
Moscow, Idaho 83843-0568 
DOB: 
DL or SSN: 
) 
) 
) Case No: CR- 
) 
NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN that the above-entitled case is hereby set for: ' 
Arraignment Monday, June 11,2007 01:30 PM 
Judge: John R. Stegner 
Courtroom: District Courtroom #3 
I hereby certify that the foregoing is a true and.correct copy of this Notice of Hearing entered by the Court and 
on file in this office. I further certify that, copies of this Noticewere servedas follows on this date Thursday, 
June 07,2007. 
Defendant: ~ i m  Carl Mantz 
Mailed- Hand Delivered- 
Private Counsel: 
John C. Judge Mailed- Hand ~elivered- / .. . 
Attorney At Law :*.;.<.& e. . 
lam W. Thompson Jr. Latah County Prosecutor 
Mailed- Hand Delivered- 4'
Officer: Ronald Vietmeier . :  . ,.. . . . - - . .- . .. ..i..... *.~!.<L . . ,.<.. . ".-: .. 
Mailed- Hand Delivered- 
Dated: Thursday, June 07.2007 
Susan R. Petersen 
Clerk Of The District Court 
STATE OF IDAHO, Plaintiff 
vs. TIM CARL MANTZ 
Defendant 
DO SSN:
The Defendant has beencharged with or convicted o f  violatina ldaho Code Sectionfs): 
0 18-901 Assault 18-903 Battery x l8-905 Aggravated Assault 0 18-907 Aggravated Battery 
0 18-909 Assault with Intent to Commit Felony 18-91 1 Battery with Intent to Commit Felony 
18-913 Felonious ~dministering of Drug 18-915 Assault or Battery upon Certain Personnel 
o 18-918 Domestic Assault or Battery D 18-919 Sexual Exploitation by Medical Provider 
n 18-671 0 Use of Telephone - LewdlProfane 0 18.671 1 Use of Telephone - False Statements 
18-7905 Stalking (1st ") 0 18-7906 Stalking' (2nd ") 0 39-6312 Violation of a Protection Order 
0 Other: 
against the ALLEGED VICTIM, KARL A. HOIDAL, AND HIS PARENTS, JULl HOIDAL AND BRIAN 
HOIDAL. 
THE COURT, having jurisdiction, and having provided the Defendant with notice of his 
opportunity to be heard, either previously or herein, ORDERS THE DEFENDANT TO HAVE NO 
DIRECT OR INDIRECT CONTACT WITH THE ALLEGED VICTIM, unless through an attorney. You 
may not harass, follow, contact, attempt to contact, communicate with in any form or by any b means including another person), or knowingly go or remain within /,o feet of the alleged 
victim's person, property, residence, workplace or school. This order is issued under ldaho Code 
18-920, ldaho Criminal Rule 46.2 and Administrative Order 2004 - 2. 
NOTICE OF RIGHT TO A HEARING: You have the right to  a hearing before a Judge on the 
continuation of this Order within a reasonable time o f  its issuance. To request that hearing, and 
TO AVOID GIVING UP THlS RIGHT you must contact the Clerk of Court, Latah County Courthouse, 
522 S. Adams, Moscow ID 83843,208-883-2255. 
VIOLATION OF THlS ORDER IS A SEPARATE CRIME UNDER ldaho Code 18-920 for which bail will 
be set by a judge; it is subject to  a penalty of up to one year in  jail and up to a $1,000 fine. THIS 
ORDER CAN ONLY BE MODIFIED BY A JUDGE AND WILL REMAIN IN EFFECT UNTIL 11:59 P.M. 
ON 7& 11. 7BD7 , OR UNTIL THIS CASE IS DISMISSED. 
The Clerk of the Court shall give written notification to the records deparimeni: of the sheriii's 
office in  the countv of issuance IMMEDIATELY and this order shall be entered into the ldaho Law 
Enforcement ~ele~ommunicat ions System. 
$17-07 
Date of sewice' 
cc: Arresting Agency, County Sheriff, Victim, Prosecuting Aitorney, DefendanffDefendant's Attorney 
CASE NO. .-,.--- 
pj'j J@$ -7 pH 4: 3@ 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
, . . .n I ,  CyE\?;\ t;r ;.!o i I %.I i,vL% 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR TI& COUNTY OF L A T m m T Y  
. __-DEPUM 
STATE OF IDAHO, 1 
1 




1 NOTICE OF ASSIGNMENT 
1 OF JUDGE 
TIM CARL MANTZ, ) 
Defendant, 1 
1 
OTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN that the above entitled action has 
rable John R, Stegner for all motions, hearings and trial. 
DATED this 7th day of June, 2007 
Susan R. Petersen, Clerk 
By 
COPIES DELIVERED TO: Deputy Pros. Attorney: Michelle Evans 
Defendants Atty: John Judge 
NOTICE OF ASSIGNMENT OF JUDGE 
CASE NO. 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THB 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF LpSj#&lg ,7 p j;i : 3 8 
STATE OF IDAI-IO, 
2 L .  .c{?~ t PC I fii,;v?r., . ,  , ? .. i - ~ g q  n 
1 
Case NO. CR-07-0129W 
Plaintiff, 
1 ORDER BINDING OVER 
vs ) DEFENDANT AND 
) SCHEDULING ARRAIGNMENT 
TIM CARL MANTZ, 1 
Defendant, 
A preliminary hearing in the above entitled matter having been held on the charge 
of AGGRAVATED ASSAULT in violation of Idaho Code 18-901,905,906, and the Court 
having ordered the defendant bound over to answer to the same in the District Court; 
is scheduled for the llfi day of June, 2007 at 1: 
PURSUANT TO 
Randall W. Robinson 
Magistrate Judge 
By: m> /&b 
Deputy Clerk 
BOND: $3,000.00 bail bond posted 
COPIES HAND DELIVERED TO: Deputy Pros. Attorney: Michelle Evans 
Defendant's Attorney: John Judge 
ORDER BINDING OVER DEFENDANT 
AND SCHEDULING ARRAIGNMENT 
LATAH COUNTY PROSECUTOR'S OFFICE 
WILLIAM W. THOMPSON, JR. 
PROSECUTING ATTORNEY 
Latah County Courthouse 
P.O. Box 8068 
Moscow, Idaho 83843-0568 
Phone: (208) 883-2246 
ISB No. 2613 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT 
STATE OF IDAHO, 
TIM CARL MANTZ, 
Defendant. 
OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF LATAH 
) Case No. CR-2007-0001292 
) 
) CRIMINAL INFORMATION - 
) 
Pursuant to Idaho Criminal Rule 7, the Prosecuting Attorney of Latah County, 
Idaho, alleges by this information that: 
TIM CARL MANTZ 
DOB:
SSN: 
has perpetrated a crime against the State of Idaho, to-wit: AGGRAVATED ASSAULT, 
Idaho Code 18-901,905,906, a Felony, and SENTENCING ENHANCEMENT, pursuant to 
Idaho Code 19-2520, committed as follows: 
CRiMINAL INFORMATION: Page -1- 
That the Defendant, TIM CARL MANTZ, on or about the 16th day of 
February, 2007, in Latah County, State of Idaho, did intentionally, 
unlawfully, and with apparent ability, threaten by word or act to do 
violence to the person of Karl A. Hoidal with a deadly weapon, by firing a 
handgun near Karl A. Hoidal's head and then saying "the next one's in 
you", whiclz created a well-foui~ded fear in Karl A. Hoidal that such 
violence was imminent. 
PART I1 
SENTENCING ENHANCEMENT, pursuant to Idaho Code 19-2520 
That the Defendant, TIM CARL MANTZ, on or about the 16th day of 
February, 2007, in Latah County, State of Idaho, did display, use, threaten 
r attempt to use a firearm while committing the crime of AGGRAVATED 
is therefore subject to enhanced sentencing pursuant to 
520. 
day of June, 2007. 
CRIMINAL INFORMATION: Page -2- 
CERTIFICATE OF DELlVERY 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing Criminal Information 
was 
- mailed, United States mail, postage prepaid 
hand delivered 
oscow, Idaho 83843 
s ;3.0S.5%33-Y543 
0- DATED this JJ- day of June, 2007. 
C m A L  INFORMATION: Page -3- 
CLERK OF D I S T I ~ ~ C T C ~ ~ , ~ ;  
LATAil COUNTY 
i t - -= . -n~pu~v 
LATAH COUNTY PROSECUTOR'S OFFICE 
MICHELLE M. EVANS 
DEPUTY PROSECUTING ATTORNEY 
Latah County Courthouse 
P.O. Box 8068 
Moscow, Idaho 83843-0568 
Phone: (208) 883-2246 
ISB No. 4795 
THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF LATAH 




) Case No. CR-2007-0001292 
v. 1 
) REQUEST FOR DISCOVERY 
TIM CARL MANTZ, ) DISCLOSURE; ALIBI DEMAND 
Defendant. 1 
\ 
TO: THE DEFENDANT, TIM CARL MANTZ 
AND COUNSEL, John C. Judge. 
PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that the undersigned pursuant to Rule 16 of the Idaho 
Criminal Rules requests discovery and inspection of the following information, evidence 
and materials: 
1. All books, papers, documents, photographs, tangible objects or copies or 
REQUEST FOR DISCOVERY 
DISCLOSURE; ALIBI DEMAND: Page -1- 
portions thereof, which are within the possession, custody or control of the defendant, 
and which the defendant intends to introduce in evidence at trial. 
2. All results or reports of physical or mental examinations and of scientific 
tests or experiments xnade in connection with this case, or copies thereof, within the 
possession or control of the defendant, which the defendant intends to introduce in 
e at  trial, or which were prepared by a witness whom the defendant intends to call 
trial when the results or reports relate to testimony of the witness. 
3. The names and addresses of all witnesses the defendant intends to call at 
trial. 
This shall be a continuing request pursuant to Idaho Criminal Rule 16(i). 
The undersigned further requests permission to copy and inspect said information, 
evidence and materials at the Prosecuting Attorney's Ofiice, Latah County Courthouse, 
Moscow, Idaho 83843, within fourteen (14) days of service of this request. 
FURTHER, THE STATE HEREBY DEMANDS OF THE DEFENDANT NOTICE 
OF DEFENSE OF ALIBI PURSUANT TO IDAWO CODE 19-519 AND IDAHO 
CRIMINAL RULE 12.1. 
of June, 2007. 
mlth$L mi-  
Michellk M. Evans 
Deputy Prosecuting Attorney 
REQUEST FOR DISCOVERY 
DISCLOSURE; ALIBI DE- Page -2- 
CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing Request for Discovery 
Disclosure; Alibi Demand was 
$-mailed, United States mail, postage prepaid 
hand delivered 
sent by facsimile 
to tl1e following: 
John C. Judge 
Attorney at Law 
P.O. Box 9344 
Moscow, Idaho 83843 
Dated this cday of JU&, 2007. 
REQUEST FOR DISCOVERY 
DISCLOSURE; AIBI  DEMAND: Page -3- 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF LATAH 
- COURTMINUTES - 
John R. Stegner 
district ~ u d g e  
...... ................ 
Date June 11,2007 
STATE OF IDAHO. 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
TIM CARL MnNTZ, 
Jodi M. Stordiau - 
Court Reporter 
. ................ . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  ..Re.cording:. J:.. 3/(2007-06-11-2007 - 
Time: 1:36 P.M. 
$ Case Nos. CR-07-01292 and CR-07-01320 
i APPEARANCES: 
1 Michelle Evans, Deputy Prosecutor 
Appearing on behalf of the State 
\ 
Defendant. j Defendant present with counsel, 
) John C. Judge, Moscow, ID ____--_-__--___-___---------------------------------------------- ..................................................... 
Subject ofproceedings: ARRAIGNMENT 
/ 
This being the time fixed pursuant to order of the Cowt for conducting 
arraignmenis in the following cases: State v. Jeremy Jason Davis, CR-06-2523; State v. Tim 
Carl Mantz, CR-07-01292 and CR-07-01320; State v. Logan Keith Morris, CR-07-01725; State 
v. Johnny Lee Peterson, CR-07-01934; and State v. Maclue Don Pope, CR-07-01848, Court 
noted the presence of counsel and all of the defendants. In response to inquiry from the 
Court, the defendant stated that he is Tim Carl Mantz. 
Court directed the defendants to pay close attention as the Court informs Defendant 
Davis of his rights as those rights will pertain to each one of them in their case as well. 
Court informed the defendants collectively of their rights as a defendant in a 
criminal case. 
PROCEEDING ON WITH THE INDIVIDUAL 
ARRAIGNMENT OF TIM CARL MANTZ, CR-07-01292 and CR-07-01320 1:55 P.M. 
Court inquired of defendant if he had heard and understood his rights as given in 
the preceding case against Defendant Davis, to which he replied that he had and did not 
wish the Court to explain them again and did not wish to discuss them with his counsel 
before proceeding. 
Court informed the defendant that he had been charged in Case No. CR-07-01292 
Terry Odenborg 
Deputy Clerk 
COURT MINUTES - 1 
with the felony offense of Aggravated Assault, in violation of idal~o Code 18-901,18-905, 
18-906, which upon conviction carries a maximup penalty of five (5) years in the state 
penitentiary and a $5,000 fine. Court further informed the defendant that if convicted he 
also could be required to pay a $5,000 civil penalty to the victim of his offense as provided 
by Idaho Code 19-5307. Court h t h e r  advised the defendant that in Part I1 of the Criminal 
Infonnation the State is seelcing a sentencing enhancement for the alleged use of a firearm 
in the commission of a felony as provided by Idaho Code 19-2520, which carries with it the 
- . ... "... possibility of an additional .fifteen (15) years of imprisonment. - ........ . 
Court informed the defendant that he had been charged in Case No. CR-07-01320 
with the felony offense of Possession of a Controlled Substance - Methamphetamine, in 
violation of Idaho Code 37-2732(c)(1), which upon conviction carries a maximurn penalty 
of seven (7) years in the state penitentiary and a $15,000 fine. 
In response to inquiry from the Court, defendant stated that he had completed his 
CED at LCSC and had attended a welding trade school in Spokane, Washington. 
Couri read the charging portion of the Criminal Mormation in CR-07-01292 to the 
defendant. In response to inquiry from the Court, defendant stated that he did not wish 
for the Court to explain the material elemerrts the State would be required to prove should 
this case proceed to trial. Defendant entered a plea of not guilty to the felony offense of 
Aggravated Battery in CR-07-01292. Defendant entered a denial to Part 11, the sentencing 
enhancement for the alleged use of a firearm in the commission of a felony. 
Court read the charging portion of the Criminal Information in CR-07-01320 to the 
defendant. In response to inquiry from the Court, defendant stated that he did not wish 
for the Court to explain the material elements the State would be required to prove should 
this case proceed to trial. Defendant entered a plea of not guilty to the felony offense of 
Possession of a Controlled Substance - Methamphetamine in CR-07-01320. 
Mr. Judge moved to have separate trials in these cases. Court stated they are two 
separate &ids unless the State moves to consolidate them. 
Counsel estimated that CR-07-01320 would take three (3) days to try and estimated 
that CR-07-01292 would take four (4) days to try on a 9:00 to 400 P.M. schedule. Court 
ordered defendant to appear for jury trial in CR-07-03292 at 900 A.M. on October 29,2007. 
h response to inquiry from the Court, Mr. Judge stated that he does intend to order 
preparation of a transcript of the preliminary hearing. 
Court ordered any and all pretrial motions filed no later ihan July 30,2007, &owing 
opposing counsel until August 13, 2007, within which to respond, and allowing mtil 
August 20,2007, for any reply to the response. It shall be the responsibility of the moving 




COURT MINUTES - 2 
Court ordered defendant to appear for jury trial in CR-07-01320 at 9:00 A.M. on 
November 26,2007. That case will be tried on a 9:00 A.M. to 4:00 P.M. scheduled as weU 
and will have the same briefing schedule. 
On motion of the State, there being no objection from the defendant, Court issued a 
No Coi~tact Order to be in effect through November 2,2007. 
ourt scheduled. at-pretrial conference in this case for CR-07~01292. September 21,. . . . . . ,. 
. and a pretrial conference in CR-07-01320 for October 29,2007, at 430 P.M. 






COURT MINUTES - 3 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDl 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FORTHE COUNTY OF LATAH COUNTY 
STATE OF IDAHO, Plaintiff Case No. CR-2007-0001292 
vs. TIM CARL MANTZ 
Defendant 
NO CONTACT ORDER 
Eff. 07/01104 
DOB SSN: 
The Defendant has been charged with or convicted of violatinildaho Code Section(s): 
0 18-901 Assault U 18-903 Battery ,~?Q8-905 Aggravated Assault 0 18-907 Aggravated Battery 
U 18-909 Assault with Intent to Commit Felony 0 18-91 1 Battery with Intent to Commit Felony 
18-913 Felonious Administering of Drug 0 18-915 Assault or Battery upon Certain Personnel 
0 18-918 Domestic Assault or Battery 0 18-919 Sexual Exploitation by Medical Provider 
0 18-6710 Use of Telephone - LewdiProfane U 18-671 1 Use of Telephone - False Statements 
0 18-7905Stalking (1st ") 0 18-7906 Stalking (2nd ") 39-6312 Violation of a Protection Order 
0 Other: 
against the ALLEGED VICTIM, KARL A. HOIDAL, AND HIS PARENTS, JULl HOlDAL AND BRIAN 
HOIDAL. 
THE COURT, having jurisdiction, and having provided the Defendant with notice of his 
opportunity to be  heard, either previously o r  herein, ORDERS THE DEFENDANT TO HAVE NO 
DIRECT OR INDIRECT CONTACT WITH THE ALLEGED VICTIM, unless through an attorney. You 
may not harass, follow, contact, attempt to contact, communicate with (in any form or by any 
means including another person), or knowingly g o  or remain within 0 feet of the alleged 
victim's person, property, residence, workplace or school. This order is issued under ldaho Code 
18-920, ldaho Criminal Rule 46.2 and Administrative Order 2004 - 2. 
NOTICE OF RIGHT TO A HEARING: You have the right to a hearing before a Judge on the 
continuation of this Order within a reasonable time of its issuance. To request that hearing, and 
TO AVOID GIVING UP THIS RIGHT you must contact the Clerk of Court, Latah County Courthouse, 
522 S. Adams, Moscow ID 83843,208-883-2255. 
VIOLATION OF THIS ORDER IS A SEPARATE CRIME UNDER ldaho Code 18-920 for which bail will 
be se t  by a judge; it is subject to a penalty of up to one year in jail and up to a $1,000 fine. THiS 
ORDER CAN ONLY BE MODIFIED BY A JUDGE AND WILL REMAIN IN EFFECT UNTIL 11:59 P.M. 
ON f i  L ) L I & ~  2, LOO? , OR UNTIL THIS CASE IS DISMISSED. 
The Clerk of the Court shall give written notificztion to the records department of the sheriff's 
office in the county of issuance IMMEDIATELY and this order shall be entered into the ldaho Law 
Enforcement Telecommunications System. - A -
cc: Arresting Agency, County Sheriff, Victim, Prosecuting Attorney, DefendanttDefendant's Attorney 2' 
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IT IS HEREBY ORDERED: 
(1) Jury trial is set to commence at 9:00 A.M. on October 29,2007, in Court~oom #3 
of the Latah County Courthouse and will be txied on a 9:00 A.M. to 4:00 P.M. schedule. 
Counsel shall be present in chambers at 8:30 A.M. on t l~e first morning of trial; 
(2) All Rule 12 LC.R. pretrial motions must be filed and served no later than July 30, 
2007, and briefs in support of any such motion s h d  be filed with the motion; 
(3) The response brief to any pretrial motion or motions shall be served and filed no 
later thari August 13,2007. Failure to file a written response within the time allowed will 
be construed by the Court as a waiver of opposition; 
(4) The reply brief or briefs, if any, shall be served and filed no later than August 20, 
2007; 
, . '  
(5) It shall be the responsibility of the moving party to schedule the motion or 
SCHEDULING ORDER - 1 
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motions for hearing at a time convenient to court and counsel; 
(6) A pretrial conference shall be conducted at 4:00 P.M. on September 21,2007; and 
(7) Each party shall serve and lodge with the clerk of the court, at least seven (7) 
days prior to trial, jury instructions sought by either party. 
- 
District juduge 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
1 do hereby c e r w  that a kill, 
true and correct copy of the foregoing 
SCHEDULING ORDER was hand delivered to: 
MICHELLE EVANS 
DEPUTY PROSECUTOR 
and mailed to: 
JOHN C. JUDGE 
ATTORNEY AT LAW 
PO BOX 9344 
MOSCOW, ID 83843 
on this - 1 9" day of June, 2007. 
Deputy Clerk 
SCHEDULING ORDER - 2 
.- JOHN C. JUDGE 
LANDECK, WESTBERG,'JUDGE GWIAM, P.A. 
414 S. Jefferson 
P.O. Box 9344 
Moscow, ID 83843 
(208) 883-1505 
FAX: (208) 883-4593 
Idaho State Bar Number 3288 
Attorneys for Defendant 
IN TKE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF LATAH 
STATE OF IDAHO, - "  1 
) Case No. CR-2007-0001292 
Plaintiff, 1 
) MOTIONS TO SUPPRESS, 
v. ) TO EXCLUDE EVIDENCE, 
) AND TO DISMISS 
TIM C. MANTZ, ) 
1 
Defendant. ) 
Defendant Tim C. Mantz ("Mr. Mantz"), through his attorneys, Landeck, 
Westberg, Judge & Graham, P.A., by John C. Judge, and pursuant to Rules 12@) and 
48(a)(2) 1.C.R.hereby moves as follows: 
1. To suppress all evidence obtained March 30,2007, during the State's search of 
Mr. Mantz's truck after he was stopped for a traffic violation and subsequently arrested 
011 a warrant on the following gounds: (1) the State had no warrant to search Mr. 
Mantz's truck; (2) the State had no independent probable cause to search the truck; (3) 
the search was not reasonable under the principles expressed in Chime1 and Belton as a 
MOTIONS TO SUPPRESS, TO EXCLUDE EVIDENCE, AND TO DISMISS -1 007f 
search incident to an arrest exception to the warrant requirement; and (4) such search 
violated Mr. Mantz's rights to be from unreasonable searches under the 4" Amendment 
to the Constitution of the United States and Article I, 5 17 of the Constitntion of the State 
of Idaho; 
2. To prohibit any attempt by the State to introduce evidence of Mr. Mantz's 
alleged prior bad acts on the grounds that such introduction would violate Rule 404@) 
I.R.E.; 
3. To dismiss this case on the grounds that, upon suppression of the above 
referenced evidence, the State will have no grounds upon which to proceed. 
This Motion is based on the anticipated testimony at hearing and upon testimony 
and evidence from the Preliminary Hearing held June 7,2007, before the Honorable 
Randall Robinson, Magistrate Judge, and is supported by the accompanying Brief in 
Support of Motion to Suppress. 
Mi. Mantz hereby requests the opportunity to present testimony and other 
evidence, cross-examine ~e State's witnesses, and present oral argument in support of 
this motion. 
DATED this 3oth day of July, 2007. 
LANDECK, WESTBERG, JUDGE & GRAHAM, P.A. 
MOTIONS TO SUPPRESS, TO EXCLUDE EVIDENCE, AND TO DISMISS -2 
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I hereby certify that on this 30" day of July, 2007, I caused a true and correct copy 
of this document to be served on the following in the manner indicated: 
MICI-EELLE M. EVANS [ ] U.S. Mail 
DEPUTY PROSECUTING ATTORNEY [ ] Overnight Mail 
L A T B  COUNTY PROSECUTOR'S OFFICE I IFAX 
LATAH COUNTY COURTHOUSE ] Hand Delivery 
P.O. BOX 8068 
MOSCOW, ID 83843 
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Defendant Tim C. Mantz, through his attorneys, Landeck, Westberg, Judge & 
Graham, P.A., hereby submits this Brief in Support of Motions to Suppress aid to 
Dismiss. 
1. STATEMENT OF RELEVANT FACTS 
It is expected that testimony and other evidence at the suppression hearing will 
show the following: 
1. On March 30,2007, an arrest warrant for Tim Mantz was issued on probable 
cause relating to an alleged incident that had occurred six weeks prior, February 16, 
2007. 
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2. At approximately 10:56 p.m., on March 30,2007 Sergeant Philip Gray and 
Deputy Travis Catt of the Latah County Sheriffs Department stopped Mr. Mantz for a 
traffic violation near Flannigan Creek Road and Highway 6 near Potlatch in Latah 
County, Idaho. 
3. Sergeant Gray executed the arrest warrant by identifj4ng the driver of the 
truck, Tim Mantz, and telling Mr. Mantz to turn the truck off, put his hands on the 
steering wheel, and step out of the truck because Mr. Mmtz was under arrest. 
4. Mr. Mantz obeyed Sergeant Gray's directives and stepped out of the truck, 
and cooperated as his hands were handcuffed behind his back. 
5. Deputy Gray walked Mr. Mantz back to Sergeant C~ay's patrol car and placed 
Mr. Mantz in the back seat. 
6. In addition to Deputies Gray and Catt, Deputies Carl Fork, Ryan Weaver, 
Richard Skiles, and Greg Pannell were also at the scene. Eventually, Deputies Brannon 
Jordan and Darren Johnson arrived at the scene. 
7. At some unknown point in time, or at several unlmown points in time, a deputy 
or deputies searched Mr. Mantz's truck. 
8. At the time of any search of Mr. Mantz's truck, there was no danger to the 
officers. In fact, Deputy Fork agreed that when he arrived at the scene, there were no 
longer any issues of officer safety. (Transcript of Preliminary Bearing of June 7,2007) 
(hereaiter "Tr.") (Tr. p. 170, L. 16-20). 
9. At the time of any search of Mr. Mantz's truck, there was no danger that any 
evidence would be destroyed or lost. 
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10. That same evening of March 30,2007, sometime affer 11:30 p.m., Detective 
Larsen and other detectives and deputies from the Latah County Sheriffs Department 
were at the Mantz residence, 101 1 Vale Road, near Potlatch, Idaho, to execule a search 
warrant for any firearms that may have been related to the February 16,2007 incident. 
(Tr. pp. 185). 
11. While inside Mr. Mantz's home and in the presence of Crystal Mantz, Tim 
Mantz's wife, Detective Larsen used bis cell phone to call a deputy (or deputies) at the 
scene of the traffic stop and arrest ofMr. Mantz. In that conversation, Detective Larson 
argued with the other deputy that they needed to wait and get a warrant before searching 
Mr. Mantz's truck. However, the deputy told Deputy Larson they had aLready started 
searching the truck. Finally, Deputy Larson told the deputy to do what he fell was right 
and they would figure it out later. 
12. During the search of the truck, a small amount of methamphetamine (less 
than .3 grams) was found inside a closed container witllin a closed container apparently 
found on the front seat ofthe truck. 
13. The incident report shows that at 11 :18 p.m. Deputy Fork arrived at the scene 
and that at 11 :46 p.m. Deputy Fork was advised by Deputy Gray to do a search on the 
vehicle incident to arrest. 
14. There are inconsistencies among the Latah County Sheriffs OEce incident 
report, the written reports of the eight deputies involved in some way with the traffic 
stop, the arrest of Mr. Mantz and the search of Mr. Mantz's truck, and the testimony of 
Deputies Fork, Gray, and Vietmeier at the Preliminary Hearing which was held on 
June 7,2007. 
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IT. ARGUMENT 
A. The State Had No Probable Cause or Any Reasonable Basis to Justify a 
Warrantless Search of Mr. Mantz's Truck and the Closed Container in the Truck 
After Arresting Him on an Outstanding Warrant During a Traffic Stop. 
Even under the Belton bright-line, a search incident to arrest must be sufficiently 
contemporaneous with the arrest. See Belton discussion below. There is still an open 
question in this case whether the search was sufficiently contemporaneous to satisfy the 
requirements of Belton and Charpentier discussed below. 
"The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects 
against unreasonable searches and seizures shalI not be violate4 and no wmant shall 
issue without probable cause shown by affidavit, particularly describing the place to be 
searched and the person or thing to be seized." Constitution of the State of Idaho, Article 
1, Section 17. See also, Constitution of the United States, Amendment 4. The State will 
likely argue that the search of Mr. Maitz's truck was valid as an exception to the warrant 
requirement because it was a search incident to arrest under the United States 
Constitution as interpreted by New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454, 101 S.Q. 2860,69 
L.Ed. 2d 768 (1981), as well as under the Idaho Constitution, as interpreted by State v. 
Charpentier, 131 Idaho 649,962 P.2d 1033 (1998), and other Idaho cases in that line. 
See, e.g., State v. Watts, 142 Idaho 230, 127 P.3d 133 (2005); State v. Holland, 135 Idaho 
159,15 P.3d 1167 (2000). 
Belton was decided twenty-six years ago and was based on the twin rationales of 
Chime1 v. Calijbnia, 395 U.S. 752,762-763, (1969), the concerns for officer safety and 
preservation of evidence. See generally, Belton, 453 U.S. at 457-60; United States v. 
Weaver, 433 F.3d 1104, 1107, (91h Cir. 2006). Bellon attempted to apply Chimel's 
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rationales for a search incident to an arrest in a home to the "question of the proper scope 
of a search of the interior of an automobile incident to a lawful custodial arrest of its 
occupants." Beldon, 453 U.S. at 459-60. Belton held that "when apoliceman has made a 
lawfirl custodial arrest of the occupant 'of an automobile, he may, as a contemporaneous 
'incident ofthat arrest, search the passenger compartment of that automobile." 'Belton, 
453 U.S. at 775. The Court: pointed out that the holding "does no more than determine 
the meaning of Chimers principles in this particular and problematic context. It in no 
way alters the fundamental principles established in the Chime1 case regding the basic . , 
scope of searches incident to lawful custodial arrests," Id., at n. 3. However, "the Belton 
rule is broader than its stated rationale." See Belton at 463-472 (Brennan, J., dissenting, 
Marshall, J. joining in dissent); see also, Weaver, 433 F.3d 1104, 1107. Four years ago, 
the United States Supreme Court affirmed the rule in Belton. Thornton v. United States, 
541 U.S. 615, 124 S.Ct 2127, 158 L.Ed 905 (2004). However, both Beldon and 
Thornton have been seriously and increasingly questioned. 
In his background for an analysis of Belton, one commentator lists, in determinjng 
what may be relevant, the following: (i) what places it would be possible for the arrestee 
presently to reach, and (ii) perhaps of somewhat lesser importance, howprobable it is 
tbal: the &estee would undertake to seek means of resistance or escape or to destroy 
evidence. See 3 WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND S E I ~ ~ E ,  5 7.l(b) at 505 (4" ed. 2004 
& Supp. 2007). (italics in original); Regarding the arrestee'spresezt reacb,.four factors 
deserve attention: (1) whether or not the arrestee was placed in some form of restraints; 
(2) the position of the defendant and the arresting officer in relation to the vehicle, that 
is, whether could the defendant "get at" the part of the vehicle seasched; (3) the ease or 
BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO SUPPRESS--5 
difficulty of gaining entry to the vebicle or of gaining access to the particular container 
or enclosure searched there because, quite clearly, when one of the arresting officers has 
the arrestee gel into the police cruiser it cannot be said the arrestee still has the interior of 
the vehicle within lus immediate control; and (4) the number of officers present in 
relation to the number of arrestees or other persons because this bears on the officers' 
ability t; control the entire situation by preventing unexpected movements by those in 
custody. Id, at 505-507, Regarding theprobability that the arrestee would attempt to 
resist, escape, ordestroy evidence, any facts tending to show that the defendant has a 
weapon in the car and may try to get at it are deserving of consideration. Id. at 507-08. 
.. . ~ In this case, the facts show that (1) Mr. Mantz had been. handcuffed with his 
hands behind his back; (2) he could not "get at" the part of the vehicle searchea (3) he 
would have difficulty gaining entry to the vehicle or access to the container searched 
because he was.in the back seat of the police cruiser; and (4) he was in the presenceof at ' . . 
least six armed officers. In addition, he was the only occupant of his vehicle, and he 
cooperated with the officers who arrested him. 
Under these facts, and applying the twin rationales of Chime1 (the stated rationale 
of Belton), the officers had no rational or reasonable basis to search Mr. Mantz's truck. 
Neither did they have separate probable cause to search his truck (or any small 
containers) for evidence of the alleged crime for which officers had waited six weeks to 
~btain a warrant for his arrest and a general warrant to search his home. Therefore, the 
fruits of the search of his vehicle should be suppressed because they are tainted by an 
unreasonable, illegal search. 
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B. The Controlluig Precedent Ras Proven Over Time to be Unjust and Unwise, 
and Overruling It Is Necessary to Vindicate Plain, Obvious Principles of Law and to 
Remedy Continued Injustice. 
Despite controlling Federal and Idaho precedent adopting a '%right-line test" 
under Belton and Charpentier, such authority should be overruled under the U.S. and 
Idaho Conslitulions. The warrantless search of Mr. Mantz's truck under the 
circmstances of his custodial arrest was unreasonable, and the evidence seized in the 
search of his truck should be suppressed. Mr. Mantz'v motion is well grounded in fact, is 
warranted under existing law from other jurisdictions, and is a good faith argument for 
the modification or reversal of existing law. 
1. The State of Idaho violated Mr. Mantz's rights under the United 
States Constitution and the evidence against him should be 
suppressed. 
Although Belton is grounded upon the proposiGon that rules of police conduct 
stated in easily understood standardized procedures often benefit both privacy and law 
enforceinent interests, in the quarter-century su~cc Belton, numerous sister states, United 
States Circuit Courts of Appeals, Supreme Court justices, and coinmentators have 
questioned, and c~ntinue to question the n~ling in Belton. Even Idaho initially rejected 
the Belton rule; however, it soon reinstated it in Charpentier. See discussion below; see 
also Note, 35 Idaho Law Review 125 (1998). 
Sister states have distanced themseIves from, or explicitly denied, the so-called 
bright-line Belton rule because it seems to allows officers to take actions that do not 
comport with the expressed underlying principles of officer safety and protection of 
evidence and leads to irrational, unreasonable searches, unconstitutionally i a g i n g  on 
citizens' privacy interests. See, e.g., State v. Bauder, No. 2004-438, March 16,2007 C\it 
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Sup Ct.) (police officers may not routinely search a vehicle when its occupant has been 
arrested, handcuffed, and secured in the back seat of a police cruiser); see also cases 
collected in LaFave, supra, at $7.l(b) notes 24 and 35.%owever, Idaho fell into line 
behind the Belton rule-but only in a 3-2 decision over the strong and long dissent by 
Justice Johnson. Charpentier, 131 Idaho at 653-55,962 P.2d at 1037-39 (Johnson, J., 
dissenting, Trout, J., concurring in the dissent). As the Charpentier dissenters said in 
1998, and numerous other states have said since Belton, 
State courts are at liberty to find within the provisions of their own 
constitutions greater protection than is afforded under the federal 
constitution as internreled by the United States Supreme Court. . . . Long 
gone are the days when state courts will blindly apply United States 
Supreme Court interpretation and methodology when in the process of 
int&preting their ow& constitutions. 
Charpentier, 131 Idaho at 654, 962 P.2d at 1038 (internal citations omitted). Courts and 
the public have grown weary of and Ciuslrated with Belton's supposed "bright-line" rule 
because it is widely perceived not. to be rational; the actions officers may take do not 
' State v. Anderson, 259 Kan. 16,910 P.2d 180 (1996) (statute on search incident to arrest, by 
listing only 3 purposes to be served -protecting ofiicer, preventing escape, and discovering fruits, 
instrumentalities and evidence - is "more restrictive" thanBelton); State v. Hernandez, 410 So.2d 1381 
(La. 1982) ('We do not consider [Belton] to be a correct rule of police conduct under our state 
constitution"); Commonwealth v. Toole, 389 Mass. 159,448 N.E.2d 1264 (1983) (invalidating search based 
on state statute limiting search to evidence of crime for which arrested or weapons); State v. Muvay,135 
N.H. 369,605 A.2d 676 (1992)(under state constitution, search ofpurse incident to arrest unlawful because 
defendant then "in an ambuiance about to be transported to the hospitalal," ineaning "whatever was in her 
purse could not at that time have posed a tbreat to the welfare ofthe officer, aid her in efiecting an escape, 
or been destroyed by her."); State v. Eckel, 185 N.J. 523,888 A.2d 1266 (2006) (answering no to question 
"whether the police may conduct a warrantless search of an automobile as incident to an arrest after the 
occupants have been removed from the vehicle and are secured in police custody"); Camacho v. State, 119 
Nev. 395,75 P.3d 370 (2003) (under the Nevada Constitution, there must exist both probably cause and 
exigent circumstances for police to conduct a warrantless search of an automobile incident to a l a d  
custodial arrest"); People v. Blasich, 73 N.Y.2d 673,543 N.Y.2d.50,541 N.E.2d 40 (1989) (state 
constitution limits search to areas where arrestee might actually gain possession of weapon or deshuctihle 
evidence); State v. Brown, 63 Obio St.3d 349,588 N.E.2d 113 (1992) (search inside of closed wooden box 
inside glove compartment illegalunder Chimel; court stresses '%back-up officer had arrived on the scene" 
and defendant was in police cruiser); State v. Kirsch, 69 Or. App. 418,686 P.2d 446 (1984) ("Belton is not 
the law of Oregon"); Commonwealth v. White, 543 Pa. 45, 669 A.2d 896 (1995) (Belton rejected; search 
permissible only to extent necessary "to prevent the arrestee from secunhg weapons or destroying 
contraband"); State v. Ringer; 100 Wash.2d 686,674 P.2d 1240 (1983) (state constitution allows only area 
of car actually within arrestee's immediate control to be searched). 
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comport with expressed principles. As many sister states have chosen to do, Idaho 
Courts should choose not to follow the Belton rule any longer-especially as interpreted 
and affimed by Thornton. 
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals has been vocal in expressing concern about 
Belton and its progeny. See, e.g., Weaver, 433 F.3d 1104; United States v. McLaughlin, 
th . 170 F.3d 889 (9 Cu. 1999)(see especially, Trott, Circuit Judge, concurring); United 
Stntes v. Yasey, 834 F.2d 782 (9th Cir. 1987). The three-judge panel in Weaver, explicitly 
suggested "that the Supreme Court may wish to re-examine this issue." Weaver, 433 F.3d 
at 1107. 
The United States Supreme Court Justices has expressed concern s h e  the day 
Belton was handed down until the present. See Belton at 463-472 (Brennan, J., 
dissenting, Marshall, J. joining in dissent)(feasing that the Belton majority "may signal a 
olesale retreat horn our carefully developed search-incident-to-arrest analysis" by 
"formulating an arbitrary 'bright-line' rule . . . that fails to reflect Chimel's underlying 
policy justifications"); (White, dissenting, Marshall, J. joining in dissent)(calling "for 
more caution than the Court today exhibits."). 
More recently, in Thornton, two dissenters called the Belton rule "swollen." 
Thornton, 541 U.S. at 633 (Stevens, J., dissenting, Souter, J., joining in the dissent). 
Justice O'Connor wrote to express her "dissatisfaction with the state of the law in this 
area." Id. at 624. (O'Connor, J., concurring in part). She noted that "lower court 
decisions seem now to treat the ability to search a vehicle incident to the arrest of a recent 
occupant as a police entitlement rather than as an exception justified by the twin 
rationales of Chime1 . . '. [This is] a direct consequence of Belton's shaky foundation." 
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Id,. Justices Scalia and Ginsburg could not join the opinion because the "Court's effort to 
apply [the Belton] doctrine to this search stretches it beyond its breaking poii~t," Id.. at 
625 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment; Ginsburg, L, joining). Scalia stated, 
In our search for clarity, we have now abandoned our constitutional 
moorings and floated to a place where the law approves of purely 
exploratory searches of vehicles during which officers with no definite 
objective or reason for the search are allowed to rummage around in a car 
to see what they might find. 
Id. at 628 (quoting McLaughlin, 170 F.3d at 894 (Trott, J., concurring)). 
Scalia's dissent in Thornton, in which Ginsberg joined, has "rendered a 
devastating blow to the theoretical underpinnings of Belton," LaFave, § 7.l(c) at 531, 
which might cause tbe Court soon to abandon its original rationale for Belton entirely. 
Id. LaFave devotes several pages to Scalia's arguments, see id. at 531-537, and 
concludes that it may well be that "an overruling of Beltorz is in the offing," or possibly, 
"Belton will simply be refurbished" and "narrowed somewhat in its scope." Id. at 532-33. 
In fact, the majority in Thornton dismissed Scalia's analysis only on the ground that "this 
is the wrong case in which to address" such matters because they were not presented on 
certiorari. Thornton, 541 U.S. 615 at 624, n. 4. 
However, LaFave is not at all convinced the Court should follow Scalia's route 
rather than tending to the total demise of Belton. See LaFave at 533-37. LaFave 
concludes &at '?he choice is not really between the old, now discredited Belton and the 
new Scalia-style Belton, but rather between a ChimeZ-type vs. Rabinowitz-type of search- 
incident-to arrest rule in automobiIe cases." Id. at 537. 
2. The State of Idaho violated Mr. Mantz's rights under the Idaho 
Constitution, and Idaho Courts should overrule Charpentier and its 
line of cases and suppress the evidence obtained against Mr. Mautz 
during the search of his vehicle. 
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There no longer continues to be merit-if there ever has been since Belton-"in 
having the same rule of law applicable within the borders of our state, whether an 
interpretation of the Fourth Amendment or its counterpart-Article I, 5 17 of the Idaho 
Constitution." Cf: Watts, 142 Idaho at 233, 127 P.3d at 136. The Idaho Supreme Court's 
"other factors worthy of note," id. at 234, 127 P.3d at 137 (internal citations omitted), 
also have proven over time to be unjust and unwise. Furthermore, this touted state 
consistency with Belton (for consistency's sake) no longer makes sense for Idaho. Only 
overruling the Idaho cases will vindicate the continued invasions of privacy of Idaho 
citizens in the name of a "clear rule" under which "the police know what they can do 
after they have made a lawful arrest." Watts, 142 Idaho at 234 (internal citations 
omitted). 
Although Belton and Charpentier both quoted a 7974 article of LaFave's as 
support for adopting the present Belton rule, LaFave currently has devoted more than 
fifty pages of his Treatise to in-depth discussion and analysis of the abuses and problems 
attributable to the Belton rule. See LaFave at 5s 5.5(a)-(b), 7.l(a)-(c), 7.2(d). LaFave 
asks four questions regarding the Belton rule: 
, (1) Does it have clear and certain boundaries so that it in fact 
makes unnecessary case-by-case evaluation and adjudication? (2) Does it 
produce results approximating those which would be obtained if accurate 
case-by-case application of the underlying principle were possible? (3) Is 
it responsive to a genuine need to forego case-by-case application of a 
principle because that approach has proved unworkable? (4) Is it not 
readily subject to manipulation and abuse? 
LaFave proceeds to analyze in detail and answer those four questions. He 
contrasts Belton's standardizedprocedure (whenever the occupant of a car is arrested, 
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you may search the passenger compartment) with the underlyingprinciple (you may 
search so much of the passenger compartment as is necessary to prevcnt thc arrestee from 
destroying evidence or getting a weapon). See id. at 515. He argues that "because the 
standardized procedure [of Belton] is intended to approximate the results which would 
obtain from correct case-by-case application of theprinciple, certainly the principle need 
not be totally ignored in working out any ambiguities as to the dimensions of the general 
rule." Id. (italics added). If incorporating the principle in Belton is more difficult than in 
some other instances, it may be because "the authorized standardizedprocedure would 
as a general matter appear to produce results unsupportable by the upplicable 
iinczple." Id. at 515 (italics added). LaFave also concludes that the "search authorized 
y Belton is a search without probable cause (other than probable cause to arrest, which 
can be and often is quite different from probable cause to search). Id. at § 7.l(c) 526-27. 
This leads lum to conclude that the rule is subject to manipulation and abuse. See id. 
(citing Robbins v. California, 453 U.S. 420,444-53, 101 S.Ct. 2841,2855-59,69 L.Ed.2d 
744,762-67 (1981) (Stevens, J., dissenting)). 
Tile problem with Belton is nothing new. "[Aln inconsistent jurisprudence [ 1 has 
been with us for years." California v. Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565,583,111 S.Ct., 1982, 
1993, 114 L.Ed.2d 619, 636 (1991), (Scalia, J., concunring). Scalianoted that despite the 
oft-stated preference for search warrants, even before Acevedo, the "warrant requirement 
had become so riddled with exceptions that it was basically unrecognizable." Id at 582, 
11 1. S.Q., 1992, 114 L.Ed.2d at 636. "There can be no clarity in this area unless we 
make up cur minds, and unless the principles we express comport with the actions we 
take." Id. at 583, 11 1 S.Ct. at 1993, 114 L.Ed.2d at 636 (italics added). 
BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO SUPPRESS--12 
Mr. Mantz urges this Court to suppress all evidence against him obtaked during a 
search of his vehicle following his arrest on a warrant. Suppression is the only valional 
outcome. Due to the Idaho's "summary adoption of the Belton rule as the measure of 
protection provided by Article I, 5 17," Chavpentiev, 131 Idaho at 654,962 P.2d at 1038, 
Mr. Manlz was deprived of his right to be secure in his person, houses, papers, and 
effects against unreasonable searches and seizures. The law allows the Idaho courts to 
deviate from the doctrine of stave decisis when, as here, "overruling [a prior decision] is 
necessary to vindicate plain, obvious principles of law and remedy continued injustice." 
State v. Watts, 142 Idaho 230,233,127 P.3d 133, 136 (2005) (internal citation omitted). 
111. CONCLUSION 
All evidence obtained from the search of Mr. Mantz's tmck should be suppressed 
as illegally obtained under the United States and Idaho Constilxtions. 
DATED UCs 30th day of July, 2007. 
LANDECK, WESTBERG, JUDGE & GRAHAM, P.A. 
/7 
L&~cI<, WESTBERG, JUDGE & GRAHAM, P.A. 
By: 
Gretchen G. Stewart 
Attorneys for Defendant 
B m F  IN SWPORT OF MOTION TO SUPPRESS--13 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on this 30& day of July, 2007, I caused a true and correct copy 
of this document to be served on the following in the manner indicated: 
MICHELLE M. EVANS [ ] U.S. Mail 
DEPUTY PROSECUTING ATTORNEE [ ] Overnight Mail 
LATAB COUNTY PROSECUTOR'S OFFICE IFAX 
LATAH COUNTY COURTHOUSE [,) 1 Hand Delivery 
P.O. BOX 8068 
MOSCOW, ID 83843 
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CI.ERK.OF QiS[Ai(;T i;OlJiiT 
l ,A . j \ $  ! C2>i ntr i  ,L,,.* 
JOHN C. JUDGE (TSB 3285) 81% IX~IJTV 
GRETCHEN STEWART (ISB 721 1) 
LANDECK, WESTBERG, JUDGE & GRAHAM, P.A. 
414 S. Jefferson 
P.O. Box 9344 
Moscow, lD 83843 
(208) 883-1505 
FAX: (208) 883-4593 
Attorneys for Defendant 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF TKE SECOND JUDICLAZ, DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF LATAH 
STATE OF LDAHO, 1 
) Case No. CR-2007-0001292 
Plaintiff, 1 
) SUPPLEMENT TO BRIEF IN SWPORT 
v. ) OF MOTION TO SUPPRESS 
1 




Defendant Tim C. Mantz, through his attorneys, Landeck, Westberg, Judge & 
Graham, P.A., hereby submits this Supplement to Brief in Support of Motioils to 
Suppress and to Dismiss, 
1. The argument made in the Briefin Support of Motion to Suppress in case 
number CR-2007-0001292 is supplemented by the facts and arguments below, which are 
hereby incorporated into the Brief in Support of Motion to Suppress in case number CR- 
2007-0001292 as though l l l y  set forth therein. 
SUPPLEMENT TO BlUEF IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO SUPPRESS --1 0088 
2. The arguments made in the Brief (and Supplement) in Support of Motion to 
Suppress in case number CR-2007-0001320 as to staleness of the information provided in 
support of the search warrant, unreasonableness of the nighttime, forced-entry search of 
the Mantz home, and lack of particularity of the Warrant are hereby incorporated into the 
Brief in Support of Motion to Suppress in case number CR-2007-0001292 as though fully 
set forth therein: 
3. Law enforcement should have applied for a search warrant for Mr. Mantz and 
his truck within a few days, at most, aRer the; aUeged incident was reported on February 
19,2007, and after Det. Vietmeier had conducted interviews with the alleged victim and 
others on February 20,2007. Instead, Det. Vietmeier waited until March 29,2007, to 
sign a complaint and obtain an Arrest Warrant for Mr. Mantz, and until March 29 or 
March 30,2007, to apply for a Search Warrant for a "revolver of unknown caliber and 
make, and a search of a 'red colored, quad cab four door, flatbed pickup"' that Mr. Mantz 
allegedly used in the alleged incident on February 16,2007. (Revised Statement of 
Deputy R.J. Vietmeier; Request for Search Wanant for T i  Carl Mantz) ('"Revised 
Statement"). 
4. The Search Warrant issued 7:15 p.m., March 30,2007 ("Warrant"), lacked 
particularity because the scope exceedcd the person of Mr. Mantz and the truck he was 
alleged to have been driving at the time of the alleged incident on February 20,2007. 
When Detective Vietmeier applied for the Search Warrant, he stated under oath that "it is 
beIieved this firearm would either be in Mantz's immediate possession and control, or in 
said described vehicle." However, the Warrant was for the entire Mantz premises, 
including the home, "its grounds, and outbuildings, and all vekicles and conveyances 
found thereon." (Warrant at 1). The Fourth Amendment most strongly protects privacy 
ofthe home. The Supreme Court decreed that "it is axiomatic that the physical entry of 
the home is the chief evil against which ihe wording of the Fourth Amendment is 
directed." Welsh v. Wisconsin, 466 U.S. 740,748 (1984). Under the Fourth Amendment, 
wanants must describe with particularity the place to be searched and the person or 
things to be seized. Coolidge v. New Ii'ampshire, 403 U.S. 443, reh'g denied, 404 U.S. 
874 (1971). 
5. The first sentence in paragraph two on page 4 of the Brief in Support of 
Motion to Suppress contains a typographical error. The sentence should read, "The 
United States Supreme Court has expressed concern . . . ." 
Because the evidence was illegally obtained under the United States and Idaho 
Constitutions, all evidence obtained from the searches of Mr. Mantz's tmck and home 
should be suppressed. 
DATED this 3rd day of August, 2007. 
LANDECK, WESTBERG, JUDGE & GRAILAM, P.A. 
By: 
Gretchen G. Stewart 
, 
Attorneys for Defendant 
SUPPLEMXNT TO BREF W SUPPORT OF MOTION TO SUPPRESS --3 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on this 31d day of August, 2007, I caused a true and correct copy 
of this document to be served on the following in the manner indicated: 
MICILELLE M. EVANS [ 1 U.S. Mail 
DEPUTY PROSECUTING ATTORNEY [ ] Overnight Mail 
LATAH COUNTY PROSECUTOR'S OFFICE [ ] FAX 
LATAH COUNTY COURTHOUSE p] I-Imd Delivery 
P.O. BOX 8068 
MOSCOW, ID 83843 
Gretchen G. Stewart 
SUPPLEMENT TO BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO SUPPRESS --4 of ig i  
JOHN C. JUDGE (ISB 3288) 
GRETCHEN STEWART (ISB 721 1) 
LANDECK, WESTBERG, JUDGE & GRAHAM, P.A. 
414 S. Jefferson 
P.O. Box 9344 
Moscow, ID 83843 
(208) 883-1505 
FAX: (208) 883-4593 
Attorneys for Defendant 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICJAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF LATAH 
STATE OF IDAHO, 
) Case No. CR-2007-0001292 
Plaintifi; 
) MOTION TO SUPPLEMENT 
v. ) PRETRIAL, MOTIONS 
1 
TIM C. MANTZ, ) 
f 
Defendant. 1 
Defendant Tim C. Mantz, through his attorneys, Landeck, Westberg, Judge & 
Grabam, P.A., by Gretchen G. Stewart, and pursuant to Rule 12 I.C.R., hereby moves this 
Couvt as follows: 
To suppress all evidence obtained March 30,2007, obtained as aresult of the 
search warrant issued for the search of the Mantz home on the additional grounds that: 
I. the no-lmock, nighttime, forced-entry search of the Mantz home was 
unreasonable, and therefore a violation of the Fourth Amendment to the United States 
Constitution and of Article I, Section 17 of the Idaho Constitution; 
MOTION TO SWPLEMENT PRETRIAL MOTIONS -1- 0092 
2. the warrant laclced particularity, and therefore violated the Fourth Amendment 
to the United States Constitution and of Article I, Section 17 of the Idaho Constitution; 
and 
3. the information provided in support of the search warrant was too stale to 
justify such a general inkusion of the Mantzes' privacy. 
DATED this 3rd day of August, 2007. 
LANDECK, WESTBERG, JUDGE & GRAHAM, P.A. 
By: 
Attorneys for Defendant 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on this 3rd day of August, 2007, I caused a true and correct copy 
of this document to be served oil the following in the manner indicated: 
MICHELLE M. EVANS [ ] U.S. Mail 
DEPUTY PROSECUTING ATTORNEY [ ] Overnight Mail 
LATAI3 COUNTY PROSECUTOR'S OFFICE 
LATAH COUNTY COURTHOUSE 
P.O. BOX 8068 
MOSCOW, ID 83843 
&\a&& 
Gi-etchen G. Stewart 
MOTION TO SUPPLEMENT PETRIAL MOTIONS -2- 
JOHN C. JUDGE (ISB 3288) 
GRETCHEN STEWART (ISB 721 1) 
LANDECK, WESTBERG; JUDGE & GRAWAM, P.A 
414 S. Jefferson 
P.O. Box 9344 
Moscow, ID 83843 
(208) 883-1505 
FAX: (208) 883-4593 
Attorneys for Defendiw~t 
JN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF TI3E STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF LATAH 
STATE OF IDNIO, ) 
) Case No. CR-2007-0001292 
Plaintiff, ) Case No. CR-2007-0001320 
) 
v. ) MOTION TO CORRECT CLERlCAL 
) ERRORS JN PRETRIAL MOTIONS, 
TIM C. MANTZ, ) BRIEFS, AND SUBSEQUENT 
) SUPPLEMENTS 
Defendant. 1 
Defendant Tiin C. Mantz, through his attorneys, Landeck, Westberg, Judge & 
Graham, P.A., and pursuant to Rules 12(b) and 47 I.C.R. hereby moves this Court as 
follows: 
1. To correct clerical errors in the case numbers contained in the documents filed 
July 30,2007, and August 3,2007, in the two related cases listed above. We 
inadvertently reversed the case numbers in the titles of the docnments as well as in the 
body of the motions, briefs, md supplements; 
2. To take judicial notice that the pretrial motions and brief (and subsequent 
MOTION TO CORRECT CLERICAL ERRORS IN PRETRJAL MOTIONS, BRIEFS, 
AND SUBSEQUENT SUPPLEMENTS -I OOQ4 
supplement) originally filed in Case No. CR-2007-0001292 sl~ould be considered as filed 
in Case No. CR-2007-0001320; and 
3. To take judicial notice that the prehial motions and brief (and subsequent 
supplement) originally filed in file in Case No. CR-2007-0001320 sl~ould be considered 
as filed in Case No. CR-2007-0001292. 
4. We apologize to the Court and counsel for any confusion caused by our 
reversal of the case numbers. 
DATED this 7th day of August, ,2007. 
LANDECK, WESTBERG, JUDGE & GRAHAM, P.A. 
By: 
Attorneys for Defendant 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on this 7th day of August, 2007, I caused a M e  and correct 
copy of 02s docunenf to be served on the following in the manner indicated: 
MICHELLE M. EVANS [ ] U.S . ail i4 
DEPUTY PROSECUTING ATTORNEY [ ] Overnight @ail 
LATAH COUNTY PROSECUTOR'S OFFICE I IFAX 
LATAH COUNTY COURTNOUSE W H a n d  Delivery 
P.O. BOX 8068 
MOSCOW, LD 83843 
MOTION TO CORRECT CLERICAL ERRORS IN PRETRZAL MOTIONS, BRIEFS, 
AND SUBSEQUENT S U P P L E ~ N T S  -2 0095 
LATAH COUNTY PROSECUTORS OFFICE 
MICHELLE M. EVANS 
D E P W  PROSECUTING ATTORNEY 
Latah County Courthouse 
P.O. Box 8068 
Moscow, Idaho 83843-0568 
(208) 882-8580 Ext. 3316 
ISB No. 4795 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF LATAH 
STATE OF IDAHO, 
Plaintiff, 
1 
) Case No. CR-2007-0001292 
, 1 Case No. CR-2007-0001320 
v. 1 
) MOTION FOR EXTENSION OF TIME 




COMES NOW the State of Idaho by and through Michelle M. Evans, Latah County 
Deputy Prosecuting Attorney, and requests this 'Court for an extension of time for filing its 
Response Brief to the Defendant's Motion to Suppress, Exclude Evidence and to Dismiss, 
and supporting briefs until 5:00 p.m. on Monday, the 20th day of August, 2007, and 
therefore extend the Defendant's time for filing his reply brief, if any, until 5:00 p.m. on 
Monday, the 27th day of August, 2007 
MOTION FOR EXTENSION OF TIME: Page -1- 
The State has spoken with John C. Judge, counsel for Defendant, and he has no 
objection to the granting of tbis motion. 
/3+ DATED this day of August, 2007. 
Michllle M. Evans 
- 
Deputy Prosecuting Attorney 
MOTION FOR EXTENSION OF TIME: Page -2- 
CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY 
I hereby certdy that a ivue and correct copy of the foregoing Motion for Extension of 
Time was 
&.mailed, United States mail, postage prepaid 
hand delivered 
s e n t  by facsimile, original by mail 
to the following: 
John C. Judge 
Attorney at Law 
P.O. Box 9344 
Moscow, ID 83843 
aC 
Dated this & day of August, 2007. 
MOTION FOR EXTENSION OF TIME Page -3- 
BY' 
IN TIlE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY 01; LATAH 
STATE OF IDAHO, 
Plaintiff, 
1 
) Case No. CR-2007-0001292 
) Case No. CR-2007-0001320 
) 
1 ORDER FOR EXTENSION OF TIME 
TIM CARL MANTZ, 1 
Defendant. 1 
) 
The above matter having come before the court upon motion of the State and 
good cause appearing; 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the State's Response Brief currently scheduled to 
be filed by 5:00 p.m. on August 13,2007, be and the same hereby is extended to August 
20,2007, at 5:00 p.m. with the Defendant's Reply Brief, if any, be and the same hereby is 
extended to August 27,2007, at 500 p.m 
DATED this !* day of August, 2007, I\ v\ 4 C  fe ? h e  a**+ /$Z b e ,  
District ~ u d g e  
0099 
ORDER FOR EXTENSION OF TIME: Page -1- 
CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY 
I hereby certify that true and correct copies of the ORDER FOR EXTENSION OF 
TIME were served on the following in the manner indicated below: 
John C. Judge 
Attorney at Law 
P.O. Box 9344 
Moscow, ID 83843 
'[%.u.s Mail 
[ ] Overnight Mail 
[ I Fax 
[ I  Hand Delivery 
William W. Thompson, Jr. [ I  U.S. Mail 
Prosecuting Attorney [ I  Overnight Mail 
Latah County Courthouse [ I  Fax 
Moscow, ID 83843 $,J P Hand Delivery 
7 ,  fi 
Dated this f i  day of August, 2007. 
ORDER FOR EXTENSION OF TIME: Page -2- 
CLERl( Cif DiS'ii?iU CGVR'T 
L.ATAH.COUNTr' PROSECUTORS OFFICE 
MICHELLE M. EVANS 
DEPUTY PROSECUTING ATTORNEY 
Latah County Courthouse 
P.O. Box 8068 
Moscow, Idaho 83843-0568 
(208) 882-8580 Ext. 3316 
ISB No. 4795 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDTCIAT, DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF LATAH 
STATE OF IDAHO, 
Plaintiff, 
1 
Case No: CR-2007-0001292 
Case No. CR-2007-0001320 
v. 1 
1 MOTION FOR EXTENSION OF TIME 
TIM CARL MANTZ, 1 
Defendant. 1 
\ 
COMES NOW the State of Idaho by and through Michelle M. Evans, Latah County 
Deputy Prosecuting Attorney, and requests this Court for an extension of time for filing its 
Response Brief to the Defendant's Motion to Suppress, Exclude Evidence and to Dismiss, 
and supporting briefs until 5:00 p.m. on Wednesday, the 22nd day of August, 2007, and 
therefore extend the Defendant's time for filing his reply brief, if any, until 5:00 p.m. on 
Wednesday, the 29th day of August, 2007. 
MOTION FOR EXTENSION OF TIME: Page -1- 
The State has spoken with John C. Judge, counsel for Defendant, and he has no 
objection to the granting of this motion (again). 
m % a y  oi August, 2007. DATED this __ 
n o , l ~ h e i l e r n L *  
. 
Michelle M. Evans 
Deputy Prosecuting Attorney 
MOTION FOR EXTENSION OF TIME: Page -2- 
CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing Motion for Extension of 
Time was 
mailed, United States mail, postage prepaid 
- hand delivered 
sent by facsimile, original by mail 
to the following: 
John C. Judge 
Attorney at Law 
P.O. Box 9344 
Moscow, ID 83843 
d 
Dated this day of August, 2007. 
MOTION FOR EXTENSION OF TIME: Page -3. 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF LATAI-I 
STATE OF IDA130, 
Plaintiff, 
1 
1 Case No. CR-2007-0001292 
) CaseNo. CR-2007-0001320 
v. 1 
) ORDER FOR EXTENSION OF TIME 
TIM CARL MANTZ, 1 
Defendant. 1 
The above matter having come before the court upon motion of the State and 
good cause appearing; 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the State's Response Brief currently scheduled to 
be filed by 5:00 p.m. on August 20,2007, be and the same hereby is extended to August 
22, 2007, at 5:00 p.m. with the Defendant's Reply Brief, if any, be and the same hereby is 
extended to August 29,2007, at 5:00 p.m. 
9- DATED this a day of August, 2007, A @ r\ L tc*  C * 
District ~ u & e  
ORDER FOR EXTENSION OF TIME: Page -1- 010.4 
CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY 
I hereby certify thattrue and correct copies of t11e ORDER FOREXTENSION OF 
TIME were served on the following in the manner indicated below: 
John C. Judge 
Attorney at Law 
P.O. Box 9344 
Moscow, ID 83843 
William W. Thompson, Jr. 
Prosecuting Attorney 
Latah County Courthouse 
Moscow, ID 83843 
+.s. Mail 
[ I  Overnight Mail 
i I Fax 
[ j Hand Delivery 
[ ] U.S. Mail 
[ I  Overnight Mail 
I 1  Fax 
[ Hand Delivery Y\ 
Dated t h i a l  day of August, 2007. 
ORDER FOR EXTENSION OF TIME: Page -2- 
ZOO? BUG 22 W# 10: 55 
LATAH COUNTY PROSECUTORS OFFICE 
WILLIAM W. THOMPSON, JR. 
PROSECUTING ATTORNEY 
Latah County CourtI~ouse 
P.0. Box 8068 
Moscow, Idaho 83843-0568 
(208) 882-8580 Ext. 3316 
ISB No. 2613 
CLERK OF DISTT1ICT COUfi'I 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE couivn OF LATAH 
STATE OF IDAHO, 1 
Plaintiff, ) e a s e  No. CR-2007-0001292 
Case No. CR-2007-0001320 
v. 1 
1 MOTION FOR EXTENSION OF TIME 
TIM CARL MANTZ, 
Defendant. 
COMES NOW the State of Idaho by and through William W. Thompson, Jr., Latah 
County Prosecuting Attorney, and requests this Court for an extension of time for filing its 
Response Brief to the Defendant's Motion to Suppress, Exclude Evidence and to Dismiss, 
and supporting briefs until 5:00 p.m. on Monday, the 27th day of August, 2007, due to the 
fact that Deputy ~rdsecuiing Attorney Michelle M. Evans (who is handling this case) is ill 
and unable to complete the response today; and therefore extend the Defendant's time for 
MOTION FOR EXTENSION OF TIME Page -1- 0106 
filing his reply brief, if any, until 5:00 p.mi oh.Tuesdaji, the 4th day of September, 2007. 
The undersigned has spoken with John C. Judge, counsel for Defendant, and he has 
no obiection to the granting of this motion. - " - 
DATED this &L day of August, 
William fi. ~horn-T\ 
Prosecuting AMo ey 
MOTION FOR EXTENSION OF TIME: Page -2- 
CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing Motion for Extension of 
Time was 
/mailed, United States mail, postage preppid 
h a n d  delivered 
sent by facsimile, original by mail 
to the following: 
John C. Judge 
Attorney at Law 
P.O. Box 9344 
Moscow, ID 83843 
Dated this g&& day of August, 2007. 
MOTION FOR EXTENSION OF TIME: Page -3- 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF TIlE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF LATAIH 
STATE OF IDAHO, 
Plaintiff, 
) 
1 (I Case No. CR-2007-0001299 
1 Case No. CR-2007-0001320 
1 
) ORDER FOR EXTENSION OF TIME 
TIM CARL MANTZ, 1 
Defendant. ) 
The above matter having come before the court upon motion of the State and 
good cause appearing; 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the State's Response Brief currently scheduled to 
be iiled by 5:00 p.m. on August 22,2007, be and the same hereby is extended to August 
27,2007, at 5:00 p.m. with the Defendant's Reply Brief, if any, be and the same hereby is 
extended to September 4,2007, at 5:00 p.m. 
DATED this 
I J P  ZZ day of August, 2007. 
District Judge 
ORDER FOR EXTENSION OF TIME: Page -1- 03 09 
CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY 
I hereby certify that true and correct copies of the ORDER FOR EXTENSION OF 
TIME were served on the following in the manner indicated below: 
Jolu~ C. Judge 
Attorney at Law 
P.O. Box 9344 
Moscow, ID 83843 
\rXU.S. Mail 
[ I Overnight Mail 
I Fax 
[I Hand Delivery 
William W. Thompson, Jr. [I U.S. Mail 
Prosecuting Attorney [ I  Overnight Mail 
Latah County Courthouse 
Moscow, ID 83843 <;ynd Delivery 
M L  
Dated this day of August, 2007. 
Deputy Clerk 
ORDER FOR EXTENSION OF TIME: Page -2- 
' '  C: < ' . , 
- ' CASE ND .t,k:i!-f21?- 
2001 AUG 27 Pi": 3: 0 1 
CLESK OF 84TkiCT CWRT 
LATAH COUNTY PROSECUTOR'S OFFICE 
MICHELLE M. EVANS 
DEPUTY PROSECUTING ATTORNEY 
ADAM D. WAY 
LEGAL INTERN 
Latah County Courthouse 
P.O. Box 8068 
Moscow, Idaho 83843-0568 
Phone: (208) 882-8580 Exxt. 3316 
ISB No. 4795 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF LATAH 
STATE OF IDAHO, 
) q vGi8@m2@&@&Q$&Q#$42$%% ,n,7"".p q 
Plaintiff, 1 Case No. CR-2007-0001320 
) 
v. BRIEF IN OPPOSITION TO 
1 DEENDANT'S MOTIONS TO 
1 SUPPRESS, EXCLUDE EVIDENCE, TIM CARL MANTZ, 
Defenda~lt. AND DISMISS 
I. STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
On March 29,2007, the defendant was charged by Criminal Complaint in CR-2007- 
0001292 with the felony c r k e  of Aggravated Assault, Idaho Code 18-901, 905, 906, 
occurring on the 16th day of February, 2007. A Warrant of Arrest was issued that same 
date by the llon&bl.e Randall W. Robinson for that offense. In the evening hours of 
March 30, 2007, a Search Warrant was issued by Judge Robinson authorizing law 
BRIEF IN OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANT'S 
MOTIONS TO SUPPRESS, EXCLUDE 
EVTDENCE, AND DISMISS: Page -1- 
enforcement to search 1011 Vale Road, Hanrard, Latah County, Idaho for Tim Carl Mantz 
and for firearms and ammunition. W d e  the Latah County Sherriff's Office was staging 
to execute that search warrant, Sgt. Phil Gray spotted the Defendant driving his piclcup 
and stopped the vehicle after observing the Defendant commit a traffic infraction. The 
Defendant was subsequently arrested on the Aggravated Assault warrant and the cab of 
his piclcup was searched. Rased upon that search, the Defendant was also arrested on the 
felony offense of Possession of a Contolled Substance - Methamphetamine, Idaho Code 
37-2732(c) (1). A Criminal Complaint was filed the following Monday, April 2, 2007, in 
CR-2007-0001320. On April 10,2007, an Amended Criminal Complaint was filed adding a 
second count - Possession of Paraphernalia, Idaho Code 37-2734A(1), a misdemeanor 
A preliminary hearing on both cases was held on June 7, 2007, before the 
Honorable Randall W. Robinson, upon which Judge Robinson bound over the Defendant 
as charged in both cases. Jury trials have been set on two different dates for each case. 
On July 30, 2007, the Defendant filed in CR-2007-0001292 (Ag AssauIt case) 
Motions to Suppress, To Exclude Evidence, and to Dismiss with a supporting brief. The 
issues raised in the motions and brief actually addressed the methamphetamine case. 
Additionally, on that same date, the Defendant filed in CR-2007-0001320 (Meth case) 
Motions to Suppress and to Exclude Evidence with a supporting brief. The issues raised 
in those motions and brief actually addressed the assault case. On August 3, 2007, the 
BRlEF IN OPPOSEION TO DEFENDANT'S 
MOTIONS TO SUPPmSS, EXCLUDE 
EVIDENCE, AND DISMISS: Page -2- 
Defendant filed a Motion to Supplement Pretrial Motions and supporting brief in each of 
the two cases, alleging further issues in regards to the search warrant and incorporating 
the previous issues and arguments to each case. Then on August 7,2007, the Defendant 
filed in each case a joint Motion to Correct Clerical Errors in Pretrial Motions, Briefs, and 
Subsequent Supplements. Finally, on August 17, 2007, the Defendant Tied in CR-2007- 
0001320, a Second Supplemental to Brief in Support of Motion to Suppress. 
The State requests that the court deny the Defendant's motion, and files in each 
case this joint brief in support of that request. 
The State relies upon the Probable Cause Affidavits for the arrests in each of the 
two cases, the Affidavit for Search Warrant for 1011 Vale Rd., Harvard, Latah County, 
Idaho, the testimony preseixted at the preliminary hearing on June 7,2007 (referred to as 
PH Tr.), as well as expected testimony and other evidence to be presented at the 
suppression hearing of this matter. Given the above, a summary of the relevant facts is as 
fo1Iows: 
Karl Hoidal and friends went on ail ATV ride oix the evening of Friday, February 
16,2007. The plan was to travel in a loop up Flat Creek Road and back again, a road he 
had traveled on before. (PII Tr. p. 15. ll. 12-24). Partway along the journey, some of the 
group heard gunshots coming from northeast of their direction (the general direction of 
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the Defendant's home). (PI3 Tr. p. 19, 1. 15 through p. 21, 1. 23). At some point in the 
journey, Mr. Hoidal's ATV collided with another ATV, resulting in some damage to Mr. 
Hoidal's ATV. As a result, Mr. Hoidal was still able to drive the ATV, but was not able to 
take the vehicle in the deeper snow areas of the road. Accordingly, about half-way up 
Flat Creek Road, Mr. Hoidal left the group and turned back. As he traveled back Flat 
Creek Road, when he was about a half mile from the entrance, he saw headlights coming 
towards him. As he rounded a corner, his ATV and the Defendant's red pickup clipped 
each other on the icy road. Each vehicle came to a stop - Mr. Hoidal's ATV became 
temporarily stuck in a snow bank. (PH Tr. p. 23 1.12 through p. 24,l. 23). 
Mr. Hoidal further testified that the Defendant then angrily confronted hkn about 
being on the road without permission while the Defendant held a pistol in his hand. (PH 
Tr. p. 32,l. 2 through p. p. 33,1. 9). Then the Defendant fired a shot over Mr. Hoidal's 
head while they were standing a couple of feet from each other. (PH Tr. p. 39,l. 3 through 
p. 41,l. 18). The Defendant then threatened Mr. Hoidal further by saying that "the next 
one's in w]." (PH Tr. p. 42,ll. 8 - 21). Mr. Hoidal believed that the pistol used was a 
revolver. The confrontation ultimately ended and Mr. Iloidal drove his ATV to his 
friend's house. 
1 
After talking with his mom and dad about what occurred, Mr. Hoidal's mother 
called the Latah County Sheriff's Office on Monday, February 19,2007, to report what had 
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occurred. Deputy Monte Russell responded to the report and spoke to Ms. Hoidal. The 
case was then turned oves to Detective Ron Vietmeier who contacted Karl Hoidal on 
February 20th and then began the investigation. 
A Criminal Cornplaint and Probable Cause Affidavit for Aggravated Assault were 
presented to the Honorable Judge Randall W. '~obinson for his review and was filed on 
March 29,2007. Judge Robinson also issued a Warrant of Arrest for the Defendant on that 
charge the same date. 
On the evening of Friday, March 30,2007, Det. Vietmeier presented an affidavit for 
a search warrant for 1011 Vale Rd, Harvard, Latall County, Idaho, to Judge Robinson, 
requesting authorization to search the residence for the Defendant and for any firearms 
and ammunition, as well as the standard request for indicia of ownership, residency or 
occupancy. Based upon Det. Viebneiers affidavit and its included statement and revised 
statement, Judge Robinson granted the search warrant, authorizing a nighttime, no-knock -. 
execution. 
That same evening, while driving his patrol car in the Potlatch area with his 
passenger, Deputy Travis Catt, Sgt. Phil Gray saw a person whom he believed to be the 
Defendant driving a red pickup. Sgt. Gray followed the truck, qbserved .a traffic 
infraction, and then initiated a traffic stop. He confirmed that the driver (and sole 
occupant) was the Defendant and placed him under arrest for the warrantaround 11:OO 
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p.m. Other deputies arrived on scene to offer assistance. (PI-I Tr. p. 137 through p. 139). 
Deputy Carl Forlc was one of the deputies that arrived on scene to assist. When he 
arrived on scene, Sgt. Gray had just arrested the Defendant and was placing cuffs on the 
Defendaht. As Sgt. Gray waked the Defendant back to the patrol car, Deputy Fork 
looked inside the red pickup and found a pistol sitting on the front s'eat, right next to the 
driver 's seat. He also observed a black leather bag that appeared to be a camera bag 
located close by. (PH Tr. p. 154,1.2 through p. 155,l. 7). Deputy Fork then removed'the 
.45 caliber semi-automatic handgun and unloaded i t  Deputy Fork then looked for any 
other possible firearms. (PH. Tr. p. 173,ll. 17 - 25). He looked inside the black bag and 
inside containers within the black bag, ultimately finding a glass pipe, a brass pipe, and a 
baggie with white crystal-like substance that ultimately tested positive for 
methamphetamine. (PH. Tr. p. 155, I. 8 though p. 156,l. 16). Deputy Fork seized all the 
above items and locked them in his patrol car. (PI3 Tr. p. 157,ll. 15 - 23). 
WISe the Defendant was being arrested and his truck ultimately impounded and 
towed, the tactical team from the Latah County Sherriff's Office was meeting to d e t e d e  
the details on serving the search warrant for the Defendant's home. After the Defendant's 
arrest and while officer's were still on scene at the area of the traffic stop, the Defendant's 
son, accompanied by another male, stopped at the scene and began to use his cell phone 
The deputies directed the ~efendant's son to cease the call, as the search warrant team 
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was about to execute the warrant: 
The LCSO team sewed the search warrant around 11:35 or 11:45 p.m., ultimately 
seizing approximately thirty-five firearms and amnunition along with a small amount of 
marijuana and some paraphernalia. (PH Tr. p. 185,l. 1 through p. 187,l. 19). 
On April 2,2007, the Defendant signed a Permission and Consent to Search iorm, 
authorizing LCSO to search his 2000 red Ford pickup that had been impounded following 
his arrest. During that s e a r 6  Det. Vietmeier found additional ammunition and took 
photographs and measurements of damage to the vel~icle. (PH. Tr. p. 195). 
111. ISSUES 
1. Was the Search Warrant for t l~e Defendant's home appropriately issued and 
executed? 
2. Was the search of the Defendant's vehicle an  appropriate search incident to arrest? 
IV. ARGUMENT 
A. THE SEARCH WARRANT FOR THE DEFENDANT'S HOME AT 1011 VALE 
ROAD, HARVARD, LATAH COUNTY, IDAHO, WAS APPROPRIATELY ISSUED 
AND EXECUTED. 
1. The information provided in support of the search warrant was 
sufficiently current and therefore, the search warrant of the Defendant's 
home was appropriately issued. 
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The information provided in the Affidavit for Search Warrant, on March 30, 
2007, was sufficiently current so as to support Judge Robinson's finding that probable 
cause existed to issue a search warrant for the Defendant's home. In determining if 
probable cause exists to issue a search warrant, a magistrate must decide "whether, 
given all the circumstances set forth in the affidavit before him, . . . there is a fair 
probability that contraband or evidence of a crime will be found in a particular place." 
State v. Wilson, 130 Idaho 213,215,938 P.2d 1251,1253 (Idaho App. 1997). The proper 
standard upon which to determine if information regarding the presence of items 
sought in a search warrant is stale or not depends upon the nature of the scenario. State 
v. Cavlson, 134 Idaho 473,477,4 P.3d 1122,1128 (Idaho Ct. App. 2000). As the court in 
Carlson stated, "there is no magical number of days within which inforrnation is fresh 
and after which the information becomes stale." Id. Therefore, under Cavlson, it is of no 
in~portance that the incident which gave rise to the search warrant was at least six 
weeks old. 
What is important is the nature of the property sought. See U.S. v. Byinklow, 560 
F.2d 1003,1006 (10" Cir. 1977) (holding that items which could reasonably be expected 
to be kept in the place searched, were designed for long term use and likely still to be 
functional was significant in holding that information provided eleven months prior to 
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a warrant's execution was not stale). Of additional significance in tlus analysis is "[ijf 
the affidavit recounts criminal activities of a ,protracted or colitinuous nature, a time 
delay in the sequence of events is of less significance." Carlson, 134 Idaho at 477,4 P.3d 
at 1128. 
Here, the affidavit by Detective Vietmeier stated that the Defendant used a 
handgun and pointed it directly at another's head. Statement of Deputy R.J. Vietmeir in 
Support of Request for Search Warrant for Tirn Carl Mantz at 1. This information 
would not be stale six weeks after the event as a firearm, by nature, is a type of item that 
is likely to still be functional, is designed for long term use, and reasonably likely to be 
kept in a persons home. Additionally, the Search Warrant was also for the Defendant 
himself who is likely to 'be found at his home even six weeks after the incident. 
Detective Vietmeier also stated that the he had personal knowledge of numerous 
.occasions the Defendant had threatened violence on otl~ers and at times produced a 
firearm in conjunction with such threats. Id. These types of threats should be 
considered assaults and give rise to a determination by a judge that the use of a firearm 
by this Defendant is a recurring event. Therefore, as Carlson tells us, a time delay in 
applying for a search warrant is of less significance and the information supporting the 
warrant should not be considered stale in this situation. 134 Idaho at 477, 4 P.3d at 
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In his brief, the Deiendant cites to various examples u~volving illegal marijuana 
to illustrate that the information for this warrant was stale as the alleged conduct of the 
Defendant, upon which the warrant is based, occurred six weeks prior to the issuance of 
the warrant. Defendant's Brief in Support of Motion to Suppress (hereafter Defendant's 
Brief) at 2-3. IHowever, there are several problems with the examples upon which the 
Defendant relies. Initially, the Defendant identifies as a relevant factor in a 
determination of stale information the use of words in the affidavit that are in either 
present or past tense. Defendant's Briei at 3. In support of this claim the Defendant 
cites to U.S. v. Harris, 403 U.S. 573,579 (1971). However, Harris does not find the use of 
word tense in an affidavit as significant, rather it states that statements in an affidavit 
that referred to a recent activity of purchasing whiskey from the Defendant was merely 
part of a two year series of purchases. Id; Therefore, any argument as to the use of 
word tense in an affidavit is without merit. 
Furthermore, the Defendant states "the overall test for staleness is that the facts 
must be sufficient to justify a conclusion that property-which is the object of a search is 
probably on tlie premises to be searched." Defendant's Brief at 3 (quoting U.S. v. 
, Greany, 929 F.2d 523 (9f" Cir. 1991)). However, Greany actually recognizes this as the 
overall test for probable cause concerning warrants and not staleness. 929 F.2d at 524; 
Wilson, 130 Idaho at 215,938 P.2d at 1253 
BRIEF IN OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANT'S 
MOTIONS TO SUPPRESS, EXCLUDE 
EVIDENCE, NVD DISMISS: Page -10- 
Accordingly, the information provided in support of thc search warrant was 
sufficiently current and therefore, the search warrant of the Defendant's home was 
appropriately issued. 
2. The search of the Defendant's home at nighttime was an 
authorized search under the Fourth Amendment to the United States 
Constitution and under Article I, Section 17 of the Idaho Constitution. 
"The Fourth Amendment states unambiguously that 'no Warrants shall issue, 
but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing . 
the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized."' Groh v. Ramirez, 540 
U.S. 551, 557, 124 S.Ct. 1284, 1289 (2004). Similarly, "Article I, section 17 of the Idaho 
Constitution provides that 'no warrant shall issue witl-~out a finding of probable 
cause....'" State v. Zueger, 143 Idaho 647, 152 P.3d 8, 11 (2006). Under the Idaho 
Criminal Rules (I.C.R.), a warrant may be served at night if the issuing authority "by 
appropriate provision in the warrant, and for reasonable cause shown, authorizes its 
execution[.]" I.C.R. Rule 41(c) (emphasis added). In State v. Holman, 109 Idaho 382,387, 
707 P.2d 493, 498 (Idaho Ct. App. 1985), the Court described "reasonable cause" as 
"cause for carrying on the unusual nighttime arrest or search that, upon showing made, 
convinces the magistrate that it is reasonable." See also State v. Lzndner, 100 Idaho 37,43, 
592 P.2d 852, 858 (1979). "[Wlhen a magistrate reasonably feels a nighttime search 
would serve the ends of justice, his discretionary decision will not be disturbed on 
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appeal." Id. at 388,707 P.2d at 499. 
Applying these standards to the present case, the nighttime, no-knock warrant 
was properly authorized which allowed law enforcement to search the Defendant's 
home. The Search Warrant itself, which allowed a search of the Defendant's home to 
locate the Defendant and any firearms, was based on the proof provided by Detective 
Vietmeier under oath. Search Warrant at 1. This proof was the affidavit he provided 
for the Search Warrant. This affidavit stated in part, that Detective Vietmeier was 
requesting the nighttime no-knock warrant authorization out of concern for officer 
safety. Affidavit for Search Warrant at Exhibit A. This is the &owing made to the 
magistrate that convinced him the time and manner of the Search Warrant was 
reasonable and provided the reasonable cause for the execution of the warrant as 
required by I.C.R. 41(c). See Holman, 109 Idaho 387,707 P.2d 498. As the warrant itself 
was properly issued in this instance, the resulting search of the Defendant's home was 
therefore reasonable 
Althougl~ the Defendant devotes a considerable'amount of time in his brief in 
explainiiig why the good faith exception to the exclusionary rule is inapplicable in 
Idaho, he does not provide any reasoning to explain how the exclusionary rule itself 
should app& when a search warrant is properly issued. Supplement to Brief in Support 
of Motion to Suppress at 3-4. As already provided, the warrant in this situation was 
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properIy issued as it was based on probable cause, supported by an affidavit which 
provided reasonable cause to believe that a nighttime, no-knock entry was required. 
Lacking an illegal warrant, there is no reason to apply the exclusionary rule to the 
resulting search of the Defendant's home 
3. The warrant authorizing the search of the Defendant's home adequately 
identified the persons, place, and things to be seized which was supported by a 
thorough affidavit. 
"The Fourth Amendment states unambiguously that 'no Warrants shall issue, 
but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and parficularly describing 
the place to be searched, and the persons or fhings fo be seized."' Groh, 540 U.S. at 557,124 
S.Ct. at 1289 (emphasis in original). The Fourth Amendment requires particularity 
sufficient to prevent the seizure of one thing under a warrant' describing another. 
Holman, 109 Idaho at 388,707 P.2d at 499 (internal citations omitted). " ' ~ o s t  courts have 
held that a court may construe a warrant with reference to a supporting application or 
affidavit if the warrant uses appropriate words of incorporation, and if the supporting 
documents accompanies the warrant." Groh, 540 U.S. at 557-558, 124 S.Ct. at 1290. In 
Idaho as in other states "all that is required is that an item seized bear "a reasonable 
relation to the purpose of the search." Slate v, Fozuler, 106 Idaho 3,11, 674 P.2d 432,441 
(Idaho Ct. App. 1983); Mesmer v. Unzied States, 405 F.2d 316,319 (lo* Cir. 1969). 
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In his Brief, the Defendant alleges that the scope of the search requested in the 
Affidavit is "much narrower" than that listed on the Warrant issued by Judge Robinson. 
Supplement Brief in Support of Motion to Suppress at 7. The Defendant primarily 
points to the Revised Statement of Detective Vietmeier to show that there are defects in 
the warrant issued as the uevised statement requests a search area that is more restricted 
than the Warrant. Id. However, the Defendant mistalcenly limits what documents 
,actually constitute the affidavit for the Search Warrant. 
The entire affidavit for the Search Warrant requested by Detective Vietmeier is 
identified as such and the initial and revised statements by Detective Vietmeier are a 
part of that affidavit, not separate affidavits in and among themselves. See Affidavit for 
Search Warrant with attached Statements. The Affidavit incorporates the statements 
"as fully set forth herein," which means that the Statements are included in the Affidavit, 
not replacing it. Affidavit for Search Warrant at 2. Therefore, when the Affidavit is 
read in its entirety, it is specifically requesting a search of 1) the Defendant, 2) firearms 
and ammunition, and 3) "indicia of residence, ownership or occupancy." Id. These 
items were indicated as located in or upon "the premises . . . its grounds and 
outbuildings, and all vehicles and conveyances found thereon [at] 1011 Vale Rd., 
Harvard, Latah County, Idaho. . ." Id. 
The revised statement of Detective Vietmeier, which is included in the Affidavit, 
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but not replacing it, also asks for a search for a revolver and a red pickup. Revised 
Statement at 2. As both Detective Vietmeier's statements are incorporated into the 
Affidavit ind  the entire Affidavit is incorporated into and accompanied the Search 
Warrant, the Search Warrant did not exceed the scope of the Affidavit. See Grok, 540 
U.S. at  557-558, 124 S.Ct. at. 1290. As the Search Warrant was issued for 1) the 
Defendant, 2) firearms and ammunition, and 3) "indicia of residence, ownership or 
occupancy, in or upou "the premises'. . . its grounds and outbuildings, and all vehicles 
and conveyances found thereon [at] 1011 Vale Rd., Harvard, Latah County, Idaho," it 
adequately described with particularity what was to be searched and where the search 
was to take place. Search Warrant at  1; Affidavit for Search Warrant at 2; See Grok, 540 
U.S. at  557,124 S.Ct. at 1289; See also Holman, 109 Idaho at 388,707 P.2d at 499. 
B. THE SEARCH OF THE DEFENDANT'S VEHICLE WAS AN APPROPRIATE 
SEARCH INCIDENT TO ARREST. 
1. The search of the Defendant's vehicle should be upheld as a 
lawful search incident to an arrest based on probable cause, as 
authorized under Belton and Charpentier. 
In the Defendant's Brief, heargues that- the officers had no independent probable 
cause or reasonable basis to justify a search of his truck. Defendant's Brief in Support of 
Motion to Suppress (hereafter Defendant's Brief) at 4. In support of this argument, the 
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Defendant argues that under the principles established under New York v. Belton, 453 
U.S. 454, 101 S.Ct. 2860 (1981), there were no concerns for officer safety or the 
preservation of evidence. The Defendant also cites extensively from WAYNE R. 
LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE, 5 7.l(b) (4a1 ed. 2004 & Supp. 2007) to su.pport his 
arguments. Defendant's Brief at 5. For example, the defendant lists that factors 
identified by LaFave as relevant in a Belton analysis are "(i) what places it would be 
possible for the arrestee presently to reach, and (ii) . . . how probable it is that the krestee 
would undertake to seek means of resistance or escape or to destroy evidence:" Id. 
(quoting LaFave, 3 7.l(b) at 505) (italics in original). 
What the Defendant neglects to mention is that LaFave finds these as relevant 
questions only when an arrestee does noi qualify as an "occupant" or "recent occupant." 
LaFave, § 7.l(b) at 505. In the present case, the Defendant was sighted at  10:50 p.m., on 
March 30, 2007, by Sergeant Phil Gray and shortly thereafter pulled over and placed 
under arrest. Latah County Sheriff's Ofiice (LCSO) report #0701315 at  1. While the 
Defendant was being cuffed just outside of the red pickup, Deputy Fork arrived on the 
scene and observed a pistol sitting next to the driver's seat of the Defendant's vehicle in 
plain view. He seized and unloaded the gun and then looked for any other possible 
weapons, searching a black bag. During that search, Deputy Fork found drug 
paraphernalia and what he believed to be methamphetamine. He seized those items 
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and ended his search at that point. The Defendant's vehicle was ultimately sealed, 
impounded and towed. The Defendant easily applies as a "recent occupant" of the 
truck and therefore the Defendant's argument is without merit in this situation. 
Further, the Defendant was arrested because there was an outstanding arrest 
warrant for him issued by an independent magistrate who found probable cause to 
issue the warrant. Under the principles laid down in Belton, and adopted by the Idaho 
Supreme Court in Siate v. Chaupentieu, 131 Idaho 649,653,962 P.2d 1033,1037 (1998), the 
search of the Defendant's vehicle is justified as a search incident to a lawful arrest. 
Under Belton, an officer may search the passenger compartment of a vehicle as a 
contemporaneous incident of a lawful arrest, to include searching any containers within 
the vehicle. Belton, 453 U.S. at 461,101 S.Ct at 2860. The Court specifically held that as 
long as a defendant has been lawfully placed under arrest based upon probable cause, 
there is no additional justification required to search the vehicle incident to the arrest. 
Id. This holding was adopted by the Idaho Supreme Court in Charpentier, in order to 
provide law enforcemel~t with a bright line rule and for additional reasons provided by 
the Idaho Supreme Court. Charpentier, 131 Idaho at 653, 962 P.2d at 1037. These 
additional reasons include: 1) automobiles are highly regulated by nature so there is not 
the level of privacy afforded to vehicles as there is to a home under the Idaho 
Constitution, 2) if an occupant of a vehicle has been arrested, there is a concern not to 
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leave the vehicle unattended without an assurance there is nothing illegal or dangerous 
remaining for a passerby to obtain. See id. 
In this situation, the arrest was lawful as the officer was acting under an arrest 
warrant issued for the Defendant for an aggravated assault charge. Therefore, Sergeant 
Gray' conducted a lawful arrest and the subsequent search of the Defendant's vehicle 
was authorized as a search incident to arrest under both the Belton and Chavpentier 
holdings. What is more, the additional rationales of Chavpentier show that in Idaho, the 
Defendant has Iess of an expectation UI the privacy of his vehicle than he does in his 
home and therefore he had no reason to not expect that his vehicle would be searched 
once he was arrested. As there was a loaded pistol found in the Defendant's vehicle, 
the second concern of Chavpentier is particularly important as the failure to search this 
, vehicle would have left this dangerous weapon (as well as illegal drugs) available for 
any person who happened to pass by. 
2. The search of the vehicle comported to the principles expressed 
by the U.S. Supreme Court in Belton and Chimel, and adopted by the 
Idaho Supreme Court in Charpentier, and contrary to the Defendant's 
asgumen&, such precedents should not be overruled in this case. 
The majority of tlxe Defendant's argument focuses on asking this Court to 
overrule longstanding State and Federal precedents in this case as they feel the search 
was unreasonable. See Defendant's Brief at 7-13. The Defendant asks the court to 
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follow cases from "sister states" which have been distancing themselves from the Belfon 
line of cases. Id. at 7. In support of this argument, the Defendant cites to Stafe v. Baudeu, 
No. 2004-438, March 16,2007 (Vt Sup Ct.). However, this case took note that the police 
conducted a search of a vehicle, after the defendant was arrested, based on questionable 
observation of incriminating evidence in plain view that was not related to the reason 
for the arrest. Baudeu, No. 2004-438 at paragraph 34. Here, there is no dispute that the 
pistol the officers saw was in fact in plain view as it lay on the driver's seat. 
Additionally, there is no dispute that this evidence directly related to the assault charge 
which he was arrested for as that charge alleges that he fired a weapon near another 
persons head. 
Next, the Defendant seeks to support his position to overturn precedent by citing 
the numerous cases listed in LaFAve, at 5 7.1(a) and @). Defendant's Brief in Support of 
Motion at 7-8. However, a brief sample of these cases show that they do not contradict 
the validity of the search at issue here. In Stafe v. Anderson, 259 Kan. 16, 910 P.2d 
180(1996) the court held that a search incident to arrest will serve the purpose of 
discovering fruits, instrumentalities and evidence. Here the officers discovered the 
pistol in plain view and certainly had reason to conduct the vehicle search for the 
purpose of discovering fruits, instrumentalities, and evidence for the assault crime the 
defendant was arrested for. In the same manner, Commonzoealtk v. Toole, 389 Mass. 159 
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(1983), will not apply as they limit the search onIy for evidence of the crime for which 
the defendant was arrested. Again, as this vehicle search commenced with discovery of 
a loaded pistol, our case does not contradict the limitations that Toole places on Belton. 
A final example here is People v. Blasich, 73 N.Y.2d 673, 543 N.Y.2d 50 (1989), the state 
limited searches to areas the arrestee might actually gain possession of a weapon. As 
the officer reports all make clear, the pistol, drugs, and drug paraphernalia all were 
found in the driver's seat near the Defendant where he could have easily gained access 
to such items. Again, this case does not contiadict the New York court's limitations on 
Finally, the Defendant cites to the dissent in Charpentier as support for his 
position that the Idaho Court's adoption of the principles outlined in Belton are ill- 
founded. Defendant's Brief at 8. He notes that the Ckarpentzer decision was a 3-2 
decision and seems to suggest that this Court should rule against this precedent. Id. at 8 
and 13. Important to note however, is that the Supreme Court unanimously upheld it's 
reasoning and holdings in Charpentier as recently as 2005, in State v. Waf ts ,  142 Idaho 
230, 127 P.3d 133. Here the court stated Charpentier has proven to be neither 
"manifestly wrong [or] . . . proven over time to be unjust or unwise, or [that] . . . 
overruling it is necessary to vindicate plain, obvious principles of law and remedy 
continued injustice." Watts,  142 Idaho at 233,127 P.3d at 136 (quoting Reyes v. Kit Mfg. 
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Co., 141 Idaho 239, 240, 953 P.2d 989, 990 (1998). Therefore, there is no reason for this 
Court to overrule precedent as this case does not provide any reason to find that 
~ h a ~ e n t i e r  and it's progeny were incorrectly decided. 
V. CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing, the State respectfully asks the Court to deny the 
Defendant's Motions to Suppress, Exclude Evidence, and Dismiss. 
DATED this =day of August, 2007. 
Michelle M. Evans 
Deputy Prosecuting Attorney 
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Defendant Tim C. Mantz, though his attorneys, Landeck, Westberg, Judge & 
Graham, P.A., hereby requests that this Court extend the time for filing his Reply Brief to 
the State's Brief in Opposition to Defendant's Motions to Suppress, Exclude Evidence, 
and Dismiss unli15:OO p.m. on Tuesday, September 11, 2007. 
The Defendant's attorneys have spoken with Michelle Evans, counsel for the 
State, and she has no objection to the granting of this Motion. 
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%- 
DATED this 2day of August, 2007. 
LANDECK, WESTBERG, JUDGE & GRAKAM, P.A. 
By: 
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The above matter having come before the Court upon Motion of the Defendant, 
and good cause appearing; 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the time for filing Defendant's Reply Brief, 
currently scheduled to be filed by 5:00 p.m. on September 4,2007, be and the same 
hereby is extended to 5:00 p.m., September 11,2007. 
DATED this of August, 2007. 
DistriAt Judge 
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Defendant Tim C. Mantz, through his attorneys, Landeclr, Westberg, Judge & 
Graham, P.A., hereby requests that this Court extend the time for filing his Reply Brief to 
the State's Brief in Opposition to Defendant's Motior~s to Suppress, Exclude Evidence, 
and Dismiss until 5:00 p.m. on Friday, September 14,2007. 
The Defendant's attorneys have spoken with Michelle Evans, counsel for the 
State, and she has no objection to the granting of this Motion. 
MOTION FOR EXTENSION OF TIME -1 
DATED this 10th day of September, 2007. 
LANDECK, WESTBERG, JUDGE & GRAKAM, P.A. 
By: 
Attorneys for Defendant 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on this 10th day of September, 2007,I caused a true and correct 
of this document to be served on the following in the mamer indicated: 
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The above matter laving come before the Court upon Motion of the Defendant, 
and good cause appearing; 
IT IS HEREBY 0.RDERED that the time for filing Defendant's Reply Brief, 
currently scheduled to be filed by 5:00 p.m. on September 11,2007, be and the same 
hereby is extended to 5:00 p.m., Friday, September 14,2007. 
Qt-. 
DATED this 1 1 day of September, 2007. 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAi30, W AND FOR THE COUNTY OF LATAH 
STATE OF IDAHO, 1 
) Case No. CR-2007-0001292 
Plaintifi' ) Case No. CR-2007-0001320 
) 
v. ) DEFENDANT'S REPLY BRIEF 
TIM C. MANTZ, 
) W SUPPORT OF MOTION TO SUPPRESS 
Defendant. j 
Defendant Tim C. Mantz ("Mr. Mantz"), through his attorneys, Landeck, 
Westberg, Judge & Graham, P.A., hereby submits this Reply Brief in Supporl of Motio11 
to Suppress in reply to the State's Brief in Opposition to Defendant's Motions to 
Suppress, Exclude Evidcnce, and Dismiss. ("State's Brief'). All references to the 
transcript of the July 27, 2007, hearing before the Magistrate u e  in the following form: 
"Tr. p. -." 
I. TIIE NO-KNOCIC YIGII?'TIAlE SI?.lRCII IVA11KLU'T I'OR 'I'RE .\11U1'% 
110111Z \V.4S SO?' .4Pl'ROI'LU.lTI~LY ISSUED 
A. STALENESS 
The State attempts to rely on State v. Carlson, 134 Idaho 471,477 (Idaho Ct. App. 2000), 
to conclude that, even though the incident that gave rise to the search wanant was a least 
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six weeks old, "it is of no importance" in determining if information regarding the 
presence of items sought is stale or not. State's Brief at 8. However, Carlson says the 
"question [of staleness] must be resolved in light of the circumstances of each case." 
Caulson, 134 Idaho at 477. The State also neglects to mention tliat, according to 
Carlson, if the affidavit recounts criminal activities of a protracted or continuous nature, 
such as narcotics trafficking, then a time delay is of less significance because those 
activities are less lilcely to become stale even over an extended period oStime. Id. Here, 
there was one alleged event that allegedly involved a revolver. 
Although Mr. Mantz collcedes that his argument was not aptly expressed and was 
an inept generalization, the State's conclusion that "any arguvnent as to the use of word 
tense in an affidavit is without merit" is perhaps an inaccurate generalization. See State's 
Brief at 10. The court in Iiavris in ruliilg that the information in the affidavit was not too 
stale to establish probable cause at the time the warrant was issued, cited a case in which 
the information in the affidavit recounted personal and recent observations of criminal 
activity that included activity up to the date of the affidavit. US. v. Harris, 403 U.S. 573, 
578.-79 (1971). The Iiarvis court found it significant that the affidavits in the cited case 
and in Harris recounted personal and recent observations of criminal activity-activity in 
the cited case occurring on the same date as the affidavit and activity in Iiarris "'within 
the past 2 weeks,' which could well include [illegal activity] up to the date of the 
affidavit." Id. 
Even iSMr. Mantz were to concede the issue of staleness regarding the search for 
the fireann alleged to have been used in an assault weelcs prior to the search, other issues, 
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such as a sufficient nexus, the scope of the search, and particularity, must be determined 
when a magiskate considers allegations in an affidavit. 
B. NEXUS 
"Assertions in the affidavit must establish a sufficient nexus between criminal 
activity, the things to be seized, and the place to be searched to lead to the issuance of a 
warrant." See Carlson, 134 Idaho at 476 (internal citation omitted). The State argues that 
the warrant "adequately identified the . . . things to be seized which was supported by a 
thorough affidavit," State's Brief at 13, even though Deputy R.J. Vietmeier ("Dep. 
Vletmeier"), in both his Statement and Revised Statement ("Statements"), specifically 
asked for a "search for the weapon, a revolver of unknown caliber and make," and 
stated that it was believed "this firearm would either be in Mantz's immediate possession 
and control" or in Mr. Mantz's red flatbed pickup. In his Statements Dep. Vietmeier 
requested specifically only four things: (1) "No-lcnock authorization for entry" for the 
purposes of officer safety, (2) night-time authorization to allow officers the protection of 
darkness, (3) a search for the weapon, a revolver ofunknown caliber and make, and (4) a 
search of the red flatbed pickup. Statements at 1 and 2. Deputy Vietmeier also referred 
to "this firea~m" in the last sentence of both Statements. Therefore, it is reasonable to 
conclude that besides the purpose of arresting Mr. M-antz in his home, the purpose of the 
search was to seize evidence of the alleged aggravated assault. Evidence of the alleged 
aggravated assault would not include "all firearms." 
However, Dep. Vietmeier wrote a warrant that authorized a search for, and 
seizure of "Fireaums, including, but not limited to, handguns, revolvers, pistols, and any 
and alljirearms and ammunition." Search Warrant at 1. No nexus was established 
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between the alleged illegal activity-an aggravated assault involving a handgun-and 
most of the things to be seized. The magistrate did not have probable cause from the 
facts set forth in support of the application for the warrant to support the issuance of a 
search warrant for things to be seized other than possibly, "handguns, revolvers, and 
pistols." Mr. Mantz might concede staleness, but will not concede there was a sufficient 
nexus between the alleged criminal activity and the things to be seized. 
C.  SCOPE 
Tile State's argument ignores the obvious problcm created when an officer, in 
support of an affidavit, gives a narrow description and specific facts regarding the things 
to be seized but then creates a more broadly worded Affidavit and Search Warrant and 
does not alert the nmgistrate to the defect. Mr. Mantz pointed out the rule in State v. 
Fowler, 106 Idaho 3 (Ct. App. 1983), regarding which language controls when affidavits 
and warrants contain differing descriptions. Suppleinent to Brief at 6 .  The State 
responded that Mr. Mantz "mistakenly limits what documents actually constitute the 
affidavit for the Search Warrant." State's Brief at 14. Mr. Mantz disagrees and does 
continue to point out and rely on the court's reasoning in Fowler. Dep. Vietmeier used 
narrower language when asking the magistrate for four specific requests in his 
Statements. However, the State ignores the explanation in Fowler that the nanower 
description always controls-no matter where it is found. See Fowler, 106 Idaho at 11- 
. 12. Based on Fowler, the explicit and narrower subset of language describing the firearm 
that Dep. Viebneier placed into his incorporated Statements logically must control and 
circumscribe the broader language he wrote into the Affidavit and Warrant. See id. at 12. 
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As if the incorporated Statements did not contain specifics, the State insists that 
the broader Affidavit and Warrant specifically request a search for "fireanns and 
ammunition," State's Brief at 14, and that the Affidavit must be read "in its entirety." Id. 
But Fowler does not talk about reading an affidavit in its entirety. Rather, Fowler points 
out that the "affidavit is the sole basis and justification for the issuance of the warrant and 
the description in the affidavit controls and circumscribes the description in the warrant." 
Fowler at 11 (quoting State v. Constanzo, 76 Idaho 19,22 (1954)). 
D. PARTICULARITY 
A search conducted pursuant to a warrant lacking particularity cannot be exempt 
from the presumption of unreasonableness even if the goals served by the particularity 
requirement are othenvise satisfied. Groh v. Ramirez, 540 U.S. 551, 563 (2004). As in 
Groh, Dep. Vietmeier prepared the Warrant, and the mere fact that the Magistrate issued 
a warrant does not necessarily establish that the Magistrate agreed that the scope of the 
search should be as broad as the affiant's request. See Groh, 540 U.S. at 560. Dep. 
Vielmeier testified that the magistrate asked for additional information regarding threats 
or rumors of threats that NLr. Mantz wouldn't be taken out of the house willingly, which 
Dep. Vietmeier then included in his Revised Statement. Tr. p. 21 1-21 3. Perhaps the 
Magistrate, feeling pressed for time aild hampered by distance, did not follow through in 
conforming Dep. Vietmeier's Warrant with the details and particularity the Magistrate 
had required for issuance of the un~~sual, nighttime no-linock warrant. As ill Groh, 
perhaps Dep. Vietmeier did not alert the Magistrate to the constitutional defect regarding 
particularity in the warrant that Dep. Vietmeier had drafted. This Court, therefore, carnot 
know whether the Magistrate was aware of the scope ofthe search he was authorizing. 
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Ln Holman, the court found that the warrant enumerated firearms with great 
particularity. State v. Holman, 109 Idaho 382,388-89 (Ct. App. 1985) (opinion by 
Burnett). As distinguished from the warrant in Holman, the warrant here directed a 
search for unidentified items under a generic heading of "firearms and anmunition." 
Warrant at 1. 
E. CONCLUSION 
The Court should not reward and thus encourage the preparation of overbroad 
affidavits and warrants for magistsate approval. In this case, both disregarded the 
requirements of descriptive particularity and the presence of a nexus between the things 
to be seized and criminal activity. Carlson, 134 Idaho at 476. The overbroad description 
of things to be seized should have been stricken from the affidavit and the warrant 
because it was improperly before the magistrate. See id. 
II. THE OFFICERS' EXECUTIONOF THE NO-KNOCK NIGHTTIME SEARCH 
WARRANT FOR THE MANTZ HOME WAS NOTREASONABLE. AND 
THEREFORE, VIOLATED MR. MANTZ'S RIGHTS UNDER THE UNITED 
STATES AND IDAHO CONSTITUTIONS. 
A. THE STATE'S RELEVANT OI\IISSIONS AND ERRORS 
Mr. Mantz concedes that United States v. Brinklow, 560 F.2d 1003 (loth Cir. 
1977), the loth Circuit case cited by the State, does indeed state that the "significance of 
the length of time between the point probable cause arose and when the warrant issued, 
depends largely upon the properly's nature." Brinklow at 1006. On the other hand, the 
State ignored the important determination in Brinklow, a determination even more 
important to this case, that "probable cause, existent in the past, however, continues to 
exist only to the extent that its underpinning probabilities endure," id. at 1005, and "the 
element of time is crucial to its concept." Id. (internal citation omitted). "Probable cause 
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ceases to exist when it is no longer reasollable to presume that items, once located on the 
premises, are still there." Id. 
The State also completely ignored the requisite second part of the reasonablencss 
analysis that Mr. Mantz argued. See Supplement to Brief at 2-3. There, Mr. Mantz cited 
Groh and Lewis for the officers' responsibility to continue to show the reasonableness of 
a search at the time they make the search. Id. In Lewis, the reasonable cause to believe 
that five pounds of marijuana existed on the premises was not destroyed by the af^te~-the- 
fact discovery that the large quantifies of narcotics seized did not include five pounds of 
marijuana. State v. Lewis, 107 Idaho 616, 620-21. Lewis can be distinguished from the 
facts in this case, in that, here, the reasonableness of an officer's decision to search 
should be judged by the before-the-fact revelation that Mr. Mantz was not at home. If 
probable cause ceases to exist when it is no longer reasonable to presume that items, once 
located on the premises, are still there, then, surely, both the probable cause to search for 
Mr. Mmtz on the pre~nises at 101 1 Vale Rd. and the reasonable cause to execute at 
nighttime under the special no-knock provision cease to exist when it is no longer 
reasonable to presume Mr. Nantz is at home-when, in fact, it is known that he is in a 
patrol car on his way to jail or actually at the jail. 
Finally, the State mistakenly equates an "authorized" search, State's Brief at 11, 
with an "appropriately executed" search, id. at 7. In Section A.2. at 11-13, the State 
repeats its argument found in Section A.l and completely ignores the legal distinction 
Mr. Mantz raised in his Brief and Supplement to Brief between the issuance and 
execution steps of a warrant. 
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B. THE NIGHTTIME SEARCH WAS NOT AUTHOMZED AND WAS 
UNREASONABLE UNDER THE CIRCUMSTANCES PRESENTED. 
Even if the Court finds the Warrant was properly issued, Mr. Mantz argues there 
is no legal support for the State's conclusioll that the officers' search was reasonable. 
Mr. Mantz does not dispute the well-recoguzed law in the State's first paragraph of 
Section A. 2., State's Brief at 11-12, but Mr. Mantz strongly disputes the entire second 
paragraph in Section A.2, especially the conclusory non-sequiter at the paragraph's end. 
The State asserts that aproperly authorized, nighttime, no-knock warrant allowed 
law enforcement to search the Mr. Mantz's home. State's Brief at 12. The State's 
attempt to argue this point logically fails because it relieves officers of responsibility for 
the continuing reasonableiless of a search under the Fousth Amendment and under the 
Idaho Constitution. It is always the State's burden to prove the search was reasonable, 
not the magistrate's. Courts should not allow law enforcement officers to point to a 
neutral, detached Magistrate and say, "The Magistrate made me do it" or "The Magistrate 
issued the warrant for a nighttime search on the reasonable cause I gave him, and, 
therefore, my subsequent search was reasonable-even though I knew at the time of the 
search that the reasonable cause I had given the Magistrate to warrant the search no 
longer existed." 
C. TEIE EXCLUSIONARY RULE SHOULD APPLY EVEN IF THE 
SEARCH WARRANT WAS PROPERLY ISSUED. 
The State asserted that Mr. Mantz "does not provide any reasoning to explain how 
the exclusionary rule itself should apply when a search waxrant is properly issued." 
State's Brief at 12. Mr. Mmtz disagrees. First, Mr. Mantz provided the rule laid down 
by the United States Supreme Court that the officer executing a search warrant must 
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"ensure the search is lawfilly authorized and lawfully conducted." Supplement to Brief at 
3 (citing Groh v. Ramirez, 540 U.S. 551, 563 (2004)) (italics added). (Mr. Mantz, 
however, admits that the extensive discussion.and clarification in Groh of the "good 
faith exception" to the exclusionary rule announced in Leon, is found in Gvoh at 563-566, 
not 553-556, as indicated in the Supplement to Brief at 3, and apologizes for theinconect 
citation.) The Court in Groh, while discissing the issue of qualified immunity for law 
enforcement officers, explained that the same standard of objective reasonableness 
applies in the context of a suppression hearing or in the qualified immunity context. See 
Groh at 563-65. The Court explained that the reasonableness depends on "whether it 
would bc clear to a reasonable officer that his conduct was unlawfi~l in the situation he 
confronted." Gvoh at 563 (internal citation omitted). 
Second, Mr. Mantz indicated that the Idaho Supreme Court rejected the Leon 
good faith exception and gave broader protections against unreasonable searches and 
seizures to Idaho citizens under Article I, 3 17. Supplement to Brief at 2-3 (citing State v. 
Guzman, 122 Idaho 981, 987-98 (1992)). Next, Mr. Mantz quoted the Conrt's five 
reasons for applying the exclusionary rule and what it sees as the chief deterrent function 
of the exclusionary rule: "its tendency to promote institutional colnpliance with Fourth 
Amendment requiremezits on the part of law enforcement agencies generally." 
Supplement to Brief at 3 (citing Guzman, 122 Idaho at 997 (internal citation omitted)). 
Finally, Mr. Mantz aclcnowledged that Leon, Gmh, and Ouzman all focused on probable 
cause for a warrant, but argued, using implicit logic, that since the standard forprobable 
cause is higher than for reasonable cause, the analysis in Leon, Groh, and Guzman 
"shouldapply no less-more likely more-to the reasonable cause required to issue and 
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execute on a nighttime search warrant." Supplement to Brief at 4. True, Idaho courts 
may not have yet explicitly addressed this issue, and thus, it may be an issue of first 
impression. Nevertheless, the logic remains. 
Even assuming that the magistrate had probable cause to issue a search warrant 
and reasonable cause based upon Dep. Vietmeier's Revised Statement for the unusual 
nighttime search, the search warrant was not legally executed because the officers were 
aware at the time they decided to search that "precisely what [Dep. Vietmeier] had 
suspected existed on the premises was not in fact there." Lewis, 107 Idaho at 621; see 
also discussion in 11. A., above. While firearms in general might still have been on the 
premises, those alone, without the presence of Mr. Mantz, were not the reason Dep 
Vietmeier gave the Magistrate in support of his request for authorization for a nighttime, 
no-knock search warrant. Unlike the officers in Lewis, on the basis of the then lnown 
facts, the officers in this case could be visualized "as contemplating a great invasion of 
privacy or as violating the sanctity of the home." Lewis, 107 Idaho at 620. Further, the 
court in Lewis saw there was "no reasonable cause for holding that during the remaining 
nighttime hours the premises needed to be leR free from search," id., but here, there is 
reasonable cause to hold that during the remaining nighttime hours Mr. Mantz's home 
needed to be left free from search. 
Justice Bumett defined "reasonable cause" in Holman, 109 Idaho at 387-88. Mr. 
Mantz argues that, even $the warrant was legally issued and for reasonable cause shown 
authoi-ized a nighttime search, the officers' choice to execute on that warrant at nighttime 
was unreasonable. Dep. Vietmeier testified that the purpose of the search warrant was 
"to locate and arrest Mr. Mantz potentially in his home." Tr. p. 185. Dep. Vietmeier 
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lcnew, prior to the various units responding for the service of the warrant, that Sergeant 
Gray had found Mr. Mantz driving through Potlatch and initiated a stop. Tr, pp.185-86. 
Dep. Vietmeier testified that the members of the team reformulated in the Potlatch area, 
decided to go on to the Mantz house, and arrived there at approximately 11:35-11:45 p.m. 
Id. at 186. They lcnew Crystal Mantz was the only one at home, and she was not the 
reason Officer Vietmeier had asked for cover of darkness for officer safety reasons. 
Officers do not need a nighttime warrant to search for firearms. The State conflates 
reasonable cause for issuance and reasonable cause for execution. The State provides no 
logical or legal basis for its claim that "because the warrant was properly issued, the 
resultingsearch was reasonable." ~ g .  12 of State's Brief. 
In addition, the State does not contend that any sort of exigency existed when the 
eleven officers conducted the search. Both as a matter of fact and as a matter of law, the 
State has not met its burden of proving the execution of the search was reasonable. 
Therefore, no matter which way the court prefers to word the circumstances, the result is 
e same: the search of the home was unreasonable and all items seized should be 
pressed and the firearms should be returned to Mr. Mantz. 
111. 1'11E 0I:FlC'EKS' SE %KC11 OF 3IK. 31A'VTZ'S TRUCK \\'AS NOT .S 
\..II.ID sr.:.u<Izcrr I X C I D E Y . ~  1'0 ARJWS'~.  
A. RELEVANT OMISSIONS AND ERRORS BY THE STATE 
Mr. Mantz concedes that many of the legal conclusions will necessarily be 
derived from the facts developed at the suppression hearing and disputes many of the 
allegations, characterizations, and purportedly f i tual  statements set forth in the State's 
Brief: Mr. Mantz relies on his Brief, Supplement to Brief, Second Supplement to Brief, 
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and the record and submits that the evidence will support the conclnsion that the State 
will fail to show that the search of Mr. Mantz's truck was a valid search incident to arrest. 
The State uses the word "appropriate" to describe the State's search, calling it a 
"search incident to arrest." State's Brief at 15. However, the State's actiolls are not to be 
judged by whether they are "appropriate" or not, but whether they are "reasonable" or 
"unreasonable" under the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution, as 
interpreted by case law and, hopefully, the common sense upon which that law is based. 
Mr. Mantz argues that the State has not proved the reasonableness of either the search of 
the vehicle, characterized by thc State as a search incident to an arrest, or the search of 
the container inside the vehicle because the testimony and record to date laclcs factual 
clarity and also because the State's supporting documents contain conflicting and vague 
assertions. 
The State calls negative attention to Mr. Mantz's citation of State v. Baude~, No. 
004-438, March 16, 2007 (Vt. Sup. Ct.). State's Brief at 19. The State misses the point 
the court's discussion of the plain view dochine; it was a minor point the court argued 
the dissent, and the court concluded its decision was not based on a plain-hew 
analysis as the dissent had proposed. See Bauder at paragraph 3 1. The question 
presented in Bauder was "whether law-enforcement officers may routinely search a 
motor vehicle without a warrant, after its occupant has been arrested, handcuffed, and 
secured in the back seat of a police cruiser, absent a reasonable need to protect the 
officers' safety or preserve evidence of a crime." Id, at paragraph 1.  The court heid that 
"such warrantless searches offend the core values underlying the right to be frce from 
unreasonable searches and seizures" embodied in its state constitution. Id. Mr. Mantz 
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cited Bauder, among others, to show that sister states are distancing themselves iiom 
Belton. Bauder, too, cites to numerous states and other authorities for the same 
proposition and its own similar conclusion. See id. at paragraphs 19-22. 
Finally, iVk Mantz replies that he cited LaFave and the cases cited in LaFave to 
show that some states require a Chimel-type rationale in the search-incident-to-anest 
vehicle context. See discussion below under m. C. at pages 15-17. The State did not 
address the arguments submitted in Mr. Mantz's Second Supplement and its attached 
case, State v. Gant, - P . 3 d ,  2007 Ariz. LEXIS 73 (Ariz. July 25,2007) (en banc), 
CR-06-0385-PR. 
B. THE SEARCH UNDER BELTON AND CHARPENTIER 
First, Mr. Mantz understands the argument at page 17 in the State's Brief. See 
Brief at 4. Second, Mr. Mantz disagrees with the State's conclusion in the State's Brief 
page 18 that a failure to search Mr. Mantz's trucli would have left a dangerous weapon 
d illegal drugs available for any person who happened to pass by. The State had other 
tions. Third, Mr. Mantz disputes the State's characterization of lzi~n as "easily" 
qualifying as a "recent occupant" of his truck under Belton and State v. Charpentier, 13 1 
Idaho 649,653 (1998), and that the conclusion that the search of his pickup by Deputy 
Forlc was therefore authorized. State's Brief at 17. The facts are in controversy regarding 
who saw what inside the truck, when they saw it, what actions they tool; if any, and 
when. There are numerous unexplained discrepancies, omissions, and conflicting facts 
between and among the various deputies' reports and Sergeant Gray and Deputy Fork's 
testimonies at the preliminary hearing. The laclc of factual clarity aid consistency leaves 
unanswered questions about the details of Mr. Mantz's arrest and the search of his truck. 
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The State has yet to give a consistent and coherent account of what actually happened 
between 1056 p.m. and 12:30 a.m. at the scene of Mr. Mantz's traffic stop and arrest. 
Many of the facts at issue are relevant even under the present so-called "bright line rule" 
of Bellon and Idaho's version in Chavpentier. 
Finally, Mr. Mantz strongly disagrees with the State's assertion that the "officer 
reports all make clear," State's Brief at 20, that Mi. Mantz "could have easily gained 
access to the items ultimately found in the vehicle." Id. As discussed before, the officer 
reports do not all maltc that clear, and, as many thinlcing courts in sister states, certain 
Supreme Court Justices, and other authorities have made clear: an arrestee cannot easily 
gain access when the facts show he can't-Eelton's curre~lt "blanket authority" 
notwithstanding. See Eauder at paragraph 21. 
C. MR. MANTZ'S GOOD FAITH ARGUMENT FORTH 
MODIFICATION OR REVERSAL OF EXISTING LAW 
Mr. Mantz relies on his Brief; Supplement, and Second Supplement, but replies to 
the State's assertion that Mr. Mantz neglected to mention what the State considers to be a 
relevant distinction in LaFave. Mr. Manlz had put forward several factors identified by 
LaFave as relevant in a Relton analysis. Defendant's Brief at 5. In its response, the State 
concluded that LaFave "finds these as relevant questions only when an arrestee does not 
qualifl as an 'occupant' or 'recent occupant."' State's Brief at 16. Mr. Mantz disagrees 
with the State's conclusion. A careful reading of LaFave reveals his belief that it is 
necessary to discuss "how the Chime1 'immediate control' test ought to be applied in an 
automobile context. . . for two reasons." WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE, 
§7.l(b) at 505 (4" ed. 2004 & Supp.2007)(italics added). A caref'ul reading also shows 
that thefirst reason is "to provide the necessary background for an evaluation of the 
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Belton decision, which is grounded in the conclusion that the Chimel rule was 
uiiworlcable in automobile cases generally." Id. Only the second reason is "to illustrate 
how the cases not covered by the Belton standardized procedure approach are to be 
decided." Id. LaFave argues that in many searches incident to an mest in the 
automobile context, Chimel ought to apply rather than Belton or T2ovnton, most lilcely 
because, in LaFave's opinion, the mestee does not qualify as an "occupant," or as a 
"recerit occupant," as discussed in J 7.l(c). Id. at note 27 (italics added). LaFave's 
reasoning can be seen by studying §7.l(c), which is a lengthy discussion of 
'"Occupant'/'recent occupant' arrests and the Belton 'bright line."' LaFave, 5 7.l(c) at 
512-537. Of particular relevance here are the discussions at pages 512-18 and at pages 
24-32. Many, though not all, ofthe cases LaFave cites in those pages show support for 
argument that the Chimel "immediate control" test ought to be applied in a1 
mobile context. LaFave says that "the Chzmel rationale is in many respects easier 
o apply] in automobile cases than in in-premises cases because the police can, and 
typically do, immediately remove the arrestee from the vehicle." LaFave, 5 7.l(c) at 525. 
Subsequently, "it is easy to take a next step such as moving him farther fiom the car, 
handcuffing him or closing the car door, thus ensuring the nonexistence of circumsta~ces 
in which the arrestee's 'control' of the car is in doubt." Id. 
Therefore, LaFave is arguing for a d e f ~ t i o n  of "occupant" or "recent occupant" 
that comports with the underlying Chimel principles found in Belton of temporal and 
spatial proximity of an arrestee to his vehicle. LaFave's questions on pages 505-509 do 
apply to cases in which Chimel ought to be applied so as topuovide the necessary 
baclcgi-ound fov evaluaring ihe Belton decision. LaFave's four questions regarding facts 
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which show "what places it would bepossible for the arresteepvesently to reach," 
LaFave at pages 505-507, deserve attention in discussing the autoinobile context of 
Belton. LaFave cites more than fifteen different cases in 5 7.1@), notes 29, 32, 33, 35, 
37,40, and 41, in which courts based their decision on the Chimel rationales for a search 
incident to an arrest and also in which the facts would qualifl- the an-estee as an 
"occupant" or "recent occupant" in some courts today under Belton. 
Mr. Mantz has presented numerous reasons and supporting authority for this 
Court to ovcrrule precedent, and he urges this court to do so. 
DATED this 14" day of September, 2007. 
LANDECK, WESTBERG, JUDGE & GRAHAM, P.A. 
By: 
Attorneys for Defendant 
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1 Case No. CR-2007-0001292 
v. 1 
) MOTIONS IN LIMINE 
TIM CARL MANTZ, ) . 
Defendant. 1 
COMES NOW the State of Idaho by and through Micl~elle M. Evans, Latah Cou~~ ty  
Deputy Prosecuting Attorney, and moves this Court in lirnine as follows: 
1) For an order allowing the admission of the preliminary hearing testimony from 
June 7, 2007, via transcript and by listening to the recoided testimony of the 
victim herein, I<arl A. Hoidal, as Mr. Hoidal died on September 25, 2007 in an 
auto accident. This motion is made pursuant to I.R.E. 401 and 402, I.C.R. 
804(b)(l) and LC. 9-336. A memorandum in support of this motion is filed 
separately. 
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NWL ojs7 
2) For an order prohibiting the Defendant from offering any evidence or 
testimony or making any comment regarding the DUI charge and conviction of 
the victim, I<arl A. Hoidal, in CR-2007-0001455, which occurred on April 8, 
2007, almost two months following. the incident in the case at bar. Karl 
Hoidal's subsequent charge of DUI is not relevant to the elements of the crime 
at issue. This motion is made pursuant to I.R.E. 401 and 402. 
For an order allowing the admission oi testimony and evidence regarding the 
irearm found in the truck when the defendant was arrested on this charge and 
the firearms found in the defendant's home when the search warrant was 
served. The Defendant's possession of the multiple firearms in his home as 
well as the firearm which he carried with hirn in his vehicle are relevant to 
show opporfxnity, laclc of mistake and the defendant's intent. This motion is 
made pursuant to I.R.E. 401,402, and 404(b). 
Oral argument is hereby requested. 
DATED this day of October, 2007 
~ichel ie  M. Evans 
Deputy Prosecuting Attorney 
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CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY 
I hereby certify that a ixue and correct copy of the foregoing MOTIONS IN 
LIMINE was 
m a i l e d ,  United States mail, postage prepaid 
- hand delivered 
original by mail 
LANDECK, WESTBERG, JUDGE & GRAHAM 
P.O. Box 9344 
Moscow, ID 83843 
Fax: (208) 883-4593 
Dated this Ci @ day of October, 2007. 
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v .  1 
1 MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT 
1 OF MOTION IN LIMINE RE: 
TIM CARL MANTZ, 1 ADMlSSION OF PRELIMINARY 
Defendant. ) HEARING TESTIMONY OF VICTIM 
COMES NOW THE STATE OF IDAHO, by and through Latah County Deputy 
Prosecuting Attorney, Michelle M. Evans, and submits the following Memorandum in 
Support of Motion in Limine Re: Admission of Preliminary Hearing Testimony of Victim 
to the Court. 
I. FACTS 
On Friday, March 30, 2007, the defendant, Tim Carl Mantz, was arrested for the 
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felony crime of Aggravated Assault, Idaho Code 518-901, 905, 906. The Criminal 
Complaint, issued March 29,2007, alleged that the defendant threatened by word or act to 
do violence to the person of Karl A. b'oidal with a deadly weapon by firing a handgun 
near his head and verbaIIy threatening him, aU occurring on February 16, 2007. On 
Monday, April 2, 2007, the defendant initially appeared before the Honorable W.C.. 
Hadet t  wherein his bond was reduced and his preliminary hearing was set for Friday, 
April 13,2007. I-Fowever, pursuant to stipulation of both parties, the preliminary hearing 
was continued to the requested date of June 7, 2007, to allow for full discovery and 
adequate time to prepare for the preliminary hearing., Additionally, the defendant 
waived his right to a speedy preliminary hearing. As of April 17,2007, the State provided 
discovery of 138 pages of reports and documentation and made availabIe 4 CDs. A few 
additional documents were provided by the State in discovery by May 15,2007, including 
Ei lab report' and a few supplemental reports and statements regarding prior incidents 
involving the defendant. However, the bulk of the discovery pertaining to the charged 
offense was discovered by April 17,2007. 
The preliminary hearing was held on June 7,2007, before the Honorable RandaIl 
Robinson. The preliminary hearing on the felony drug offense in CR-2007-0001320 was 
held at the same time. That charge resulted from a substance found in the defendant's 
vehicle upon his arrest on the warrant for the Aggravated Assault in the case at bar. At 
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the preliminary hearing Latah County Deputy Prosecuting Attorney Michelle M. Evans 
represented the State, and the defendant was represented by John C. Judge. 
During the preliminary hearing, the State called as one of its witnesses I<arl A. 
Hoidal, the alleged victim of t h e ~ g ~ r a v a t e d  Assault charge. Mr. Hoidal was subject to 
direct examination, cross-examination, redirect examination and recross-exainination. 
Following the testimony and arguments of the parties, Judge ~obinson bound the 
defendant over to the district court as charged. The defendant, appeared for his 
arraignment on June 11,2007, wherein he entered a plea of not guilty and the matter was 
set for jury trial to commence on October 29,2007. 
On September 25,2007, Karl A. Hoidal died in an auto-mobile accident. The fact of 
* his death makes him unavailable to teseshfy at the defendant's upcoming trial. 
11. ARGUMENT 
Because of his death, Karl A. Hoidal is unavailable to testify. This means that his 
statements given at the defendant's preliminary hearing are now hearsay testimony 
given by an unavailable declarant. This evidence is crucial to the State's case; without it 
the case will be eviscerated. 
Due to the nature of his statements, the testimony is subject to both the Idaho 
rules of evidence and the Sixth Amendment's confrontation clause. For the reasons 
discussed below, Karl Hoidal's twtimony meets the analyses under both Idaho 
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eviderice law and the confrontation clause. Tl~erefore, it is admissible. 
A. BECAUSE KARL HOIDAL'S PRELIMINARY HEARING TESTIMONY MEETS 
THE REQUIREMENTS OF BOTH I.C. § 9-336 AND I.R.E. 804(b)(l), IT IS 
ADMISSIBLE UNDER IDAHO EVIDENCE LAW. 
The issue of this motion in limine is whether testimony provided by Karl Hoidal 
during the defendant's preliminary hearing may be admitted at his trial where Karl 
Hoidal is now unavailable to testify due to death. There are two statutory cornerstones 
that provide the basic foundation for resolving this issue - Idaho Rule of Evidence 
804(b)(l) and Idaho Code 5 9-336. These two cornerstones, read in combination, 
provide the answer as to whether I<arl Hoidal's preliminary hearing testimony may be 
admitted at trial. 
Idaho Rule of Evidence 804(b)(l) states that prior testimony is not excluded by 
the hearsay rule when the declarant is unavailable to testify when such "[t]estimony [is] 
given as a witness at another hearing of the same or a different proceeding . . . if the 
party against whom the testimony is now offered . . . had an opportunity and similar 
motive to develop the testimony by direct, cross, or redirect examination." IRE 
804(a)(4) includes death in its definition of urravailability. Therefore, tesfimony of a 
state's witness from a preliminary hearing is admissible at the trial court proceeding 
when such wihess has since diedand the defendant had an opportunity to conduct a 
cross examination during the preliminary hearing. The second element of this rule 
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION 
IN LIMINE RE: ADMISSION OF PRELIMINARY 
HEARING TESTlMONY OF VICTIM: PAGE -4- 
concerning whether the Defendant had an adequate opportunity to conduct a cross 
examination during the preliminary hearing is best discussed in conjunction with the 
similar requirement provided in I.C. 5 9-336. 
Under I.C. 5 9-336, prior to admitting such evidence from a preliminary hearing, 
a court is specifically required to find that the testimony is: 
1. Offered as evidence of a material fact and that the testimony is inore 
probative on the point for which it is offered than any other evidence 
which the proponent can procure through reasonable efforts; and 
2. That the witness is, after diligent and good faith attempts to locate, 
unavailable for the hearing; and 
3. That at the preliminary hearing, the party against whom the admission 
of the. testimony is sought had an adequate opportunity to prepare and 
cross-examine the proffered testimony. 
The second requirement of this rule, as already explained above, is met as the court will 
obviously find that the witness is sufficiently unavailable to testify due to death and 
therefore any good faith attempts to locate the witness are satisfied. 
Turning then to the first requirement of I.C. 5 9-336, we must determine if the 
preliminary hearing testimovly given by IGrl I-loidal is material and inore probative 
than any other evidence that the State can provide. The most current case law 
concerning this issue can be found in State v. Ricks, 122 Idaho 856 (1992). In Ricks, the 
defendant was arrested for possession of a controlled substance. Id. at 858. She was 
denied a motion in limine to exclude testimony previously given by the arresting officer 
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who was lcilled in an automobile accident before the trial. Id. The Court agreed that as 
the officer was the only witness for the state and was the one dho  took the evidence 
into custody, his testimony was material and more probative than any other evidence. 
Id. at 861 (the Court stated that the "state's case would have been eviscerated had 
Ricl<s's motion in limine been granted"). 
In this case, the victim, Karl Hoidal, was the only person who could testify to the 
actions of the defendant which led to his subsequent arrest. No other witness can 
testify to personally observing the defendant when he confronted the victim, threatened 
him, and fired a pistol near his head. Such testimony was offered at the preliminary 
hearing by the victim and it is material to the aggravated assault crime charged against 
the defendant. No other evidence will be offered by the State wluch will be more 
probative to the material facts this testimony provides. It therefore meets the first 
requirement of I.C. 5 9-336. 
As previously mentioned, the third requirement of I.C. 5 9-336 is similar to the 
second requirement of I.R.E. S04(b)(1) in that, in this case, it requires that the defendant 
had an adequate opportunity to prepare and cross examine Mr. I-IoidaI during his 
testimony at the preliminary hearing. In Xicics, the Court held that the third 
requirement to LC. 5 9-336 was sufficiently met simply because the defendant had a full 
seven days from the time the police reports were received by defense counsel to the 
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time of the preliminary , hearing, in order to prepare for cross examination. Ricks, 
In the current case, the defendant was arrested on March 30,2007, the bulk of discovery 
was provided in mid-April, and his preliminary hearing was not held until June 7,2007. 
As such, this period went far beyond the seven days the Court has held as an adequate 
opportunity to prepare and cross-examine a witness. See Id. 
The Court in Xzclcs conducted a more detailed analysis of the similar requirement 
in LR.E. 804(b)(l), as the Defendant there argued that they had a different molive in 
cross examining the witness during the preliminary hearing than they would have at 
trial. Id. at 862-863. The Court stated that there is no per se rule regarding whether or 
not a party has an adequate opportunity and similar motive to develop testimony 
during a cross examination, but that each case must be analyzed by the totality of the 
circumstances. Id. at 863. Relevant to this analysis are several factors to consider if a 
similar motive exists for developing the testimony which include: "1) the type of 
proceeding in which the testimony is given, 2) trial strategy, 3) the potential penalties or 
financial stakes, and 4) the number of issues and parties." Id. In Rzcks, the Court held 
that the defendant in fact questioned the deceased officer during the preliminary 
hearing regarding the incident for which he arrested the defendant and therefore had 
an adequate opportunity and motive for cross-examining the witness on material 
elements affecting the case. Id. Similarly, in this case the defendant did in fact cross 
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examine and recross-examine Mr. Hoidal in detail regarding the incident that led to the 
arrest of the defendant and examined the witness as to the reliability of his observations 
on the evening in question. Such questioning would go towards attacking the 
testimony as to its impact on any material elements it might have in criminal charges 
against the defendant. Also, as in Ricks, the identity of the issues remains the same 
throughout the proceedings from the preliminary hearing to the trial. The witness was 
"the only person whose testimony could provide the material element of the offense 
charged and the "factual elements to be established" at both proceedings are the same 
Id. at 864. As such, the third element of LC. 5 9-336 and the second element of I.R.E. 
804(b)(l) are satisfied. 
Therefore, the testimony of Karl Hoidal is admissible under both I.R.E. 804(b)(l) 
and I.C. 5 9-336. As the testimony is allowed under Idaho statutory and case law, we 
must next determine the admissibility oi this testimony under the Coilfrontation Clause 
to the U.S. Constitution and the analysis provided in Crawjord. 
B. KARL HOIDAL'S HEARSAY TESTIMONY MEETS THE SIXTH AMENDMENT 
CONFRONTATION CLAUSE ANALYSIS SET FORTH IN CRAWTORD V. 
WASZITNGTON. 
The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constibtion states, in pertinent part: 
"In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to be confronted with 
witnesses against him[.]" In Cua~oford v. Washington, - 541 U.S. 36, 124 S.Ct. 1354, 158 
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L.Ed.2d 177 (2004), the U.S. Supreme Court held that the Confrontation Clause applies 
to "'witnesses' against the accused- in other words, those who 'bear testimony.'" Id., 
541 U.S. at 51,124 S.Ct. at 7364 (internal citations omitted). Cvawford, established three 
elements that are required to be met under a Confrontation Clause analysis to allow the 
admission of out-of-court statements. These elements are 1) the evidence proffered by 
the declarant must be testimonial, 2) the deciarant must be unavailable, and 3) the party 
against whom the evidence is offered must have been afforded a prior opportunity for 
cross-examination. Id. at 68,124, S.Ct at 1374. All commentators agree that the Court 
created the most difficulty for lower courts in conducting a Cvawfovd analysis by not 
attempting to clearly define what constitutes "testimonial" statements. Id. ("we leave 
for another day any effort to spell out a comprehensive definition of "testimonial."). 
However, in the current case our analysis of the first element of the Confrontation 
Clause is easy as the Court specifically listed testimony at a preliminary hearing as 
"testimonial." Id. ("Whatever else the term covers, it applies at a minimum to prior 
testimony at a preliminary hearing[.]"). , Therefore, if Mr. Hoidal's preliminary hearing 
testimpny meets the second and third elements of the Crawford analysis, it is admissible 
he subsequent tiid. 
The second element is easily met and does not require a,ny lengthy explanation. 
Simply stated, the witness is deceased, and therefore unavailable. As to the third 
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element, the Court in Crawford 'did not provide any meaningful analysis in deter~ng~ing 
what is an acceptable prior opportunity for cross examination, as that Court was 
dealing with statements made by 'a defendant during a police interrogation and found 
that there was no cross-examination conducted at all. Id. Therefore, we should rely on 
the previous analysis provided, above under Idaho case law to reach the result that an 
dequate opportunity did exist. Furthermore, case law from other jurisdictions 
ides support for this position. See People v. Carter, 36 Cal.4th 1114 (2005) 
timony of ex-boyfriend of a murder victim who testified at preliminary hearing and 
died before trial was admitted &ith the court stating that defendant is allowed "an 
, .. 
opportunity for effective cross examination, not cross examination that is as effective as 
defendant might prefer"); State v. Piper, 2006 SD 1 (2006) ("The Confrontation Clause 
only guarantees an opportunity for effective cross-examination, not cross-examination 
that is in whatever way, and to whatever extent, the defendant might wish."); Anaya v. 
Huslcey 2005 U.S Dist LEXIS 6104 (ND CAL 2005) (allowing preliminary hearing 
testimony of a victim when she was deemed unavailable to testify at trial). 
As the preIiminary hearing testimony of Mr. Woidal was testimonial, he is 
currently unavailable to testify at the defendant's trial, and the defendant had a prior 
opportunity to conduct a cross-examination, his testimony is admissible during the trial 
under the Confrontation Clause analysis provided in Crawford. 
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Ill. CONCLUSION 
For the abovestated reasons, the preliminary hearing testirnony of Karl Hoidal 
in State v. Mant?, is admissible as evidence during the subsequent trial proceeding even 
though Mr. Iloidal is now deceased. ThiS is because Mr. Hoidal's testrimony establishes 
material facts which are more probative than any other evidence the State can provide, 
because he is unavailable as a witness for the subsequent trial, and because the 
defendant had an adequate opportunity to cross-examine hi* during the preliminary 
the preliminary hearing testimony satisfies both state and federal 
law. Accordiilgly, the State respectfully asks that its Motion in 
Limine to allow Karl Hoidal's testimony at trial be granted. 
DATED this day of October, 2007. 
Deputy Prosecuting Attorney 
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1 Michelle Evans, Deputy Prosecutor 
TIM CARL MANTZ, 1 Appearing on behalf of the State 
Defendmt. 1 Defendani present with counsel, 
1 John C. Judge, Moscow, ID ................................................................. ............................ 
Subject of Proceedings: MOTIONS TO SUPPRESS 
This being the time iixed pursuant to order of the Court for the hearing of pretrial 
motions in these cases, Court noted the presence of counsel and the defendant. 
Mr. Judge informed the Court that one oi his witnesses will be late today and the 
otlzer one is unavailable and requested a continuance. In response to inquiry from the 
Court, Mr. Judge made an offer of proof as to what he believed the testimony will show. 
Mr. Judge moved for continuance of the trial and argued in support of the motion. 
Ms. Evans stated that the State would not be opposed to trying the aggravated assault case 
at the time the possession of methamphetamine case is currently set. 
Court informed the defendant of his right to a speedy trial and questioned the 
defendant on his understanding of that right. Court found that the defendant is intelligent 
and dcu la t e  and that he understands his right to a speedy trial and has voluntarily 
relinquished his right to speedy trial in each of these cases. Court accepted the defendant's 
waiver of his right to speedy trial in both of these cases. 
Court vacated the October 29, 2007, jury trial setting in CR-07-01292 and 
rescheduled it to commence at 9:00 A.M. on November 26, 2007. Court vacated the 
November 26,2007, jury trial setting in CR-07-01320 and rescheduled jury trial in that case 
to commence at 9:00 A.M. on December 3,2007. 
Terry Odenborg 
Deputy Clerk 
COURT MTNUIXS - 3 
Court.rescheduled hearing of the inotions to suppress in these cases for 1:00 P.M. on 
October 17,2007. 
Court scheduled hearing of the State's Motion in Limine RE: Admission of 
Preliminary Hearing Testimony of Victim in CR-07-01292 for 430 P.M. on October 29,2007, 
ordering briefing due by October 24,2007. 
Court stated that it would also conduct a pretrial conference in CR-07-01292 on 
October 29,2007, ordering that the defendant be in attendance on that date. 





JOHN R. STEGNER 
D r s m c r  J ~ G E  
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF LATAH 
STATE OF IDAHO, 1 
Case No. CR-07-01292 
Plaintiff, ) 
1 SECOND SCHEDULING ORDER 
vs . ) 







IT IS IlEREBY ORDERED: 
(1) The October 29,2007, jury trial setting is vacated and reset to commence at 9:00 
011 November 26,2007, in Courtroom #3 of the Latall County Courthouse and will be 
on a 900 A.M. to 400 P.M. schedule. Trial is estimated to run four (4) days. Counsel 
shall be present in chambers at 8:30 A.M. on the first morning of trial; 
(2) The defendant's Motion to Suppress shall be heard at 1:00 P.M. on October 17, 
2007; 
(3) The State's h/iotion in Limine RE: Admission of Preliminary Hearing Testimony 
of Victim shall be heard commencing at 430 P.M. on October 29,2007. Any briefing on 
that motion shall be served and filed no later than October 24,2007; 
(4) A pretrial conference shall be conducted immediately following the rnoiion 
hearing on October 29, 2007. The defendant shall be in attendance at that pretrial 
SECOND SCHEDULING ORDER - 1 
conference; and 
(5) Each parw shall serve and lodge with the clerk of the court, at least seven (7) 
days prior to trial, all requested jury instructions sought by either party. 
DATED this ~ 5 G o f  October, 2007. 
fohn R. Sterner 
District ~ u & e  
CERTGICATE OF SERVICE 
I do hereby certify that a full, h e ,  complete 
and correct copy of the foregoing SECOND 
SECOND SCI-TEDULING ORDER was 
hand delivered to: 
MICHELLE EVANS 
JOHN C. JUDGE 
ATTORNEY AT LAW 
PO BOX 9344 
MOSCOW, ID 83843 
on this day of October, 2007. 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF LATAH 
- COURTMINUTES - 
John R. Siegner Sheryl L. Engler 
District Judge Court Reporter 
Recording: J: 3/2007-10-17 
Date: October 17,2007 Time: 1:04 P.M. 
STATE OF DAEIO, 1 




TIM CARL MANTZ, 
) 
1 Michelle Evans, Deputy Prosecutor 
1 Appearing on behalf of the State 
\ 
Defendant. j Defendant present with counsel, 
1 John C. Judge, Moscow, ID .................................................................  
Subject ofP~oceedings: MOTIONS TO SUPPRESS 
This being the time fixed pursuant to order of the Court for the hearing of pretrial 
' in these cases, Court noted the presence of counsel and the defendant. 
Colloquy was had between Court and counsel regarding the order in which the 
motions would be heard. It was decided that the defendant's motion to suppress with 
regard to the search of the home would be heard first. 
Ron Vietmeier was called, sworn and testified for the defendant. Cross examination 
by Ms. Evans. Redirect examination by Mr. Judge. No recross examination. The witness 
stepped down. 
Proceeding on with the defendant's motion to suppress with regard to the search of 
the 1;-250 vehicle at the time of arrest, 
Richard Isaac Slules was called, sworn and testified for the State. State's Exhibits #1, 
photograph with photo index; #2 two photographs; #3, two photographs; #4, two 
photographs; #5, 60 photographs; and #6, two. photographs, were marked for 
identification and offered. Mr. Judge examined the witness in aid of objection. There 
being no objection f ~ o m  Mr. Judge, State's Exhibits #I  through #6 were admiffed into 
evidence. Direct examination of Officer Skiles resumed. Cross examination by Mr. Judge. 
Defendant's Exhibits A, dispatch record Incident Report; and B, Sgt. Jordan's Report, were 
marked for identification. Cross examination continued. Redirect examination by Ms. 
Terry Odenbo~g 
Deputy Clerk 
COURT MINUTES - 1 
Evans. Recross examination by Mr. Judge. Defendant's Exhibit C, Officer Sldes' Report, 
was marked for identification. Defendant's Exhibits A and C were offered and admitted 
into evidence after hearing hbjections from Ms. Evans as to A. 
Direct examination of Officer Skiles by Mr. Judge with regard lo executiorr of the 
Search Warrant of the Mantz home. Cross examination by Ms. Evans. No redirect 
examination. Court questioned the witness. Mr. Judge examined the witness on the 
Court's questions. There being no objection from counsel, the witness was excused. 
Defendant's Exhibit B, Officer SWes' Report, was offered and admitted into 
evidence without objection. 
Mr. Judge argued in support of the defendant's Motion to Suppress regarding the 
fruits of the service of the search Warraat for the home. Ms. Evans argued in opposition to 
the motion. No rebuttal argument. For reasons articulated on the record, Court denied the 
Motion to Suppress with regard to the fruits of the service of the Search Warrant at the 
defendant's home. Court instructed Ms. Evans to prepare an order in accordahce with its 
rulings. 
Ms. Evans argued in opposition to the defendant's Motion to Suppress with regard 
pickup truck. Mr. Judge argued in support of the defendant's 
otion. Ms. Evans argued i11 rebuttal. For reasons articulated on the record, Court denied 
Court instructed Ms. Evans to prepare a n  order in accordance 
s. Evans informed Court and counsel of the State's intent to file a motion in lh ine  





COURT MINUTES - 2 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF TIlE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF LATAH 
STATE OF IDAHO, 1 
Plaintiff, 1 Case No. CR-2007-0001292 
1 Case No. CR-2007-0001320 
1 
1 ORDER DENYING DEFENDANT'S 
CARL MANTZ, 1 MOTIONS TO SUPPRESS AND 
1 EXCLUDE EVIDENCE 
1 
On the 17th day of October, 2007, the defendant, TIM CARL MANTZ, his counsel, 
John C. Judge, and the State's attorney, Michelle M. Evans, appeared before the Court for 
hearing of the defendant's Motions to Suppress and Exclude Evidence. The Court heard 
testimony, arguments of Counsel, reviewed the case file herein, directed statements to the 
Defendant and counsel, and HEREBY ORDERS for reasons articulated by the Court on the 
record, as follomrs: 
1) That the Defendant's Motion to Suppress and Exclude Evidence 
seized pursuant to the search warrant for 1011 Vale Road, Harvard, 
Idaho BE DENIED; 
ORDER DENYING DEFENDANT'S MOTIONS 
' TO SUPPRESS AND EXCLUDE EVIDENCE: Page -1- 
2, That the Defendant's Motion to Suppress and Exclude Evidence 
seized from the Defendant's piclcup following a traffic stop and arrest 
pursuant to a Warrant BE DENIED. 
rk 
DATED this 25 day of October, 2007, nunc pro tunc to October 1.7,2007. 
ORDER DENYING DEFENDANT'S MOTIONS 
TO SUPPRESS AND EXCLUDE EVIDENCE: Page -2- 
CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY 
I hereby certify that true and correct copies of the ORDER DENYING DEFENDANT'S 
MOTIONS TO SUPPRESS AND EXCLUDE EVIDENCE were served on the following in 
the manner indicated below: 
John C. Judge 
[ I  Pax 
[ J Eland Delivery 
'lliam W. Thompson, Jr. [ J U.S. Mail 
[ I  Overnight Mail 
\ 
[ I Fax 
N Hand Delivery 
\ 
Dated this f October, 2007. 
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CLERK OF DlSifi;i;l' COUFiT 
LATAH COUNTY PROSECUTOR'S OFFICE 
MICHELLE M. EVANS 
DEPUTY PROSECUTING ATTORNEY 
Latall County Courthouse 
P.O. Box 8068 
Moscow, Idaho 83843-0568 
(208) 882-8580 Ext. 3316 
ISB No. 4795 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF T m  SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF LATAH 




1 Case No. CR-2007-0001292 
V. 1 
1 MOTION IN LIMINE AND 
TIM CARL MANTZ, 1 NOTICE OF I.R.E. 404(b) EVIDENCE 
Defendant. 1 
COMES NOW the State of Idaho by and through Michelle M. Evans, Latah County 
Deputy Prosecuting Attorney, and moves this Court in li.&ne for an order allowing the 
admission of testimony and evidence regarding other crimes, wrongs, or acts of the 
defendant - more specifically, the State wants to produce evidence that the Defendant has 
previously threatened people, usually on or near his property, and usually with a 
handgun. Such evidence is relevant to show the Defendant's motive, opportunity, intent, 
preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident. 
MOTION IN LLMINE AND NOTICE 
OF I.R.E. 404(b) EVIDENCE: PAGE -1- 
0481 
The'main u~cidents at issue are summarized as follow: 
* Latah Co. Case No C-1142, LCSO #C87-0319 - Defendant charged with Agg Assault 
with a pistol on Vernon Judlcins and Melody Butterton on 10/23/87 occurring on Ruby 
Creek Road. Defendant pled guilty to Exhibition of a Deadly Weapon. 
* Latalz Co. Case No C-232, LCSO #86-298 - Defendant charged with Agg Assault with 
a pistol on Anthony Flodin on 10/11/86 occurring in Moscow. Defendant pled guilty 
to Exhibition of a Deadly Weapon. 
* LCSO 2005-03099 and 2005-05127 - 7/7/05 incident involving Brandon Hendrix auto 
accident with josh Mantz where it is alleged Defendant came on scene and threatened 
Brandon with a gun. 
* LCSO 2005-04548 - 9/30/05 incident involving Cynthia Cole on Mantz property 
wlzere Defendant chased her car down with his and then threatened her. 
* LCSO 2007-00706 (current case) - statement obtained from Larry Berry regarding 
11/06 incident where Defendant chased him down in his pickup and yelled at lum 
about use of road while holding a pistol in his hand. 
This motion is made pursuant to T.R.E. 401, 402, and 404(b). Oral argument is 
hereby requested. 
$q%ay of October, 2007. DATED Chis -
mk.&$,$,. M 
Michelie M. Evans 
Deputy Prosecuting Attorney 
MOTION W LIMINE: Page -2- 
CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing Motion in Limine and 
Notice of I.R.E. 404(b) Evidence was 
- mailed, United States mail, postage prepaid 
h a n d  delivered 
$'-sent by facsimile, original by mail 
to the following: 
John C. Judge 
Attorney ai Law 
P.O. Box 9344 
Moscow, ID 83843 
Fax: (208) 883-4593 
Dated this d>qd day of October, 2007. 
MOTION IN LJMNB: Page -3- 
JOHN C. JUDGE (ISB 3288) 
GRETCHEN G. STEWART (ISB 721 1) 
LANDECK, WESTBERG, JUDGE & GRAHAM, P.A. 
414 S. Jefferson 
P.O. Box 9344 
Moscow, ID 83843 
(208) 883-1505 
FAX: (208) 883-4593 
Attorneys for Defendant 
IN T I B  DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF LATAH 
STATE OF IDAHO, 1 
) Case No. CR-2007-0001292 
Plaintill, 1 
) BRIEF IN OPPOSITION TO 
V. ) STATE'S MOTIONS IN LIMINE 
1 
TIM C. MANTZ, 1 
1 
Defendant. 1 
Defendant Tim C. Mantz ("Mr. Mantz"), through his attorneys, Landeck, 
Westberg, Judge & Graham, P.A., hereby submits this Brief in Opposition to State's 
Motiolls in Limine. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The State seeks to introduce Mr. Hoidal's preliminary hearing testimony on the 
grounds that it meets the requirements of Idaho Code $ 9-336, Rule 804(b)(l) I.R.E., and 
the Sixth Amendment Confrontation Clause analysis set forth in Ci*a~forcl v.
BRIEF W OPPOSITION TO STATE'S MOTIONS W LIMJNE - 1 
Washingfon, 541 U.S. 36, 124 S.Ct. 1354 (2004). Unfortunately, the Slate's argument 
never reaches the issue central to admitting preliminary hearing testimony in failing to 
acknowledge the limits placed on Mr. Mantz's cross-examination of Karl Hoidal. Rased 
on Idaho and federal law, Mr. Mantz was denied an adequate "opportunity" to cross- 
examine Mr. EIoidal at the preliminary hearing aid, therefore, the admission of the 
preliminary hearing transcript under a hearsay exception would violate Mr. Mantz's 
rights of confrontation under the Idaho and U.S. Constitutions. 
11. ARGUMENT 
Former testimony is allowed at trial when tile declarant is unavailable as a 
witness, but only if the party against whom the testimony is offered had an opportunity 
and similar motive to develop thc testimony by direct, cross, or redirect examination. See 
I.R.E. 804(b)(l). Since Crawford, "Rule 804(b)(l) [Federal Rules of Evidence] 
implements the command of the Sixth Amendment's Confrontation Clause: 'The 
accused shall enjoy the right. . . to be confronted wilh the witnesses against him.' U.S. 
Const. Amend. VI. The prosecution may not offer proof of a prior statement that is 
testimonial in nature unless (1) the accused has had, will have, or has forfeited the 
opportunity to 'be confronted with' the witness who made the statement, and (2) the 
witness is unavailable to testifj at trial. See c~~awfovdv .  Washington, 541 U.S. 36,68, 
124 S. Ct. 1354, 158 L. Ed. 2d 177 (2004)." US. v. Yida, 2007 U.S. App. LEXlS 19468 
p. 4-5 (9"' Cir., August 16, 2007). 
While Yida primarily addresses the requirement of "unavailability" as applied to 
Rule 804 (b)(l) F.R.E., the case explains at length the preference for live testimony under 
the Confrontation Clause. 
BRIEF M OPPOSITION TO STATE'S MOTIONS IN LIMME - 2 
Underlying both the constit~~tional principles and the rules of 
evidence is a preference for live testimoily. Live testimoiiy gives the jury 
(or other trier of fact) tile opportunity to observe the demeanor of the 
witness while testifying. William Blacltstolle long ago recognized this 
virtue of the right to confrontation, stressing that tlxough live testimony, 
''and this [procedure] only, tile persons who are to decide upon the 
evidence have an opportunity of observing tlie quality, age, education, 
understanding, behavior, and inclinations of the witness." 3 William 
Blackstone, Commentdries on the Laws of England 373-74 (1768). 
Transcripts of a witness's prior testimony, eve11 when subject to prior 
cross-examination, do not offer any such advantage, because "all persons 
must appear alike, when their [testimony] is reduced to writing." Id. at 
374. As the National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers 
("NACDL") amicus brief highlights, the superiority of live testimony as 
contrasted wit11 a transcript of prior testimony has been equally praised in 
our own judicial system since its inception. See, .e.g., Mattox v. United 
States, 156 U.S. 237, 242-43, 15 S. Ct. 337, 39 L. Ed. 409 (1895) ("The 
primary object of tlie constitutional provision in question was to  prevent 
depositions . . . being used against the prisoner in lieu of a personal. 
examination and cross-exanlination of the witness, in which the accused 
has an oppol-tunity, not only of testing the vecollectiorr and sifting the 
conscience of t l~e  witness, but of compelling him to stand face to face with 
the jury in order that they may look at him, and judge by his demeanor 
upon the stand and the manner in which he gives his testimony whether he 
is worthy of belief."); see also NLXB v. Universal Camera Corp., 190 
F.2d 429, 430 (2d Cir. 1951) ('"Tlhat part of the evidence which the 
printed words do not preserve . . . . is the most telling part, for on the issue 
of veracity the bearing and delivery of a witness will usually be the 
dominating factors. . . ."); Broad ~Mzlsic, Inc. v. Havana Madrid Rest. 
Corp., 175 F.2d 77,. 80 (2d Cir. 1949) ("The liar's story may seem 
uncontradicted to one who merely reads it, yet it may be contradicted . . . 
by his manner . . . which cold print does not preserve.") (iiltemal 
quotations omitted). 
More recently, the United States Court of Appeals for tlle Third 
Circuit voiced the importance of observing, first hand, a witness's 
demeanor while testifying: 
Demeanor is of the utmost importance in the 
dete~mination of the credibility of a witness. The 
i m u e r a b l e  telltale indications which fall from a witness 
during the course of his examination are often much more 
of an indication to judge or jury of his credibility and the 
reliability of his evidence than is the literal meaning of his 
words. Eve11 beyond the precise words themselves lies the 
unexpressed indication of his alignment with one side or 
the other in the trial. It is indeed rarely that a cross- 
BRIEF IN OPPOSITION TO STATE'S MOTIONS IN LIMINE - 3 
us 86 
examiner succeeds in compelling a witness to retract 
testimony which is harmful to his client, but it is not 
inhequently that he leads a hostile witness to reveal by his 
demeanor -- his tone of voice, the evidence of fear which 
grips hiin at the height of cross-examination, or even his 
defiance -- that his evidence is not to be accepted as true, 
either because of partiality or overzealousness or 
inaccuracy, as well as outright untruthfulness. The 
demeanor of a witness, as Judge Frank said, is 'wordless 
language.' 
Aquino, 378 F.2d at 548 (quoting Broad. Music, 175 F.2d 
at 80). 
2007 U.S. App. LEXIS 19468 at p. 5-6 
In Idaho, even pre-Crawford, the Idaho Supreme Courtprohibited the admission 
of preliminary hearing testimony on "public policy grouids." State 1r Elisondo, 114 
Idaho 41 2, 415 (1988). While the absolute prohibition on the admission of preliminary 
,-r 
hearing testimony was then changed by the adoption of Idaho Code 5 9-336, State v. 
Ricks, 122 Idaho 856 (Ct. App. 1992), the admission of preliminary hearing testimony 
must still be determined by a "case-by-case approach." 122 Idaho at 863. The lower 
court must be mindful orthe "concern about admitting such testimony expressed by the 
Supreme Court in Elisondo," 122 Idaho at 863, in detcmining "whether the party 
opposing the use of such testimony 'had an opportunity and similar motive to develop the 
testimony by direct, cross, or redirect examination."' 122 Idaho at 863. Given that the 
confrontation analysis at the time Ricks was decided was based on Ohio v. Roberts, 448 
U.S. 56 (1980), overruled by Crawford, this issue must now be analyzed with an eye 
toward the protection of confrontation rights required under Cvawford. 
BRIEF :I; OPPOSITION TO STATE'S MOTIONS :I; LIMINE - 4 
In this case, Mr. Mantz was prevented from cross-examining Mr. Hoidal in an 
area with tile poteiitial to ~mpeach Mr. Hoidal's testimony on several grounds, including 
bias, motivation, untruthful acts, and character for truthfulness. 
With the recognition that the Rule 804(b)(l) requirement for prior opportunity for 
cross-examination now carries the protection of the Confrontation Clause, several post- 
Crawford cases have strictly scrutinized any limitation on a defendant's opportunity 
when consideriiig the admission of preliminary hearing testimony of an unavailable 
witness. 
For example, in State v Sfuart, 2005 WI 47; Wis. 2d 659; 695 N.W.2d 259 
(2005), at the preliminary hearing during cross-examination of the State's wiaess, the 
prosecution objected on the grounds o f  relevance to questions regarding circumstances 
under which the witness had given a statement to police. Id. at P.9, Wis. 2d at 665, 695 
N.W. 2d at 262. Stuart was uItimateIy ibund guilty of first-degree intentional homicide. 
Stuart subsequently asked the court to reexamine its 2003 decision that the testimony had 
. been properly admitted under Confrontation Clause precedent. (&!.at P. 19, Wis 2d 659 at 
669, 695 N.W.2d at 264. While Stuart's petition for review was pending, the United 
States Supreme Court decided Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 124 S.Ct. 1354 
(2004), w l ~ c h  altered Confrontation Clause jurisprudence. Id. at P.21, Wis. 2d at 670, 
695 N.W.2d at 264. The Stuart court pointed out that, like Idaho, the scope of cross- 
examination at a preliminary hearing is focused on issues of plausibility, not credibility, 
because the preliminary hearing is intended to be a summary proceeding to determine 
essential or basic facts relating to probable cause-not a full evidentiary trial on the issue 
of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt See id. at P.30, Wis 2d at 673, 695 N.W.2d at 265- 
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66. When that kind of restriction is enforced and the State attempts lo use the 
preliminary hearing testimony at a later trial, a Confrontation Clause problem arises. See 
zd. at P.3 1, Wls. 2d at 673, 695 N. W.2d at 266. 
Because Stuart was denied the opportunity at the preliminaiy hearing to question 
the witness about a potential motive to testify falsely, the court found that the use of the 
unavailable witness's testimony at trial violated his right to conhontation and should not 
have been admitted at trial. Id. at P.37, Wis. 2d at 676, 695 N.W.2d at 267. 
In analyzing whether the error was harmless under the Chapman test and cases 
with alternative wording, the Stuaut court noted that, regarding the inlportance of the 
e ~ x o ~ ~ e o u s l ~  admitted evidence, the words and actions of the prosecutor and judge 
indicated that the "most important evidence all came in through [the unavailable 
witness's] testimony and [one ofher wit~~ess's] testimony." Id. at P.51-53, Wis. 2d at 680- 
682,695 N.W.2d at 269-70. Second, regarding the overall strength of the State's case, 
the court found .that because there was no physical evidence and no eyewitnesses, the 
State relied on circumstantial evidence to prove its case; firthemore, without the 
admission of the unavailable witness's preliminary hearing testimony, the State's case 
would have "diminished appreciably." Id. at P.54, Wis. 2d at 681, 695 N.W.2d at 270. 
Third, whether there was untainted evidence corroborating or duplicating the erroneously 
admitted evidence, the cow? found that the corroborating evidence could "hardly be 
described as untainted," but nevertheless, its cumulative effect benefited the State. See id. 
at 55, Wis. 2d at 681-82, 695 N.W.2d at 270. Finally, when examining the nature ofthe 
defense, the court found that is was "certainly plausible," given the facts and 
circumstances the defense brought to light. Id. at 55, Wis. 2d at 681-82,695 N.W 2d at 
BRIEF IN OPPOSITION TO STATE'S MOTIONS IN LIMINE - 6 
admitting the prelimiliary hearing testimony, in violation o f  the defendant's right to 
confion~atioi~, was not harmless. Ih: at P. 57, Wis. 2d at 682, 695 N.W.2d at 270. 
in another case providing clear guidance to protect confrontation riglits, State v. 
Fry, 92 P.3d 970,2004 Colo. LEXIS 529 (2004), the Supreme Court of Colorado 
affirmed a reversal o f  a conviction for second degree assault. The court found the case to 
exemplify the dangers o f  admitting preliminary hearing testimony as evidence at trial 
when the witness is unavailable. Id., 92 P.3d at 979, LEXIS 529 at 25-26. In that case, 
the preliminary hearing did not provide an adequate opportunity to confront the witness 
and reveal issues ofcredibility, such as a motive to lie and evidence o f  intoxication. Id., 
92 P.3d at 979, LEXIS 529 at 27. Even though the trial court allowed Fry to present 
evidence that indirectly questioned the witness's testimony, it denied Fry's request to 
rebut testimony immediately after it was read. Id. 92 P.3d at 979, LEXIS 529 at 28. 
Instead, the evidence o f  credibility was not allowed until Fry's case-in-chief, much later 
in trial, and thereby greatly diminished the effect o f  that rebuttal. Id. The  Fry court 
concluded the procedure did not allow any opportunity for Fry to attempt to rebut the 
testimony against him. Id. at 979, LEXIS 529 at 27-28. 
In this finding, the court reiterated that cross-examination is the "greatest legal 
engine ever invented for the discovery o f  truth." Id. at 979, LEXIS 529 at 28 (quoting 
California v. Gi,een, 399 U.S. 149,90 S. Ct. 1930 (1970)). "Indirect rebuttal evidence 
cannot have the same effect on a jury as answers to questions put directly to the witness 
on cross-examination." Id. at 979, LEXIS 529 at 28. Before a slcilled cross-examiner, a 
dishonest or mistaken witness can see the corner into which he has painted himself and 
BRIEF IN OPPOSiTION TO STATE'S MOTIONS IN LIMINE - 7 
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eact in a way that permits the jury to judge credibility from what it hears and sees. See 
id. at 980, LEXIS 529 at 29. "Thus, a witness's testimony on cross-examination may be 
much more damning to the witness's credibility than any sod of indirect evidence the 
defense can offer." Id. The court concluded that, by admitting the preliminary hearing 
testimony of the unavailable witness at trial, the trial court denied Fry his right to an 
adequate opportunity to cross-examine the witnesses against him, resulting in denying 
Fry his right to confiont the witnesses against him. Id. at 29. The error was not 
harmless-that is "wllether the guilty verdict actually rendered in the trial was surely 
unattributable to the error." Id. (quoting Sullivan v. ~ouisiana, 508 U.S. 275,279, 113 S. 
Ct. 2078 (1993)). 
Likewise, inlriargrave v. McKee, 2007 U.S. App. LEXIS 22956,2007 FED App. 
(6'" Cir), the Court, relying on Davis, concluded that the state trial court's 
~miting defendant's questions to whether a witness was diagnosed as a paranoid 
schizophrenic was similar to that in Davis. Id. at 24. In Hargrave, as in Davis, the 
questioning was fouid ineffective because further questions were not permitted that 
could have exposed the jury to facts from which.the juror could adequately judge the 
witness's reliability. Id. at 24. The court also discounted the State's argument that the 
trial court did not entirely prohibit evidence regarding the witness's psychiatric condition 
countering with, "where, as here, the Government's case may stand or fall on the jury's 
belief or disbelief of one witness, h[is] credibility is subject to close scrutiny." Id. at 23- 
24. The court found, that as in Davis, the limitatioll in the cross-examination violated 
Hargrave's rights under the Confrontation Clause. Id. at 24-25. 
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"Cross-examination is the principal means by which the believability of a witness 
and the iruth of his testimony are tested." Davis v. Alaslia, 415 U.S. 308,3 16 (1974). 
The partiality of a witness is subject to exploration at trial, and is 'always relevant as 
discrediting ihe witness m d  affecting the weight of his testimony."' Id (quoting 
Wigmore, Evidcncc). 
A criminal defendant states a violation of the Confrontation Clause 
by showing that he was prohibited from engaging in otheiwise appropriate 
cross-examination designed to show a prototypical form of bias on the part 
of the witness, and thereby to "expose to tlie jury the facts from which 
jurors . . . could appropriately draw inferences relating to the reliability of 
tlle wit~less." 
Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308, 318 (1974). "The exposure of a witness' motivation in 
testitling is a proper and important hlct ion of the constitutionally protected riglit of 
cross-examination." Id at 316-317. (Cited with approval by State v Guinn, 114 Idaho 
30, 38 (1988) ("If a balancing decision is close, the scale should tip in favor of the 
defendant's right of confrontation. 114 Idaho at 35 (Burnett, J. concurring).) 
In a criminal case, a defendant's right of confrontation is violated by a reslriction 
which precludes inquiry into a matter relev.int to impeachment of a prosecution witness. 
Olden v. Kentuclw, 488 U.S. 227 (1988). While the Confrontation Clause does not 
prevent a trial judge "from imposillg any limits on defense counsel's inquiry into the 
potential bias of aprosecution witness," Delaware v. Van Ausdall, 475 U.S. 673, 678-79 
(1 986) (emphasis added), the trial court cannot prohibit all inquiry into an area of 
potential impeachment without violating the Confrontation Clause ("By tlius c~~tt ing off
all questioning about an event that the State had conceded had talten place [the dismissal 
of a public drunkenness charge] and that a jury might reasonably have found furnished 
the witness a motive for favoring the prosecution in his testimolly, the court's ruling 
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violated respondent's rights secured by the Confrontation Clause."). 475 U.S. at 779. 
The Ninth Circuit has empl~asized that while some restrictions on cross-examination may 
be appropriate, they must be reasonable and may not be arbitrary or disproportionate to 
the purposes they are designed to serve. See, e.g, Fowler v. Sacramento County, 421 
F.3d, 1027, 1037 (9'" Cir. 2005); UnitedStates v. Schoneberg, 396 F.3d 1036, 1042 (9" 
Cir. 2005) (holding that the trial court was "erroneous" in characterizing the precluded 
cross-examination as irrelevant and misleading and, thus, concluding that "we cannot 
sustain the limitation on cross examination concerning motive to lie as an exercise of 
permissible discretion"). 
The bias, prejudice, or motive of a witness to lie concerning issues presented in a 
trial is always material and relevant to effective cross-examination. State v Araiza, 124 
Idaho 82, 91 (1993) (citing Davis, 415 U.S. at 316). "jW]henever evidence is introduced 
for purposes of impeachment, it necessarily involves a witness' credibility, and credibility 
is always relevant." State v Hairston, 133 Idaho 496,503 (1999) (emphasis added) 
(quoting State v. Arledge, 119 Idaho 584, 588, (Ct. App. 1991)). "If tlie limitation on 
[the defendant's] opportunity to impeach [a State witness] were error, it would be 
fundamental error, because i t  goes to the foundation or basis of [the defendant's] rights." 
State v. Araiza, 124 Idaho 82,91 (1993) (citing State v. Kenner, 121 Idaho 594,597 
(1 992)). 
In Davis, counselwas permitted to ask the witness "whether he was biased," 
Davis, 41 5 U.S. at 3 17, but "was unable to male a record from which to argue why [the 
witness] might have been biased or otherwise lacked that degree of impartiality expected 
of a witness at trial." Id. at 3 18. There, counsel sought to introduce evidence from which 
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he would seelc to sliow-or at least argue-that the witness acted out of fear or concein 
of possible jeopaxdy to liis probation or to shift suspicion away from himseli; and that the 
witness may have been subject to undue pressure from the police. See id. at 31 1. 
However, counsel was prevented from malcing any reference to the witness's juvenile 
record in the course of cross-examination. Id. at 3 10-1 1. Ultimately, the Court did not 
accept the Alaslca Supreine Court's conclusion that the permitted cross-examination had 
been adequate to develop the issue of bias properly to the jury. Id. at 3 1 8 .  
On the basis ofthe limited cross-examination that was permitted, the jury 
' 
might well have tliought that defense counsel was engaged in a speculative 
and baseless line of attack on the credibility of an apparently blameless 
witness or, as the prosecutor's objection put it, a 'rehash' of prior cross- 
examination. 
Id. The Court stated that "to make any such inquiry effective, defense counsel should 
have been permitted to expose to the jury the facts from which jurors, as the sole triers of 
fact a id  credibility, could appropriately draw inferences relating to the reliability of the 
witness." Id. The defendant was thus "denied the right of effective cross-examination 
which would be constitutional error of ihe first magnitude." (internal citations omitted) 
Id. "Serious damage to the strength of the State's case would have been a real possibility 
had petitioner had been allowed to pursue his line of inquiry." Id. at 3 19. Even in the 
face of the State's policy interest in seeking to preserve the anonymity of a juvenile 
offender; the Court upheld the right of confrontation as "paramount." Id 
In State v. Gomez, 137 Idaho 671,674 (2002), the State had objected on the basis 
of relevancy to ilitroduction of evidence that police had found marijuana in the witnesses' 
home during a search. Id. The defendant souglit to question thc witnesses to show tbat 
they had not been prosecuted for this crime and this couid show bias. Id. The court held 
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that the questions regarding the presence of marijuana were relevant and that the district 
court had improperly restricted the defendant's right to cross-examine witnesses for bias. 
Id. at 675. 
The Ninth Circuit has also recognized that file constitutional right to cross- 
examine, though subject to a trial judge's discretion to preclude repetitive and und~dy 
harassing interrogation, cannot preclude a defendant from asking, not only whether the 
witness was biased, but also to make a record from which to argue wily the witness might 
have been biased. See, e.g., US. v. Larson, 495 F.3d 1094, 1101-04 (2007)(en bano); 
US. v. Schonebevg, 396 F.3d 1036, 1042 (9Ih Cif. 2005). The court in Larson articulated 
three factors courts should consider in determining whether a defendant's Confrontation 
Clause right to cross-examination was violated: (1) whether tho excluded evidence was 
relevant; (2) whether there were other legitimate interests outweighing the defendant's 
interest in presenting the evidence; and (3) whether the exclusion of evidence left the jury 
with sufficient information to assess the credibility of the witness. Lavson, 495 F. 3d at 
003 (internal citations omitted). 
Mr. Mantz's counsel attempted to cross-examine Mr. Hoidal for possible bias and 
motivation favoring the prosecution, for trying to deflect responsibility for his own 
behavior, and for issues related to his truthfulness when asking about a D.U.I. charge that 
had apparently been resolved just prior to Mr. Hoidal's preliminary hearing testimony. 
The court sustained the State's objection to Mr. Mantz's line of questioning based on 
relevance, (Tr. p. 60,l. 1 - 1.-1 I), and completely eliminated my opportunity for Mr. 
Mantz to develop impeachment evidence that would go to show bias and motive, and 
expose the witness's untruthfulness, evidence which is always relevant. This line of 
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questioiling also would have certainly led to specific evidence of untruthfulness the night 
of the D.U.I. See Rules 404(a)(2) and (3) and 608(b). As in Davis, the court precluded 
all questioning illto possible witness bias or motivation based upon events of April 2007. 
The limit on this cross-examination of Mr. Hoidal occurred as follows: 
Q: Most every weekend you get drunk? 
A: I wouldn't say drunk, but I-- I do drink. 
Q: And you've been in trouble for that, haven't you? 
A: Yes. 
Q: You've been in trouble with your parents? 
A: Uhm, yes, I've-- I have got 111 trouble with my parents. 
Q: And you've been in trouble with- with the law. 
A: Just previously, yes. 
Q: Uh, but when you say just previously, you mean just in the recent past? 
A: Yes. 
Q: Uhm, say in April? 
A: Yes. 
Q: Of two thousald seven? 
A: Yes, I believe so. 
Q: Were you charged with a D-U-I? 
A: Yes. 
Q: And malicious destruction of property? 
A: I do not believe malicious destruction of property. I don't-- 
as charged with that. 
: Were you driving an A-T-V? 
How much had you had to drink that night? 
S. EVANS: Again, Your Honor, I'm going to object. I don't believe that's 
relevant to what-what happened in April of 0 seven is relevant to what 
happened in February of 0 seven. 
TI-IE COURT: Yeah, I'm not sure that-- I think we are going a bit astray. 
MR. JUDGE: Your FIonor, it's relevant to uh-to show some uh possible 
motivation for trying to deflect uli responsibility-forhis own con&wt-~Mhe-night------.- 
in question. 
THE COURT: I'm going to sustain the objection. 
Tr. p. 58,l. 22 - p. 60, line 1 1. 
Evidence of Mr. Hoidal failing to be forthright about his drinking is hinted at 
elsewhere during the preliminary hearing. 
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i i 
Q: . . . on the night we're talking about, February sixteenth, . . . you crashed into 
another f o u  wlieeler uh near ihe cattle guard on Flat Creek Road? 
A: The four wheeler crashed into me. 
Q: Okay. Who was driving that four wlieeler? 
A: Dallas Hash. 
Q: Who?. 
A: Dallas Hash. 




Q: All under age? 
A: Ulun, a few of them were, yes. 
Q: And-and uh lnany of them had beell drinking as well, is that right? 
A: Yes. 
Q: And there was-- there was alcohol uh on the txip too, correct? 
A: Yes. 
Q: Did you tell Officer Vietmeier that? 
A: No. I did not. He never asked. 
Q: Officer Vietmeier never asked you if there was drinking uh involved tliat 
night? 
A: Yes. 
Q: That's correct? 
A: Yeah. 
.atp.60,1.17-p.61,1.19. 
As in Davis, defense counsel was unable to make a record from which to argue 
why Mr. Hoidal migbt have been biased or otherwise lacked that degree of impartiality 
expected of a witness at trial, including his perception of obtaining favorable treatment 
for not being prosecuted as a minor possessing alcohol on February 16,2007, or to 
obtaining a more favorable resolution of the April 2007 D.U.I. charge. I-Iad counsel been 
allowed. to pursue this line of inquiry, "[s]erious damage to the strength of the State's 
case would have been a real possibility." Davis, 415 U.S. at 3 19. 
As in ~ a v i s ;  Mr. Mantz was ilnproperly denied "the right of effective cross- 
examination which would be constitutional error of tile first magnitude." Id. at 31 8. This 
denial of the opportunity to cross-examine at the preliminary hearing, therefore, has 
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direct bearing on whether the banscript may be introduced at trial. To allow such an 
introduction under the circumstances of this case would not only violate Rule 804(b)(l), 
but would violate Mr. Mantz's confrontation rights under.tlle federal and state 
constitutions. 
The constitutionally improper denial of a defendant's opportunity to impeach a 
witness for bias, like other Confrontation Clause errors, is subject to Chapman v. 
Calvornia, 386 U.S. 18 (1967), h'urxless-error analysis. Olden v. Kentucky, 488 U.S. 
227, (1988); Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673,684 (1986); State v. Green, 136 
Idaho 553 (Ct. App. 2001). The Chapman analysis depends upon a host of factors, all 
readily accessible to reviewing courts. Van Arsdall at 684. These include: (1) the 
ortance of the witness's testimony in the prosecution's case, (2) whether the 
imony was cumulative, (3) tile presence or absence of evidence corroborating or 
imony of the witness on material points, (4) the extent of cross 
se permitted, and, of course, (4) the overall strength ofthe 
prosecution's case. See id. "The correct inquiry is whether, assuming that the damaging 
potential of the cross-examination were fully realized, a reviewing court inight 
nonetheless say that the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt." Id. In that case, 
the Court found that, because the trial court cut off all questioning into possible witness 
bias, based upon an event that even ihe State admitted and a jury might reasonably have 
found funished the witness a motive for favoring the prosecution in his testimony, the 
court's ruling violated rights secured by h e  Conhontation Clause. Id. at 679. 
Applying the Erst Chapman factor to this case, Mr. Hoidal's testimony is not only 
important-it is crucial to the prosecution's case because Mr. Hoidal was "the only 
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person who could testify" to tlle alleged actions of Mr. Mantz. State's Memorand~un at 6 
Indeed, the State argues that without Mr. I-Ioidal's testimony, the State's case will be 
eviscerated. See id. at 3. However, under the Chapman harmless-error ailalysis, whether 
or not the Stale's case will be eviscerated is actually an important factor that favors the 
conclusion that a fundamental error of admitting such hearsay would not be harmless to 
Mr. Mantz. See, e.g., U S  v. Richard, 2007 U.S. App. LEXIS 23930,4-21 (9th Cir. 
The second Chapman factor, whether the testimony was cumulative, also favors 
excluding the limited preliminary hcaring testimony. The line o F inquiry Mr. Mantz's 
counsel sought to pursue was not cumulative. Thus, tile fundament 
transcript iestimony would not be hannless error. 
third Chapman factor, there is an absence of 
idal's claims. There was no gunpowder residue on Mr. Hoidal's cap, 
clear link with any revolver owned by Mr. Mantz, also supporting 
the conclusion the introduction of Mr. I-Ioidal's testimony would n0.t be harmless. 
Regarding the fourth Chapman factor, the extent of cross-examination otherwise 
permitted, Mr. Mantz's preliminary hearing was extraordinary in its scope because it 
combined preliminary hearings for two separate cases, resultillg in multiple issues to 
address and witnesses to examine. The time pressure on defense counsel to limit cross- 
examination was real due to explicit comments on the record regarding backed-up 
preliminary hearings on the court calendar that conflicted with Mr. Mantz's preliminary 
hearing. The court interrupted defense counsel's cross-examination of Mr. Roidal two 
times to tell waiting attorneys that the preliminary hearings were baclted up and to 
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suggest when they might return to couit. ARer tlie second interruption, Mr. Mantz's - 
defense counsel volunteered that he would. like to reserve the opportunity to recall Mr. 
lioidal a id  would not be opposed to continuing the hearing until another time when the 
calendar was not quite so congested. The court thanked defense counsel, but did not 
continue the hearing. See Prelim. I-Irg. Tr., p. 71,l. 1 - p. 72,l. 4. and p. 75,l. 25 - p. 76, 
1. 1 - 13. The extent of cross-examination otlienvise permitted is at least questionable, if 
not obviously limited by the external court pressures, and adds more weight to support 
the conclusion that, "assuming the damaging potential of the cross-examination were 
fully realized," Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. at 684, the f~~ndainental error of introducing 
State has no physical evidence and no eyewitnesses, and the State's crucial witness has 
motivcs to deflect attention horn himself and curry favor with the State by fabricating, 
exaggerating, or embellishing what actually transpired. The State's case is weak because 
it is based almost exclusively on the testimony of an unavailable witness with motives to 
favor t l~e  prosecution. 
All five Chapman factors support the exclusion at trial of Mr. Hoidal's hearsay 
testimony. To introduce such testimoizy would constitute fundamental error under a 
Conhontation Clause analysis and would not be considered harmless. Tlie limitations 
placed on Mr. FIoidal's cross-examination put a strait jacket on MI. Mantz's 
confrontation rights. Mr. Hoidal's preliminary hearing testimony should be excluded. 
BRIEF IN OPPOSITION TO STATE'S MOTIONS IN LIMINE - 17 
Just as at the preliminary hearing, the State through its motion in limine seelcs to 
prevent Mr. Maiitz from exploring the issues surrounding Mr. Hoidal's D.U.I. in April 
2007. The State has refused to provide the reports related to this incident despite Mr. 
Mantz's argument that those materials may contain exculpatory evidence. Mr. Mantz 
will be filing a motion to compel that discovery. 
Based on the probable cause affidavit filed by Deputy Travis Catt in State v. 
Hoidal, Latah County Case Nuniber CR-07-1455, we lcnow that Mr. Hoidal had a breath- 
alcohol concentration level of approximately .18, that he was operating his A.T.V. at the 
lime, a ~ d  that he lied to the officer about how much he had lo drink ("nothing"). We also 
ow from ICarl. Hoidal himself that he had a revolver with him at the time. (Tr., p..66,1. 
- 13.) And we Icnow that the Latall County Prosecutor's Office prosecuted the case, 
at is was resolved a mere six days before Mr. Hoidal's preliminary testimony, and that 
the case was resolved favorably for Mr. Hoidal. For example, Mr. EIoidal could have 
been prosecuted for an underage D.U.I. and had his driving privileges suspended for one 
year. Instead, the Stale agreed to allow only the 90-day administrative license suspension 
to stand as Mr. Hoidal's only suspension in that case. And why wasn't the possession of 
the revolver prosecuted? 
As set forth above, there is no question that these circumstances raised critical 
questions about Mr. Hoidal's credibility, his bias, his motivation to favor the prosecution, 
and Iris truthfulness. Mr. Mantz should be allowed con~plete access to this potentially 
exculpatory evidence and, if necessary, oxplore these issues at trial. 
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III. CONCLUSION 
Because Mr. Mantz's cross-examination of Karl Boidd was unfairly restricted at 
the preli~ninary hearing, h e  lequiremellts of Rule 804(b)(l) 1.R E., Idaho Code 5 9-336, 
and Mr. Mantz's confrontation rights under the 6" Amendment and Article I, 5 13 have 
not been satisfied, and therefore, the preliminary hearing transcript of Karl Hoidal's 
testimony should not be admitted. Issues surroundiiig Mr. Hoidal's April 2007 D.U.I. 
and its resolution bear directly on Mr. Hoidal's credibility. Now, there is no way to go 
back and explore those issues with Mr. l3oidal. The State's motions in limine should be 
denied. 
DATED this 24th day of October 2007. 
LANDECK, WESTBERG, JUDGE & GRAHAM, P.A. 
@, WESTBERG, JUDGE & GRAHAM, P A .  
By: 
Attorneys for Defendant 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certi@ that on this 24" day of October 2007, I caused a true and correct 
copy of this document to be served on the following in the manner indicated: 
MICHELLE M. EVANS [ ]U.S.Mail 
DEPUTY PROSECUTING ATTORNEY [ ] Ovenlight Mail 
LATAll COUNTY PROSECUTOR'S OFFICE [ IFAX 
LATAH COUNTY COURTHOUSE [ X ] Hand Delivery 
P.O. BOX 8068 
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CLERK qi: C;ISIFI!C~',C~~!IFIT 
JOHN C. JUDGE 
. . @ E T Y  
LANDECK, WESTBERG, JUDGE & GRAHAM, p.4. RY.-_.. -~.DEP\JTi' 
414 S. Jefferson 
P.O. Box 9344 
Moscow, ID 83843 
(208) 883-1505 
FAX: (208) 883-4593 
Idaho State Bar Number 3288 
Attorneys for Defendant 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF TEXE SECOND JUDICLAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF LATAH 
STATE OF IDAHO, 
) Case No. CR-2007-0001292 
Plaintiff, ) 
) DEFENDANT'S MOTIONS IN LIMJX? 
v. ) 
) 





Defendant Tim C. Mantz ("Mr. Mantz"), through his attorneys, Laildeck, 
Westberg, Judge & Graham, P.A., hereby moves in limine for the following orders 
prohibiting evidence to be admitted: 
1. Prohibiting the admission of Karl Hoidal's preliminary hearing testimony or 
any other hearsay from Karl Hoidal on the grounds that such testimony would violate Mr. 
Mantz's confrontation rights under Art. I, 5 13 of the Idaho Constitution and the 6" 
DEFENDANT'S M0T.IONS IN LIMJNE--1 
Amendment of the U.S. Constitution and would violate the requirements of Rule 
804(l)(b) I.R.E. and Idaho Code 5 9-336; 
2. Prohibiting the State from offering any evidence or testimony regarding the 
pistol that was allegedly found in Mr. Mantz's truck on March 30,2007, on the grounds 
of relevance under Rules 401,402, and 403 LR.E.; 
3. Prohibiting the State from offering any evidence or testimony regarding any 
rnethamphetamil~e, pipes, marijuana andlor any drug paraphernalia allegedly found in 
Mr. Mantz's truck on March 30,2007, on the grounds of relevance under Rules 401,402, 
and 403 I.R.E.; 
4. Prohibiting the State from offering any evidence or testimony regarding 
firearns allegedly found at the Mantz home during the search on March 30-3 1,2007, on 
the grounds of relevance under Rules 401,402, and 403 I.R.E.; 
5. Prohibiting the State from offering any evidence or testimony regarding 
marijuana allegedly found at the Mantz home during the search on March 30-31,2007, 
on the grounds of relevance under Rules 401,402,.and 403 I.R.E.; 
6 .  Prohibiting the State tiom offering any evidence or testimony regarding any 
prior bad acts of Mr. Mantz under Rule 404(b) I.R.E.; 
7. Prohibiting the State fro~n offering any evidence or testimony of Karl Roidal's 
death on the grounds of relevance under Rules 401,402, and 403 I.R.E. 
DATED this ~ 4 ' ~  day of 0ctober 2007. 
LANDECK, WESTBERG, JUDGE & GRAHAM, P.A. -
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that OD this 24& day of October 2007, I caused a true and correct 
copy oflhis document to be served on the following in the manner indicated: 
MICHELLE M. EVANS [ ] U.S. Mail 
DEPUTY PROSECUTING ATTORNEY [ ] Overnight Mail 
LATAH COUNTY PROSECUTOR'S OFFICE [ I F M  
LATAFI COUNTY COURTHOUSE [ X 1 Hand Delivery 
P.O. BOX 8068 
MOSCOW, ID 83843 
DEFENDANT'S MOTIONS IN LIMINB--3 
2~5706T 24 PI4 &: tr6 
JOHN C. JUDGE (ISB 3288) 
LANDECK, WESTBERG, JUDGE & GRAHAM, P.A. 
414 S. Jefferson 
P.O. Box 9344 
Moscow, ID 83843 
(208) 883-1505 
FAX: (208) 883-4593 
Attorneys for Defendant 
JN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF LATAE-I 
STATE OF IDAHO, 
) Case No. CR-2007-0001292 
Plaintiff, j 
) NOTICE OF WEARING 
v. 
1 
TIM C. MANTZ, 1 
Defendant. 1 
Defendant Tim C. Mantz, through his attorneys, Landeck, Westberg, Judge & 
Graham, P.A., hereby schedules for hearing his Motions in Limine on Monday, October 
29,2007, at 4:30 p.m., or as soon thereafter as counsel may be heard, before the 
Honorable Jolul R. Stegner in the designated courtroom at the Lat& County Courthouse, 
Moscow, Idaho. 
DATED this 24th day of October 2007. 
LANDECK, WESTBERG, JUDGE & GRAHAM, P.A. 
NOTICE OF HEARING - 1 
CERTIFICATEOF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on this 24" day of October 2007, I caused a true and correct 
copy of lhis document to be served on the following in the manner indicated: 
MICHELLE M. EVANS [ ] U.S. Mail 
DEPUTY PROSECUTING ATTORNEY [ ] Overnight Mail 
LATAH COUNTY PROSECUTOR'S OFFICE C IFAX 
LATAH COUNTY COURTI3OUSE [ X ] Hand Delivery 
P.O. BOX 8068 
MOSCOW, ID 83843 
0308 
NOTICE OF HEARING - 2 
LATAH COUNTY PROSrxfuTOR'S OFPXCE 
MfCHELLlE N FiVANS 
DEPUTY PROs6CUTWG ATTORNEY 
tatah County Courthouse 
P.0. Box 8068 
M06cow, Idaho 
Phone: 21014SW 
1% No. 4YP5 
IN TEE QlSTRICT COURT OF TME SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
) 
) Case No. CR-2007-0001292 
) Case No. CR-2007-0001320 
V. 1 
) SCIPUEATIQN K J  CONTINUE 
n M  CARE MAWE. 1 
oJmslnr 
COW NOW thestate of Idaho and the above named defendant, by and t m g h  
thejr respestive attorneye of record, and hereby stipulate to the: mtry of an ordm hkein 
~acatin~the p r ~ ~  eonference/rn~tl~n i  l.iminehetiring c u ~ x c m t l ~  sc1,cduled for 0ctobr 
29,2037, and resetting the same for November 1,Z@J7, at 200 p.m. 
&&I L&dY of ~CtOber, 2007. 
m c 6 u h  J'Kc 
Michelle M Evans 
aaputy Pcoeecuting Attorney 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF LATAI-I 
STATE OF IDAHO, 
Plaintiff, 
TIM CARL MANTZ, 
Defendant. 
Case No. CR-2007-0001292 
Case No. CR-2007-0001320 
ORDER CONTINUING 
The above matter having come before the court upon stipulation of the parties 
and good cause appearing; 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the pre-trial conference/motion in limine hearing 
currently scheduled for October 29, 2007, be and the same hereby is rescheduled to 
November 1,2007, at 200 p.m. 
f h  
DATED this -30 day of October, 2007, /\ Mn C ("-0 
/ 
b,c. hj 
0- - 2 4  ~ Q Q T ,  Q f + q L  - 
\ 
Johd R. Stegner 
District Judge 
ORDER CONTINUING: Page -1- 
CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY 
X hereby certify that true and correct copies of the ORDER CONTINUING were 
served on the following in the manner indicated below: 
John C. Judge 
Attorney at Law 
P.O. Box 9344 
Moscow, ID 83843 
U.S. Mail b vernight Mail 
I I Fax 
[ I  Hand Delivery 
William W. Thompson, Jr. [ I  U.S. Mail 
Prosecuting Attorney [ I  Overnight Mail 
Latah County Courthouse 
Moscow, ID 83843 qG:nd Delivery 
Dated this ZJ] day of October, 2007. 
ORDER CONTINUING: Page -2- 
p i z y  i-:;: fi;<!'-q:!:-:- ?(-,Li:.: 
w !  ' ! z'r;:y{ e-(Ji.y<'; \{ 
JOHN C. JUDGE (ISB '3288) FV , a  CjEPUi'f 
GRETCHEN G. STEWART (ISB 721 1) 
LANDECIC, WESTBERG, SUDGE & GRAHAM, P.A. 
414 S. Jefferson 
P.O. Box 9344 
Moscow, ID 83843 
(208) 883-1505 
FAX: (208) 883-4593 
Attorneys for Defendant 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, WAND FOR THE COUNTY OF LATAH 
STATE OF IDAHO, ) 
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) AND NOTICE OF I.R.E. 404fb) EVIDENCE 
TIM C. MANTZ, 1 
1 
Defendant. ) 
Defendant Tiin C. Mmtz ("'Mr. Mantz"), througll his attorneys, Landeck, 
Westberg, Judge & Graham, P.A., hereby submits this Brief in Oppositioil to State's 
Motion in Limine and Notice of I.R.E. 404(b) Evidence. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The State seeks admission of testimony and evidence that Mr. Mantz has, oil at 
least five previous occasions, "threatened people, usually on or near his property, and 
usually with a handgun," State's Motion in Limine at 1, and implicitly aclcnowledges 
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that such evidence is not admissible to prove Mr. Mantz's character in order to show he 
acted in conformity with his character. See id. The State asserts in a shotgun fashion 
that such evidence is relevant to slmow one of the other purposes listed in I.R.E. 40407) 
under which a court may allow evidence of prior bad acts, but the State does not offer any 
authority or analysis to support this assertion, nor tell the Court which evidence is 
relevant to which purpose(s) and why. Based on Idaho and federal law, any evidence 01 
those previous alleged incidents is inadmissible because it is irrelevant character and 
propensity evidence and not relevant to any of the I.R.E. 40407) exceptions. Furthermore, 
even if the court were to find any of the prior alleged acts relevant to one of the other 
purposes, the probative value of the evidence would be far outweighed by the unfair 
prejudice to Mr. Mantz, requiring the court to exclude the evidence under I.R.E. 403. 
Finally, to allow such evidence would require at least five additional trials within the trial 
and would require another continuance of the trial. 
11. ARGUMENT 
The recent case of State v. Cook, 2007 Ida. App. LEXIS 94 (Idaho Ct. App. 
2007), reaffirms the Idaho courts' longstanding prohibition against propensity evidence. 
In that case, Coolc supplied two minors with nmethamphetamine more than one year prior 
to the incidents with which he was currently charged, and the lower court had indicated 
its belief that their testimony was relevant to motive, plan, and intent. Id. at 8. However, 
the Court of Appeals disagreed completely and found "no merit in the rationales used to 
justify admission" of the testimony. Id. at 9. 
If the evidence of Cook's unrelated drug deliveries were admissible here 
on the theories that have been advanced, the restrictions of Rule 404(b) 
would be virtually eviscerated. Given that there exists no permissible 
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purpose for which the evidence was relevant, we conclude the district 
court committed error by allowing the state to present the testimony of 
[witnesses] describing the 2003 incident. 
Coolc at 13-14. Because the court concluded the evidence was illadmissible under Rule 
404(b), it did not need to reach the issue of whether the probative value of the evidence 
was substantially outweighed by unfair prejudice under I.R.E. 403 "as that rule only 
applies to relevant evidence." Id. at 14, n. 3 (emphasis in original). 
Long before Cook, the Idaho Cout of Appeals had outlined in detail the rationale 
for excluding propensity evidence: 
Tlle policy expressed in Rule 404, precluding use of character evidence or 
other misconduct evidence to suggest that the defendant must have acted 
consistently with those past acts or traits, is a long-standing element of 
American law. It is part of our jurisprudential tradition that an accused 
may be convicted based only upon proof that he committed the crime with 
which he is charged-not based upon poor character or uncharged sins of 
the past. The rule against use of other misconduct etidence to suggest that 
the defendant had a propensity to commit crimes of the type charged 
recognizes that such evidence may have a too-powerful influence on the 
jurors, and may lead them to determine guilt based upon either a surmise 
that if the defendant did it before, he must have done it this time, or a 
belief that it matters little whether the defendaxt committed the charged 
crime because he deserves to, be punished in any event for other 
transgressi0.n~. 
'The prejudicial effect of such testimony is that it induces the jury to 
believe the accused is more likely to have committed the crime on trial 
because he is a man of criminal character. It, therefore, takes the jury 
away from their primary consideration of the guilt or innocence of the 
particular crime on trial.' 
State v. Wood, 126 Ida110 241, 244-45 (Ct. App. 1994)(intemal citations omitted). 
In order to determine the admissibility of evidence over an I.R.E. 404(b) 
objection, the court must engage in a two-tiered analysis. See State v. Moore, 120 Idaho 
743, 745 (1991). First, the evidence must be relevant to a material and disputed issue 
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concerning the crime charged. Id. Second, the court must determine whether the 
probative value of the evidence is outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice to the 
defendant. Id. The court must also recognize the special rules that allow evidence of 
similar acts of sexual misconduct by a defendant against another witness with the rules 
that prohibit introduction of propensity evidcnce in other crimes. See, e.g., State v. 
Wood, 126 Idaho at 246-47. 
In Wood, the court compared cases involving sexual abuse of children that present 
special proof problems to the case of Mr. Wood, a defendant who may have been a quick- 
tempered or violent person. Id. (internal citatioils omitted). The court understood the 
decisions in Moore and Tolman to be limited in their application to sexual abuse cases 
where other similar incidents of sexual rnisconduct by the defendant with the same or , 
similar victims tended to corroborate a child victim's version of the charged incident. Id. 
at 247. However, the charge in Wood was not one of sexual abuse, nor were any of the 
State's witnesses a chiid. Id. Furthermore, the court found that a sudden fit of temper is 
inconsistent with any arguinent that the crime was the culmination of a plan somehow 
evidenced by a prior incident. Id. Furthermore, the "evide~ice may have led the jury to a 
guilty verdict based upon an impermissible inference that Wood had a propensity to 
violence, rather than upon the evidence as to his guilt or innocence of the crime charged." 
Id. at 250. 
"Whether evidence is unfairly prejudicial within the meaning of Rule 403 relates 
to its tendency to generate hostility or a presumption of guilt in the minds of the jury, or 
to cause the jury to infer that the defendant is a bad person deserving of punishment in 
any event." State v. Nichols, 124 Idaho 651,656 (Ct. App. 1993). In Mi-. Mantz's case, 
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if the evidence is admitted, it certainly would unfairly prejudice Mr. Mantz by its 
tendency to generate hostility or a presumption of guilt or an inference that he is a bad 
person deserving of punishment. In addition, each of the prior incidents, if admitted, 
would require a trial within the trial, multiple witnesses, and would place undue focus on 
propensity evidence, taking the focus away from the charged conduct. Jil addition, the 
notice the State gave on October 24, 2007, a little more than a month before trial, of its 
intent to use events from twenty and twenty-one years ago, allegations that will require 
extensive discovery and investigation, can in no way be called "reasonable" as required 
by I.R.E. 404(b). 
The Idaho courts have found propensity evidence in general to be dangerous and 
have lcept out evidence that could lead the jury to believe the defendant had apropensity 
to commit sexual abuse, to sell drugs, to rob a bank, or to be violent and thus should be 
found guilty regarding the currently charged offense. See, e.g., State v. Thompson, 132 
Idaho 628,636 (1999); State v. Feunandez, 124 Idaho 381,384 (1993); State v. Bursard, 
114 Ida110 781 (Ct. App. 1988). As Justice Bm~lett wrote in Bussard, the potential for 
unfair prejudice was "clearly manifest," id. at 786, because the evidence of uncharged 
crimes tended to poitray the defendants as common house burglars, predisposed to 
commit crimes like those charged. Id. 
The possibility of prejudice against a defendant "resulting from evidence or 
lmowledge of prior crimes outweighs any policy argument regarding the complicatioil of 
trial proceedings." State v. Wiggins, 96 Idaho 766 (1975). 
It seems too plain for argument that to place before a jury the charge in an 
indictment, and to offer evidence on trial as a part of the state's case that 
the defendant has previously been coilvicted of one or inore offenses is to 
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m a great rislc of creating a prejudice in the minds of the jury that no 
instruction of the court can wholly erase. 
Id. at 768 (internal citatio~ls omitted). 
Additionally, case law and statutes set out special strict procedural safeguards, 
such as the Johnson/Wiggins bifurcated procedure to prevent unfair prejudice to a 
criminal defendant charged under the persistent violator statute. See, e.g., State v. Roy, 
127 Idaho 228 (1995); State v. Wiggins, 96 Idaho 766 (1975); State v. Johnson, 86 Idaho 
51 (1963). In a DUI trial where the charge has been enhanced to a felony because the 
defendant is a repeat offender, special measures are outlined to prevent the jury from 
becoming biased due to the prior convictions. See Roy, 127 Idaho at 230-31. In that 
case, the procedural safeguards designed to alleviate the problem of unfair prejudice were 
compromised by use of the words "felony" and "felonious" in jury instructions, creating 
error because 'tan astute juror might recognize that the defendant must have at least two 
prior DUI convictions." Id. at 231. Use of those words defeated the purpose of 
bifurcation of the trial and defeated, as well, the purpose of preparing the information in 
two pats  to avoiding info~ming the jury of prior DUI convictions. See id. at 230-31. 
These procedural safeguards highlight the importance of preventing unfair prejudice to 
Mr. Mantz by excludi~lg evidence of prior crimes, wrongs, or acts. 
A. Motive 
In Wood, the prosecutor openly acknowledged that the purpose in offering a 
wit~~ess's testimony about Wood's temper was to show Wood's propensity for violence. 
Wood, 126 Idaho at 245. The prosecutor also made an effort to fit the evidence within 
some of the permissible purposes reference in I.R.E. 404@), but the court found the 
rationales unpersuasive. Id. First, the prosecutor suggested the evidence would be 
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relevant to show motive, but the court found that neither a bad temper nor a prior incident 
of violence against the child's mother logically suggested any motive to harm the child. 
Id. at 245-46. "While an explosive temper could be a cause of a violent act, it does not 
constitute a motive." Id. at 246. As in Wood, the court should find that prior co~lvictions 
from twenty or more years ago, and the other thee alleged incidents in which it is alleged 
of threatening or chasing does not constitute a motive. 
In the recent case of State v. Coolc, 2007 Ida. App. LEXIS 94 (Idaho Ct. App. 
2007), the district court referenced the evidence as being relevant to motive, but the Court 
of Appeals "fail[ed] to see how this is so," id. at 10-1 1, when the State introduced, and 
the court allowed, evidence that Cook had supplied two minors with methamphetamine 
more than one year prior to the incidents with which lie was currently charged. Id. The 
Cook court cited to its discussion in State v. Stoddard, 105 Idaho 533,537,670 P.2d 
1318, 1322 (Ct. App. 1983), noting that motive is not an element of larceny, the crime of 
which the defendant was charged, nor had Stoddard's not-guilty plea, or any other action 
in the case, raised the issue. Cook at 11. Why Cook committed the alleged acts was not a 
material issue. Id. Likewise, as in Cook and Stoddard, motive is not an element of 
aggravated assault, and any prior act evidence should be excluded. 
B. Opportunity 
Evidence may also be a&~iissible to show opportunity to commit the act charged. 
Ln State v. Anderson, 129 Idaho 763,766 (1997), acts all occurring at times other than the 
day of the injury were offered to demonstrate that [a person] "had the opportunity and 
tliat her tendencies fit that profile of an abuser." This offer of proof was rejected by the 
trial court, and admission of the evidence under Rule 404 "would have had no probative 
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value as to 'opportnnity' and therefore was not relevant." Andeuson, 129 Idaho at 766. 
Similarly, in this case, evidence related to tlie incidents the State desires to introduce 
would have no probative value as to "opportunity" because the acts all occurred at other 
tiines and are, therefore, not relevant. Opportnnity is not at issue in Mr. Mantz's case 
C. Intent 
The prosecutor in Wood also argued that the proffered testimony would show 
intent. Wood, 126 Idaho at 246. The logical relevant of such evidence generally is 
dependent upon proof that the charged and uncharged acts were similar, involved the 
sane or similar victims, and that the uncharged act involved the same state of mind that 
constitules the mens rea element of the charged crime. Id. In Wood, the court found 
insufficient silnilarity to provide logical relevance on the issue of intent between the 
occurrences as closely-related as "an unprovoked blow" and pushing someone against the 
wall with hands on the throat during the course of an argument and mutual shoving 
match. Id. 
In the recent case of Cook, mentioned above, Cook was charged with delivery of 
methamphetamine to two minors. Cook, 2007 Ida. App. LEXIS 94 at 2-3. However, the 
Court found no merit in the intent rationale, which the trial court used to justify 
admission of two minors' testimony regarding Cook's delivery of methamphetamine 
more than one year prior to the incidents with which he was currently charged. Id. at 9. 
Intent was not genuinely at issue. Id. The court discussed at length its decision in 
Stoddavd, in which the question was whether Rule 404(b) evidence that the defendant had 
previously stolen a vehicle was admissible to prove intent in a case where he had been 
charged with stealing a different automobile. Cook, 2007 Ida. App. LEXIS 94 at 9. "In 
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holding the evidence inadmissible for this purpose, we noted it was the type of case 
where the act charged against the defendant itself characterizes the offeiise; thus, guilty 
intent was proven by proving the act, and evidence of other crimes was not necessary or 
admissible to establish the accused's intent." Id. On this point, the court also cited State 
v. Roach, 109 Idaho 973,974-75 (Ct. App. 1985), and State v. Alsanea, 138 Idaho 733, 
740 (Ct. App. 2003). Cook at 10. 
Ln Alsanea, prior bad acts were not sufficiently similar, and, even if' they were, 
proof of the act of the charged crime carries "the evident implication of a criminal intent, 
[aid] evidence of the perpetration of other like offenses or bad acts will not be admitted." 
Alsanea at 740 (citing Stoddard, 105 Idaho at 537). 
As in the cases discussed above, the court should find intent is not a permissible 
purpose for the evidence the State seeks to introduce. 
D. Preparation 
In State v. Nichols, 124 Idaho 651 (Ct. App. 1993), on a motion in liinine, the 
prosecutor argued inter alia, that the evidence of a robbery was relevant to show 
"common scheme or plan, lack of mistake . . ., preparation and plan, as to the makeup 
that [the defendant] used and admitted using in both the robberies." Id. at 655. However, 
the court found that essentially "the state's point was that the evidence was relevant to the 
identicy issue," id., and the court did not in any way approve of "tl~e imprecise 
invocation" of a purpose for introducing evidence where the purpose was "not an 
element ofthe crime charged nor relevant to any issue in dispute." Id. at 11.3. As in 
Nichols, the court should find that tile state does not have evidence relevant to 
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preparation for the alleged crime, but that it seeks to admit propensity evidence disguised 
in an ""imprecise invocalion" of all the Rule 404(b) exceptions. 
E. Plan 
"The scope of this exception is not well deiined, and it tends to overlap the intent 
and identity exccptions." Stale v. Roach, 109 Idaho 973,975 (Ct. App. 1985). However, 
"we do not in any way approve the imprecise invocation of 'plan or scheme' where the 
existence of a 'plan' is not an element of the crime charged nor relev'ant to any issue in 
dispute." Nichols, 124 Idaho at 655. '"The Idaho cases formulate the exception as 
allowing other crime evidence to prove a common scheme or plan embracing the 
connnission of two or more crimes so related to each other that proof of one tends to 
prove the other." Roach at 975. The court found that a sexual act with the mother did 
not have any tendency to prove later lewd conduct with the son. Id. at 975-76. 
In Bussavd, the defendants sought to exclude all evidence pertaining to various 
burglaries committed prior to the charged burglaries. Bussavd, 114 Idaho at 784. The 
trial judge admitted testimony regarding uncharged crimes and physical evidence of those 
crimes on the theory of a "common scheme or plan." Id. at 785. The State argued that 
the judge's ruling was witbill lus broad discretion to admit evidence, but Justice Burnett 
countered that "the law of evidence is not merely a collection of discretionary guidelines. 
It is a body orrules. Discretion is properly exercised oi~ly when a rule calls for it, and it 
must be exercised consistently with the tenor of the rules." Id. (internal citation omitted). 
The court found that the testimony and physical evidence were relevant only if they 
genuinely tended to show a "plan" integrating the charged and uncharged crimes and if 
such aplan was itself relevant to a material issue in the case. Id. Because the prior 
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burglaries and the crimes charged were not shown to be progressive stages of a single 
plan forrned in the minds of the defendants, but rather each was self-contained and not a 
step toward the others, the court declined to hold that a desire for money is a unifylng 
"plan" within the meaning of Rule 404(b). Id. at 785-86. As in Bussavd, there is no 
"plan" in this case to unify the charged and uncharged conduct within the meaning of 
Rule 404(b). 
P. Knowledge 
I.R.E. 404(b) allows evidence of other acts if admitted for the purpose of showing 
knowledge or consciousness of guilt. State v. Sheahan, 139 Idaho 267,279 (2003). 
There, the court allowed evidence that Sheahan removed bags placed on his hands by law 
enforcement because an inference could be drawn &om the incident that Sheahan was 
trying to destroy evidence and had lu~o'wledge of his guilt. Id. h Mr. Mantz's case, none 
of the evidence that the State wishes to introduce is relevant to show knowledge of guilt 
ofthe crime for which he is charged. 
G. Identity 
Again, in Wood, the prosecutor argued that the testimony was relevant to the 
question of Wood's identity as the perpetrator of the crime. Wood, 126 Idaho at 246. 
However, the "prosecutor's rationale---that becausc Wood allegedly had a propensity to 
violence, he must have acted in accordance with that propensity in this case-is precisely 
the course of logic condemned and the type of propensity evidence prohibited by I.R.E. 
404." Id. Because identity is not at issue in this case, the State should not be allowed to 
use this condemned rationale to justify the admission of propensity evidence. 
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8. Absence of Mistake or Accident 
Absence of mistake or accident is not at issue. This puvpose is associated with 
intent and often with fiaud. See, e.g., State v. McAbee, 130 Idaho 517 (Ct. App. 1997). 
Whether Mr. Mantz committed the alleged acts inadvertently is not a material issue. 
Therefore, none of the evidence that the State wishes to introduce is relevant to show 
absence of mistake or accident. 
111. CONCLUSION 
Because the State cannot show how evidence that Mr. Mantz allegedly made 
previous threats on or near his property are relevant for any other purpose other than to 
prove that Mr. Mantz acted in conformity with those alleged acts, this propensity 
evidence is irrelevant and should not be admitted. The State cannot circumvent the 
inadmissibility of its proffered propensity evidencc simply by claiming that such 
evidence is relevant to show all the exceptions listed in Rule 404(b). The State's motions 
in limiiie should be denied. 
DATED this 3 1st day of October 2007. 
LANDECK, WESTBERG, JUDGE & GRAHAM, P.A. 
By: 
Attorneys for Defendant 
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1 Michelle Evans, Deputy Prosecutor 
TIM CARL M N T Z ,  ? Appearing on behalf of the State 
/ 
Defendant. ) . Defendant present with counsel, 
)' John C. Judge, Moscow, ID 
................................................................. 
Subject ofPuoceedings: Motion in Limine 
This being the time fixed pursuant to order of the Court for the hearing of the State's 
Motion in Liinine in this case, Court noted the presence of counsel and the defendant. 
Ms. Evans argued in support of that portion of the State's Motion in Limine wherein 
it seeks an order of the Court allowing the State to present the preliminary hearing 
testimony of the victim of this offense at the trial of this case, since the victim is now 
deceased. Mr. Judge argued in opposition to the motion. No rebuttal argument. For 
reasons articulated on the record, Court granted the State's motion to allow the 
preliminary hearing testimony of Mr. Hoidal at trial. 
Ms. Evans argued in support of that portion of the State's Motion in Limine wherein 
it seeks a n  order of the Court prohibiting the defendant from offering any testimony or 
other evidence regarding Karl Hoidal's April 8,2007, Driving Under the Influence charge. 
Mr. Judge argued in opposition to the motion. Ms. Evans argued in rebuttal. Mr. Judge 
argued in surrebuttal. Court took the issue of whether Mr. Hoidal's April DUX is relevant 
under advisement. Court ruled that defense counsel is entitled to review reports from 
Hoidal's DUI arrest regarding whether Mr. Eloidal was in possession of a firearm. 
Ms. Evans argued in support of that portion of the State's Motion in Limine wherein 
it seeks an order of the Court allowing the State to present testimony or evidence at triaI 
regarding the firearm found in the defendant's pickup truclc and the firearms found in the 
search of his home. Mr. Judge argued in opposition to the motion. Ms. Evans argued in 
Terry Odenborg 
Deputy Clerk * 
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rebuttal. Court granted the State's motion to the extent that it would allow the State to 
present testimony or other evidence at trial regarding the semi automatic firearm found in 
the defendant's pickup at the time of arrest and any revolvers found ~JI his home at the 
time of the service of the search warrant. 
Ms. Evans argued in support of that portion of the State's Motion in Limine wherein 
it seeks an order of the Court allowing the State to present Rule 404 B evidence, evidence 
regarding defendant's prior bad acts, at trial. Mr. Judge argued in opposition to the 
motion. For reasons articulated on the motion, Court denied the State's motion to present 
testimony or other evidence regarding the defendant's prior bad acts at trial. 
Court granted d'efendant's moiion in limine to exclude evidence relating to the 
black bag found in the defendant's pickup and the marijuana found in the hoine. 
Mr. Judge argued in support of the defendant's motion in lknine to prohibit the 
State from informing the jury of I k l  Hoidal's subsequent death. Ms. Evans argued in 
opposition to the motion. Mr. Judge argued in rebuttal. Ms. Evans argued in surrebuttal. 
For reasons articulated on the record, Court denied the motion, suggesting that counsel 
come up with a stipulated statement to read to the jury regarding Karl Hoidal's death. 
Court informed counsel that it will draft an order reflecting today's rulings. 
Colloquy was had between Court and counsel regarding the method of 
presentation of the preliminary hearing testimony of Karl Hoidal. Court stated that the 
jury would listen to a redacted recording of Mr. Hoidal's preliminary hearing testimony 
and the jury would be provided with a written transcript to follow along. Court allowed 
Mr. Judge until November 16, 2007, to file any objections to how the preliminary hearing 
testimony has been redacted. 
Upon motion of the State, there being no objection from the defendant, Court 
extended the No Contact Order. 
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